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Update SVN version number to 5.51SVN so that it is above the current release number (5.50).
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docs/nmap.1
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docs/nmap.1
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
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'\" t
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.\" Title: nmap
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.\" Author: [see the "Author" section]
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.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.74.3 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
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.\" Date: 01/28/2011
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.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.75.2 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
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.\" Date: 01/29/2011
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.\" Manual: Nmap Reference Guide
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.\" Source: Nmap
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.\" Language: English
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.\"
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.TH "NMAP" "1" "01/28/2011" "Nmap" "Nmap Reference Guide"
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.TH "NMAP" "1" "01/29/2011" "Nmap" "Nmap Reference Guide"
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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.\" * set default formatting
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ This options summary is printed when Nmap is run with no arguments, and the late
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.RS 4
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.\}
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.nf
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Nmap 5\&.36TEST4 ( http://nmap\&.org )
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Nmap 5\&.51SVN ( http://nmap\&.org )
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Usage: nmap [Scan Type(s)] [Options] {target specification}
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TARGET SPECIFICATION:
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Can pass hostnames, IP addresses, networks, etc\&.
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@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ Tells Nmap what interface to send and receive packets on\&. Nmap should be able
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.PP
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\fB\-\-source\-port \fR\fB\fIportnumber\fR\fR\fB;\fR \fB\-g \fR\fB\fIportnumber\fR\fR (Spoof source port number) .\" --source-port .\" -g .\" source port number
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.RS 4
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One surprisingly common misconfiguration is to trust traffic based only on the source port number\&. It is easy to understand how this comes about\&. An administrator will set up a shiny new firewall, only to be flooded with complains from ungrateful users whose applications stopped working\&. In particular, DNS may be broken because the UDP DNS replies from external servers can no longer enter the network\&. FTP is another common example\&. In active FTP transfers, the remote server tries to establish a connection back to the client to transfer the requested file\&.
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One surprisingly common misconfiguration is to trust traffic based only on the source port number\&. It is easy to understand how this comes about\&. An administrator will set up a shiny new firewall, only to be flooded with complaints from ungrateful users whose applications stopped working\&. In particular, DNS may be broken because the UDP DNS replies from external servers can no longer enter the network\&. FTP is another common example\&. In active FTP transfers, the remote server tries to establish a connection back to the client to transfer the requested file\&.
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.sp
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Secure solutions to these problems exist, often in the form of application\-level proxies or protocol\-parsing firewall modules\&. Unfortunately there are also easier, insecure solutions\&. Noting that DNS replies come from port 53 and active FTP from port 20, many administrators have fallen into the trap of simply allowing incoming traffic from those ports\&. They often assume that no attacker would notice and exploit such firewall holes\&. In other cases, administrators consider this a short\-term stop\-gap measure until they can implement a more secure solution\&. Then they forget the security upgrade\&.
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.sp
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