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Remove trailing whitespace in lua files
Whitespace is not significant, so this should not be a problem. https://secwiki.org/w/Nmap/Code_Standards
This commit is contained in:
dmiller
@@ -1,54 +1,54 @@
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---
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-- This module takes care of the authentication used in SMB (LM, NTLM, LMv2, NTLMv2).
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-- This module takes care of the authentication used in SMB (LM, NTLM, LMv2, NTLMv2).
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--
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-- There is a lot to this functionality, so if you're interested in how it works, read
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-- on.
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-- on.
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-- In SMB authentication, there are two distinct concepts. Each will be dealt with
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-- separately. There are:
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-- * Stored hashes
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-- * Authentication
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--
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-- What's confusing is that the same names are used for each of those.
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-- What's confusing is that the same names are used for each of those.
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--
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-- Stored Hashes:
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-- Windows stores two types of hashes: Lanman and NT Lanman (or NTLM). Vista and later
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-- store NTLM only. Lanman passwords are divided into two 7-character passwords and
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-- used as a key in DES, while NTLM is converted to unicode and MD4ed.
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-- store NTLM only. Lanman passwords are divided into two 7-character passwords and
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-- used as a key in DES, while NTLM is converted to unicode and MD4ed.
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--
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-- The stored hashes can be dumped in a variety of ways (pwdump6, fgdump, Metasploit's
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-- <code>priv</code> module, <code>smb-psexec.nse</code>, etc). Generally, two hashes are dumped together
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-- <code>priv</code> module, <code>smb-psexec.nse</code>, etc). Generally, two hashes are dumped together
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-- (generally, Lanman:NTLM). Sometimes, Lanman is empty and only NTLM is given. Lanman
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-- is never required.
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-- is never required.
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--
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-- The password hashes can be given instead of passwords when supplying credentials;
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-- The password hashes can be given instead of passwords when supplying credentials;
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-- this is done by using the <code>smbhash</code> argument. Either a pair of hashes
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-- can be passed, in the form of Lanman:NTLM, or a single hash, which is assumed to
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-- be NTLM.
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-- be NTLM.
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--
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-- Authentication:
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-- There are four types of authentication. Confusingly, these have the same names as
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-- stored hashes, but only slight relationships. The four types are Lanmanv1, NTLMv1,
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-- Lanmanv2, and NTLMv2. By default, Lanmanv1 and NTLMv1 are used together in most
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-- applications. These Nmap scripts default to NTLMv1 alone, except in special cases,
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-- but it can be overridden by the user.
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-- stored hashes, but only slight relationships. The four types are Lanmanv1, NTLMv1,
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-- Lanmanv2, and NTLMv2. By default, Lanmanv1 and NTLMv1 are used together in most
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-- applications. These Nmap scripts default to NTLMv1 alone, except in special cases,
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-- but it can be overridden by the user.
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--
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-- Lanmanv1 and NTLMv1 both use DES for their response. The DES mixes a server challenge
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-- with the hash (Lanman hash for Lanmanv1 response and NTLMv1 hash for NTLM response).
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-- The way the challenge is DESed with the hashes is identical for Lanmanv1 and NTLMv1,
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-- the only difference is the starting hash (Lanman vs NTLM).
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-- with the hash (Lanman hash for Lanmanv1 response and NTLMv1 hash for NTLM response).
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-- The way the challenge is DESed with the hashes is identical for Lanmanv1 and NTLMv1,
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-- the only difference is the starting hash (Lanman vs NTLM).
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--
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-- Lanmanv2 and NTLMv2 both use HMAC-MD5 for their response. The HMAC-MD5 mixes a
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-- server challenge and a client challenge with the NTLM hash, in both cases. The
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-- Lanmanv2 and NTLMv2 both use HMAC-MD5 for their response. The HMAC-MD5 mixes a
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-- server challenge and a client challenge with the NTLM hash, in both cases. The
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-- difference between Lanmanv2 and NTLMv2 is the length of the client challenge;
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-- Lanmanv2 has a maximum client challenge of 8 bytes, whereas NTLMv2 doesn't limit
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-- the length of the client challenge.
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-- the length of the client challenge.
