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Claudiu's IPMI scripts from GSoC 2014
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104
scripts/ipmi-cipher-zero.nse
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104
scripts/ipmi-cipher-zero.nse
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local ipmi = require "ipmi"
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local nmap = require "nmap"
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local shortport = require "shortport"
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local stdnse = require "stdnse"
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local string = require "string"
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local vulns = require "vulns"
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description = [[
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IPMI 2.0 Cipher Zero Authentication Bypass Scanner. This module identifies IPMI 2.0
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compatible systems that are vulnerable to an authentication bypass vulnerability
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through the use of cipher zero.
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]]
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---
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-- @usage
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-- nmap -sU --script ipmi-cipher-zero -p 623 <host>
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--
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-- @output
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---PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
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-- 623/udp open|filtered unknown no-response
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-- | ipmi-cipher-zero:
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-- | VULNERABLE:
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-- | IPMI 2.0 RAKP Cipher Zero Authentication Bypass
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-- | State: VULNERABLE
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-- | Risk factor: High
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-- | Description:
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-- |
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-- | The issue is due to the vendor shipping their devices with the
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-- | cipher suite '0' (aka 'cipher zero') enabled. This allows a
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-- | remote attacker to authenticate to the IPMI interface using
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-- | an arbitrary password. The only information required is a valid
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-- | account, but most vendors ship with a default 'admin' account.
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-- | This would allow an attacker to have full control over the IPMI
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-- | functionality.
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-- |
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-- | References:
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-- | http://fish2.com/ipmi/cipherzero.html
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-- | http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/93039
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-- |_ http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/93040
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--
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author = "Claudiu Perta <claudiu.perta@gmail.com>"
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license = "Same as Nmap--See http://nmap.org/book/man-legal.html"
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categories = {"vuln", "safe"}
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portrule = shortport.port_or_service(623, "asf-rmcp", "udp", {"open", "open|filtered"})
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action = function(host, port)
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local vuln_table = {
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title = "IPMI 2.0 RAKP Cipher Zero Authentication Bypass",
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state = vulns.STATE.NOT_VULN,
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risk_factor = "High",
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description = [[
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The issue is due to the vendor shipping their devices with the
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cipher suite '0' (aka 'cipher zero') enabled. This allows a
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remote attacker to authenticate to the IPMI interface using
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an arbitrary password. The only information required is a valid
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account, but most vendors ship with a default 'admin' account.
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This would allow an attacker to have full control over the IPMI
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functionality
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]],
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references = {
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'http://fish2.com/ipmi/cipherzero.html',
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'http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/93040',
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'http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/93039',
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}
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}
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local report = vulns.Report:new(SCRIPT_NAME, host, port)
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local request = ipmi.session_open_cipher_zero_request()
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local socket = nmap.new_socket()
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socket:set_timeout(
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((host.times and host.times.timeout) or 8) * 1000)
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socket:connect(host, port, "udp")
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-- Send 3 probes
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local tries = 3
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repeat
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socket:send(request)
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tries = tries - 1
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until tries == 0
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local status, reply = socket:receive()
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socket:close()
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if not status then
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stdnse.debug1(string.format("No response (%s)", reply))
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return nil
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end
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nmap.set_port_state(host, port, "open")
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local info = ipmi.parse_open_session_reply(reply)
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if info["session_payload_type"] == ipmi.PAYLOADS["RMCPPLUSOPEN_REP"] then
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vuln_table.state = vulns.STATE.VULN
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end
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return report:make_output(vuln_table)
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end
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