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Merged in significant changes to Microsoft RPC calls
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@@ -3,27 +3,23 @@ Returns information about the SMB security level determined by SMB.
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Here is how to interpret the output:
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User-level authentication: Each user has a separate username/password that is used
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* User-level authentication: Each user has a separate username/password that is used
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to log into the system. This is the default setup of pretty much everything
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these days.
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Share-level authentication: The anonymous account should be used to log in, then
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* Share-level authentication: The anonymous account should be used to log in, then
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the password is given (in plaintext) when a share is accessed. All users who
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have access to the share use this password. This was the original way of doing
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things, but isn't commonly seen, now. If a server uses share-level security,
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it is vulnerable to sniffing.
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Challenge/response passwords supported: If enabled, the server can accept any type of
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password:
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* Plaintext
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* LM and NTLM
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* LMv2 and NTLMv2
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If it isn't set, the server can only accept plaintext passwords. Most servers
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are configured to use challenge/response these days. If a server is configured
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to accept plaintext passwords, it is vulnerable to sniffing. LM and NTLM are
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fairly secure, although there are some brute-force attacks against them.
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Message signing: If required, all messages between the client and server must
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* Challenge/response passwords supported: If enabled, the server can accept any
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type of password (plaintext, LM and NTLM, and LMv2 and NTLMv2). If it isn't set,
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the server can only accept plaintext passwords. Most servers are configured to
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use challenge/response these days. If a server is configured to accept plaintext
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passwords, it is vulnerable to sniffing. LM and NTLM are fairly secure, although
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there are some brute-force attacks against them. Additionally, LM and NTLM can
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fall victim to man-in-the-middle attacks or relay attacks (see MS08-068 or my
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writeup of it: http://www.skullsecurity.org/blog/?p=110).
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* Message signing: If required, all messages between the client and server must
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be signed by a shared key, derived from the password and the server
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challenge. If supported and not required, message signing is negotiated between
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clients and servers and used if both support and request it. By default,
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@@ -31,7 +27,7 @@ Windows clients don't sign messages, so if message signing isn't required by
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the server, messages probably won't be signed; additionally, if performing a
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man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker can negotiate no message signing. If
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message signing isn't required, the server is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
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attacks.
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attacks or SMB-relay attacks.
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This script will allow you to use the <code>smb*</code> script arguments (to
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set the username and password, etc.), but it probably won't ever require them.
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@@ -48,8 +44,8 @@ set the username and password, etc.), but it probably won't ever require them.
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-- |_ smb-security-mode: Message signing supported
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--
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-- @args smb* This script supports the <code>smbusername</code>,
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-- <code>smbpassword</code>, <code>smbhash</code>, <code>smbguest</code>, and
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-- <code>smbtype</code> script arguments of the <code>smb</code> module.
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-- <code>smbpassword</code>, <code>smbhash</code>, and <code>smbtype</code>
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-- script arguments of the <code>smb</code> module.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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author = "Ron Bowes"
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