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--
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-- The primary advantage to the 'v2' protocols is the client challenge -- by
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-- The primary advantage to the 'v2' protocols is the client challenge -- by
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-- incorporating a client challenge, a malicious server can't use a precomputation
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-- attack.
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-- attack.
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--
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-- In addition to hashing the passwords, messages are also signed, by default, if a
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-- v1 protocol is being used (I (Ron Bowes) couldn't get signatures to work on v2
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-- In addition to hashing the passwords, messages are also signed, by default, if a
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-- v1 protocol is being used (I (Ron Bowes) couldn't get signatures to work on v2
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-- protocols; if anybody knows how I'd love to implement it).
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--
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--@args smbusername The SMB username to log in with. The forms "DOMAIN\username" and "username@DOMAIN"
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@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
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-- accounts if the incorrect password is given. Although it's rare that the
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-- Administrator account can be locked out, in the off chance that it can, you could
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-- get yourself in trouble. To use a blank password, leave this parameter off
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-- altogether.
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-- altogether.
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--@args smbhash A password hash to use when logging in. This is given as a single hex string (32
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-- characters) or a pair of hex strings (both 32 characters, optionally separated by a
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-- single character). These hashes are the LanMan or NTLM hash of the user's password,
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@@ -71,14 +71,14 @@
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-- * <code>NTLMv1</code>: Sends NTLMv1 only (default).
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-- * <code>v2</code>: Sends LMv2 and NTLMv2.
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-- * <code>LMv2</code>: Sends LMv2 only.
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-- * <code>NTLMv2</code>: Doesn't exist; the protocol doesn't support NTLMv2 alone.
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-- The default, <code>NTLMv1</code>, is a pretty decent compromise between security and
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-- compatibility. If you are paranoid, you might want to use <code>v2</code> or
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-- <code>lmv2</code> for this. (Actually, if you're paranoid, you should be avoiding this
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-- protocol altogether!). If you're using an extremely old system, you might need to set
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-- this to <code>v1</code> or <code>lm</code>, which are less secure but more compatible.
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-- For information, see <code>smbauth.lua</code>.
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--@args smbnoguest Use to disable usage of the 'guest' account.
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-- * <code>NTLMv2</code>: Doesn't exist; the protocol doesn't support NTLMv2 alone.
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-- The default, <code>NTLMv1</code>, is a pretty decent compromise between security and
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-- compatibility. If you are paranoid, you might want to use <code>v2</code> or
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-- <code>lmv2</code> for this. (Actually, if you're paranoid, you should be avoiding this
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-- protocol altogether!). If you're using an extremely old system, you might need to set
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-- this to <code>v1</code> or <code>lm</code>, which are less secure but more compatible.
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-- For information, see <code>smbauth.lua</code>.
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--@args smbnoguest Use to disable usage of the 'guest' account.
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local bin = require "bin"
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local nmap = require "nmap"
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@@ -136,17 +136,17 @@ end
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-- * registry[ip]['smbaccounts'] => array of table containing 'username', 'password', and 'is_admin'
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--
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-- The final place, 'smbaccount', is reserved for the "best" account. This is an administrator
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-- account, if one's found; otherwise, it's the first account discovered that isn't <code>guest</code>.
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-- account, if one's found; otherwise, it's the first account discovered that isn't <code>guest</code>.
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--
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-- This has to be called while no SMB connections are made, since it potentially makes its own connection.
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--
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--@param host The host object.
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--@param username The username to add.
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--@param domain The domain to add.
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--@param password The password to add.
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--@param password_hash The password hash to add.
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--@param host The host object.
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--@param username The username to add.
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--@param domain The domain to add.
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--@param password The password to add.
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--@param password_hash The password hash to add.
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--@param hash_type The hash type to use.
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--@param is_admin [optional] Set to 'true' the account is known to be an administrator.
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--@param is_admin [optional] Set to 'true' the account is known to be an administrator.
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function add_account(host, username, domain, password, password_hash, hash_type, is_admin)
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-- Save the username in a global list -- TODO: restore this
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-- if(nmap.registry.usernames == nil) then
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@@ -216,11 +216,11 @@ function add_account(host, username, domain, password, password_hash, hash_type,
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end
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---Retrieve the current set of credentials set in the registry. If these fail, <code>next_credentials</code> should be
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-- called.
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-- called.
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--
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--@param host The host object.
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--@param host The host object.
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--@return (result, username, domain, password, password_hash, hash_type) If result is false, username is an error message. Otherwise, username and password are
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-- the current username and password that should be used.
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-- the current username and password that should be used.
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function get_account(host)
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if(host.registry['smbindex'] == nil) then
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host.registry['smbindex'] = 1
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@@ -237,9 +237,9 @@ function get_account(host)
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end
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---Create the account table with the anonymous and guest users, as well as the user given in the script's
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-- arguments, if there is one.
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-- arguments, if there is one.
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--
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--@param host The host object.
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--@param host The host object.
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function init_account(host)
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-- Don't run this more than once for each host
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if(host.registry['smbaccounts'] ~= nil) then
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@@ -327,8 +327,8 @@ end
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---Generate the Lanman v1 hash (LMv1). The generated hash is incredibly easy to reverse, because the input
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-- is padded or truncated to 14 characters, then split into two 7-character strings. Each of these strings
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-- are used as a key to encrypt the string, "KGS!@#$%" in DES. Because the keys are no longer than
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-- 7-characters long, it's pretty trivial to bruteforce them.
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-- are used as a key to encrypt the string, "KGS!@#$%" in DES. Because the keys are no longer than
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-- 7-characters long, it's pretty trivial to bruteforce them.
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--
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--@param password the password to hash
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--@return (status, hash) If status is true, the hash is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ local function lm_create_hash(password)
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end
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---Generate the NTLMv1 hash. This hash is quite a bit better than LMv1, and is far easier to generate. Basically,
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-- it's the MD4 of the Unicode password.
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-- it's the MD4 of the Unicode password.
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--
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--@param password the password to hash
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--@return (status, hash) If status is true, the hash is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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@@ -376,12 +376,12 @@ function ntlm_create_hash(password)
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return true, openssl.md4(to_unicode(password))
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end
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---Create the Lanman response to send back to the server. To do this, the Lanman password is padded to 21
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---Create the Lanman response to send back to the server. To do this, the Lanman password is padded to 21
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-- characters and split into three 7-character strings. Each of those strings is used as a key to encrypt
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-- the server challenge. The three encrypted strings are concatenated and returned.
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-- the server challenge. The three encrypted strings are concatenated and returned.
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--
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--@param lanman The LMv1 hash
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--@param challenge The server's challenge.
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--@param challenge The server's challenge.
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--@return (status, response) If status is true, the response is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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function lm_create_response(lanman, challenge)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ function lm_create_response(lanman, challenge)
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key3 = openssl.DES_string_to_key(str3)
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-- Print a warning message if a blank challenge is received, and create a phony challenge. A blank challenge is
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-- invalid in the protocol, and causes some versions of OpenSSL to abort with no possible error handling.
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-- invalid in the protocol, and causes some versions of OpenSSL to abort with no possible error handling.
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if(challenge == "") then
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stdnse.print_debug(1, "SMB: ERROR: Server returned invalid (blank) challenge value (should be 8 bytes); failing login to avoid OpenSSL crash.")
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challenge = "AAAAAAAA"
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@@ -419,10 +419,10 @@ function lm_create_response(lanman, challenge)
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end
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---Create the NTLM response to send back to the server. This is actually done the exact same way as the Lanman hash,
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-- so I call the <code>Lanman</code> function.
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-- so I call the <code>Lanman</code> function.
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--
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--@param ntlm The NTLMv1 hash
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--@param challenge The server's challenge.
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--@param challenge The server's challenge.
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--@return (status, response) If status is true, the response is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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function ntlm_create_response(ntlm, challenge)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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@@ -432,12 +432,12 @@ function ntlm_create_response(ntlm, challenge)
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return lm_create_response(ntlm, challenge)
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end
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---Create the NTLM mac key, which is used for message signing. For basic authentication, this is the md4 of the
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---Create the NTLM mac key, which is used for message signing. For basic authentication, this is the md4 of the
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-- NTLM hash, concatenated with the response hash; for extended authentication, this is just the md4 of the NTLM
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-- hash.
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--@param ntlm_hash The NTLM hash.
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--@param ntlm_response The NTLM response.
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--@param is_extended Should be set if extended security negotiations are being used.
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-- hash.
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--@param ntlm_hash The NTLM hash.
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--@param ntlm_response The NTLM response.
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--@param is_extended Should be set if extended security negotiations are being used.
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function ntlm_create_mac_key(ntlm_hash, ntlm_response, is_extended)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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return false, "SMB: OpenSSL not present"
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@@ -449,12 +449,12 @@ function ntlm_create_mac_key(ntlm_hash, ntlm_response, is_extended)
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end
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end
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---Create the LM mac key, which is used for message signing. For basic authentication, it's the first 8 bytes
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-- of the lanman hash, followed by 8 null bytes, followed by the lanman response; for extended authentication,
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-- this is just the first 8 bytes of the lanman hash followed by 8 null bytes.
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--@param lm_hash The NTLM hash.
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--@param lm_response The NTLM response.
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--@param is_extended Should be set if extended security negotiations are being used.
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---Create the LM mac key, which is used for message signing. For basic authentication, it's the first 8 bytes
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-- of the lanman hash, followed by 8 null bytes, followed by the lanman response; for extended authentication,
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-- this is just the first 8 bytes of the lanman hash followed by 8 null bytes.
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--@param lm_hash The NTLM hash.
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--@param lm_response The NTLM response.
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--@param is_extended Should be set if extended security negotiations are being used.
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function lm_create_mac_key(lm_hash, lm_response, is_extended)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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return false, "SMB: OpenSSL not present"
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@@ -467,13 +467,13 @@ function lm_create_mac_key(lm_hash, lm_response, is_extended)
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end
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end
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---Create the NTLMv2 hash, which is based on the NTLMv1 hash (for easy upgrading), the username, and the domain.
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-- Essentially, the NTLM hash is used as a HMAC-MD5 key, which is used to hash the unicode domain concatenated
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-- with the unicode username.
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---Create the NTLMv2 hash, which is based on the NTLMv1 hash (for easy upgrading), the username, and the domain.
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-- Essentially, the NTLM hash is used as a HMAC-MD5 key, which is used to hash the unicode domain concatenated
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-- with the unicode username.
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--
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--@param ntlm The NTLMv1 hash.
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--@param username The username we're using.
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--@param domain The domain.
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--@param ntlm The NTLMv1 hash.
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--@param username The username we're using.
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--@param domain The domain.
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--@return (status, response) If status is true, the response is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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function ntlmv2_create_hash(ntlm, username, domain)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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@@ -488,8 +488,8 @@ function ntlmv2_create_hash(ntlm, username, domain)
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return true, openssl.hmac("MD5", ntlm, username .. domain)
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end
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---Create the LMv2 response, which can be sent back to the server. This is identical to the <code>NTLMv2</code> function,
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-- except that it uses an 8-byte client challenge.
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---Create the LMv2 response, which can be sent back to the server. This is identical to the <code>NTLMv2</code> function,
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-- except that it uses an 8-byte client challenge.
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--
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-- The reason for LMv2 is a long and twisted story. Well, not really. The reason is basically that the v1 hashes
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-- are always 24-bytes, and some servers expect 24 bytes, but the NTLMv2 hash is more than 24 bytes. So, the only
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@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@ end
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-- learned something
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--
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--@param ntlm The NVLMv1 hash.
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--@param username The username we're using.
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--@param domain The domain.
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--@param challenge The server challenge.
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--@param username The username we're using.
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--@param domain The domain.
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--@param challenge The server challenge.
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--@return (status, response) If status is true, the response is returned; otherwise, an error message is returned.
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function lmv2_create_response(ntlm, username, domain, challenge)
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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@@ -511,14 +511,14 @@ function lmv2_create_response(ntlm, username, domain, challenge)
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end
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---Create the NTLMv2 response, which can be sent back to the server. This is done by using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm
|
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-- with the NTLMv2 hash as a key, and the server challenge concatenated with the client challenge for the data.
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-- with the NTLMv2 hash as a key, and the server challenge concatenated with the client challenge for the data.
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-- The resulting hash is concatenated with the client challenge and returned.
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--
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-- The "proper" implementation for this uses a certain structure for the client challenge, involving the time
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-- and computer name and stuff (if you don't do this, Wireshark tells you it's a malformed packet). In my tests,
|
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-- and computer name and stuff (if you don't do this, Wireshark tells you it's a malformed packet). In my tests,
|
||||
-- however, I couldn't get Vista to recognize a client challenge longer than 24 bytes, and this structure was
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-- guaranteed to be much longer than 24 bytes. So, I just use a random string generated by OpenSSL. I've tested
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-- it on every Windows system from Windows 2000 to Windows Vista, and it has always worked.
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-- it on every Windows system from Windows 2000 to Windows Vista, and it has always worked.
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function ntlmv2_create_response(ntlm, username, domain, challenge, client_challenge_length)
|
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if(have_ssl ~= true) then
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return false, "SMB: OpenSSL not present"
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@@ -533,21 +533,21 @@ end
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||||
|
||||
---Generate the Lanman and NTLM password hashes. The password itself is taken from the function parameters,
|
||||
-- the nmap arguments, and the registry (in that order). If no password is set, then the password hash
|
||||
-- is used (which is read from all the usual places). If neither is set, then a blank password is used.
|
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-- is used (which is read from all the usual places). If neither is set, then a blank password is used.
|
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--
|
||||
-- The output passwords are hashed based on the hash type.
|
||||
-- The output passwords are hashed based on the hash type.
|
||||
--
|
||||
--@param ip The ip address of the host, used for registry lookups.
|
||||
--@param username The username, which is used for v2 passwords.
|
||||
--@param domain The username, which is used for v2 passwords.
|
||||
--@param password [optional] The overriding password.
|
||||
--@param password_hash [optional] The overriding password hash. Shouldn't be set if password is set.
|
||||
--@param ip The ip address of the host, used for registry lookups.
|
||||
--@param username The username, which is used for v2 passwords.
|
||||
--@param domain The username, which is used for v2 passwords.
|
||||
--@param password [optional] The overriding password.
|
||||
--@param password_hash [optional] The overriding password hash. Shouldn't be set if password is set.
|
||||
--@param challenge The server challenge.
|
||||
--@param hash_type The way in which to hash the password.
|
||||
--@param hash_type The way in which to hash the password.
|
||||
--@param is_extended Set to 'true' if extended security negotiations are being used (this has to be known for the
|
||||
-- message-signing key to be generated properly).
|
||||
--@return (lm_response, ntlm_response, mac_key) The two strings that can be sent directly back to the server,
|
||||
-- and the mac_key, which is used for message signing.
|
||||
-- message-signing key to be generated properly).
|
||||
--@return (lm_response, ntlm_response, mac_key) The two strings that can be sent directly back to the server,
|
||||
-- and the mac_key, which is used for message signing.
|
||||
function get_password_response(ip, username, domain, password, password_hash, hash_type, challenge, is_extended)
|
||||
local status
|
||||
local lm_hash = nil
|
||||
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ function get_password_response(ip, username, domain, password, password_hash, ha
|
||||
-- Output what we've got so far
|
||||
stdnse.print_debug(2, "SMB: Lanman hash: %s", stdnse.tohex(lm_hash))
|
||||
stdnse.print_debug(2, "SMB: NTLM hash: %s", stdnse.tohex(ntlm_hash))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- Hash the password the way the user wants
|
||||
if(hash_type == "v1") then
|
||||
-- LM and NTLM are hashed with their respective algorithms
|
||||
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ function get_password_response(ip, username, domain, password, password_hash, ha
|
||||
else
|
||||
stdnse.print_debug(1, "SMB: No login type specified, using default (NTLM)")
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
status, lm_response = ntlm_create_response(ntlm_hash, challenge)
|
||||
status, ntlm_response = ntlm_create_response(ntlm_hash, challenge)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -665,10 +665,10 @@ function get_security_blob(security_blob, ip, username, domain, password, passwo
|
||||
|
||||
if(security_blob == nil) then
|
||||
-- If security_blob is nil, this is the initial packet
|
||||
new_blob = bin.pack("<zIILL",
|
||||
new_blob = bin.pack("<zIILL",
|
||||
"NTLMSSP", -- Identifier
|
||||
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE, -- Type
|
||||
flags, -- Flags
|
||||
flags, -- Flags
|
||||
0, -- Calling workstation domain
|
||||
0 -- Calling workstation name
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ function get_security_blob(security_blob, ip, username, domain, password, passwo
|
||||
lanman,
|
||||
ntlm,
|
||||
session_key)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
return true, new_blob, mac_key
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ function get_host_info_from_security_blob(security_blob)
|
||||
local ntlm_challenge = {}
|
||||
--local pos, identifier, message_type, domain_length, domain_max, domain_offset, server_flags, challenge, reserved, target_info_length, target_info_max, target_info_offset = bin.unpack("<A8ISSIILLSSI", security_blob)
|
||||
local pos, identifier, message_type, domain_length, domain_max, domain_offset, server_flags, challenge, reserved, target_info_length, target_info_max, target_info_offset = bin.unpack("<A8ISSIILLSSI", security_blob)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- Do some validation on the NTLMSSP message
|
||||
if ( identifier ~= "NTLMSSP\0" ) then
|
||||
stdnse.print_debug( 1, "SMB: Invalid NTLM challenge message: unexpected signature." )
|
||||
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ function get_host_info_from_security_blob(security_blob)
|
||||
stdnse.print_debug( 1, "SMB: Invalid NTLM challenge message: unexpected message type: %d.", message_type )
|
||||
return false, "Invalid message type in NTLM challenge message"
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- Parse the TargetName data (i.e. the server authentication realm)
|
||||
if ( domain_length > 0 ) then
|
||||
local length = domain_length
|
||||
@@ -750,10 +750,10 @@ function get_host_info_from_security_blob(security_blob)
|
||||
pos, target_realm = bin.unpack( string.format( "A%d", length ), security_blob, pos )
|
||||
ntlm_challenge[ "target_realm" ] = from_unicode( target_realm )
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- Parse the TargetInfo data (Wireshark calls this the "Address List")
|
||||
if ( target_info_length > 0 ) then
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- Definition of AvId values (IDs for AV_PAIR (attribute-value pair) structures),
|
||||
-- as definied by the NTLM Authentication Protocol specification [MS-NLMP].
|
||||
local NTLM_AV_ID_VALUES = {
|
||||
@@ -779,20 +779,20 @@ function get_host_info_from_security_blob(security_blob)
|
||||
[NTLM_AV_ID_VALUES.MsvAvDnsTreeName] = "dns_forest_name",
|
||||
[NTLM_AV_ID_VALUES.MsvAvTimestamp] = "timestamp",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
local length = target_info_length
|
||||
local pos = target_info_offset + 1 -- +1 to convert to Lua's 1-based indexes
|
||||
local target_info
|
||||
pos, target_info = bin.unpack( string.format( "A%d", length ), security_blob, pos )
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
pos = 1 -- reset pos to 1, since we'll be working out of just the target_info
|
||||
repeat
|
||||
local value, av_id, av_len
|
||||
pos, av_id, av_len = bin.unpack( "<SS", target_info, pos )
|
||||
pos, value = bin.unpack( string.format( "A%d", av_len ), target_info, pos )
|
||||
local friendly_name = NTLM_AV_ID_NAMES[ av_id ]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if ( av_id == NTLM_AV_ID_VALUES.MsvAvEOL ) then
|
||||
break
|
||||
elseif ( av_id == NTLM_AV_ID_VALUES.MsvAvTimestamp ) then
|
||||
@@ -803,16 +803,16 @@ function get_host_info_from_security_blob(security_blob)
|
||||
end
|
||||
until ( pos >= #target_info )
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
return ntlm_challenge
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
---Create an 8-byte message signature that's sent with all SMB packets.
|
||||
---Create an 8-byte message signature that's sent with all SMB packets.
|
||||
--
|
||||
--@param mac_key The key used for authentication. It's the concatination of the session key and the
|
||||
-- response hash.
|
||||
-- response hash.
|
||||
--@param data The packet to generate the signature for. This should be the packet that's about to be
|
||||
-- sent, except with the signature slot replaced with the sequence number.
|
||||
-- sent, except with the signature slot replaced with the sequence number.
|
||||
--@return The 8-byte signature. The signature is equal to the first eight bytes of md5(mac_key .. smb_data)
|
||||
function calculate_signature(mac_key, data)
|
||||
if(have_ssl) then
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user