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398 lines
17 KiB
C
398 lines
17 KiB
C
/***************************************************************************
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* ncat_digest.c -- HTTP Digest authentication handling. *
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***********************IMPORTANT NMAP LICENSE TERMS************************
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* *
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* The Nmap Security Scanner is (C) 1996-2012 Insecure.Com LLC. Nmap is *
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* also a registered trademark of Insecure.Com LLC. This program is free *
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* software; you may redistribute and/or modify it under the terms of the *
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* GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software *
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* Foundation; Version 2 with the clarifications and exceptions described *
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* below. This guarantees your right to use, modify, and redistribute *
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* this software under certain conditions. If you wish to embed Nmap *
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* technology into proprietary software, we sell alternative licenses *
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* (contact sales@insecure.com). Dozens of software vendors already *
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* license Nmap technology such as host discovery, port scanning, OS *
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* detection, version detection, and the Nmap Scripting Engine. *
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* *
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* Note that the GPL places important restrictions on "derived works", yet *
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* it does not provide a detailed definition of that term. To avoid *
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* misunderstandings, we interpret that term as broadly as copyright law *
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* allows. For example, we consider an application to constitute a *
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* "derivative work" for the purpose of this license if it does any of the *
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* following: *
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* o Integrates source code from Nmap *
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* o Reads or includes Nmap copyrighted data files, such as *
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* nmap-os-db or nmap-service-probes. *
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* o Executes Nmap and parses the results (as opposed to typical shell or *
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* execution-menu apps, which simply display raw Nmap output and so are *
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* not derivative works.) *
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* o Integrates/includes/aggregates Nmap into a proprietary executable *
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* installer, such as those produced by InstallShield. *
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* o Links to a library or executes a program that does any of the above *
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* *
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* The term "Nmap" should be taken to also include any portions or derived *
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* works of Nmap, as well as other software we distribute under this *
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* license such as Zenmap, Ncat, and Nping. This list is not exclusive, *
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* but is meant to clarify our interpretation of derived works with some *
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* common examples. Our interpretation applies only to Nmap--we don't *
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* speak for other people's GPL works. *
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* *
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* If you have any questions about the GPL licensing restrictions on using *
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* Nmap in non-GPL works, we would be happy to help. As mentioned above, *
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* we also offer alternative license to integrate Nmap into proprietary *
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* applications and appliances. These contracts have been sold to dozens *
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* of software vendors, and generally include a perpetual license as well *
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* as providing for priority support and updates. They also fund the *
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* continued development of Nmap. Please email sales@insecure.com for *
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* further information. *
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* *
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* As a special exception to the GPL terms, Insecure.Com LLC grants *
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* permission to link the code of this program with any version of the *
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* OpenSSL library which is distributed under a license identical to that *
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* listed in the included docs/licenses/OpenSSL.txt file, and distribute *
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* linked combinations including the two. You must obey the GNU GPL in all *
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* respects for all of the code used other than OpenSSL. If you modify *
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* this file, you may extend this exception to your version of the file, *
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* but you are not obligated to do so. *
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* *
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* If you received these files with a written license agreement or *
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* contract stating terms other than the terms above, then that *
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* alternative license agreement takes precedence over these comments. *
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* *
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* Source is provided to this software because we believe users have a *
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* right to know exactly what a program is going to do before they run it. *
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* This also allows you to audit the software for security holes (none *
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* have been found so far). *
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* *
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* Source code also allows you to port Nmap to new platforms, fix bugs, *
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* and add new features. You are highly encouraged to send your changes *
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* Insecure.Org development mailing lists, or checking them into the Nmap *
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* source code repository, it is understood (unless you specify otherwise) *
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* that you are offering the Nmap Project (Insecure.Com LLC) the *
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* unlimited, non-exclusive right to reuse, modify, and relicense the *
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* code. Nmap will always be available Open Source, but this is important *
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* because the inability to relicense code has caused devastating problems *
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* for other Free Software projects (such as KDE and NASM). We also *
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* occasionally relicense the code to third parties as discussed above. *
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* If you wish to specify special license conditions of your *
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* contributions, just say so when you send them. *
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* *
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but *
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* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of *
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU *
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* General Public License v2.0 for more details at *
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* http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html , or in the COPYING file *
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* included with Nmap. *
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* *
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***************************************************************************/
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/* $Id$ */
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/* Nonces returned by make_nonce have the form
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timestamp-MD5(secret:timestamp)
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using representative values, this may look like
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1263929285.015273-a8e75fae174fc0e6a5df47bf9900beb6
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Sending a timestamp in the clear allows us to compute how long ago the nonce
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was issued without local state. Including microseconds reduces the chance
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that the same nonce will be issued for two different requests. When a nonce
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is received from a client, the time is extracted and then the nonce is
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recalculated locally to make sure they match. This is similar to the strategy
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recommended in section 3.2.1 of RFC 2617.
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When Ncat does Digest authentication as a client, it only does so to make a
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single CONNECT request to a proxy server. Therefore we don't use a differing
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nc (nonce count) but always the constant 00000001. */
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#include "ncat.h"
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#include "http.h"
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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/* What's a good length for this? I think it exists only to prevent us from
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hashing known plaintext from the server. */
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#define CNONCE_LENGTH 8
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#define SECRET_LENGTH 16
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static unsigned char secret[SECRET_LENGTH];
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static int secret_initialized = 0;
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static int append_quoted_string(char **buf, size_t *size, size_t *offset, const char *s)
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{
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const char *t;
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strbuf_append_str(buf, size, offset, "\"");
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for (;;) {
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t = s;
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while (!((*t >= 0 && *t <= 31) || *t == 127 || *t == '\\'))
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t++;
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strbuf_append(buf, size, offset, s, t - s);
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if (*t == '\0')
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break;
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strbuf_sprintf(buf, size, offset, "\\%c", *t);
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s = t + 1;
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}
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strbuf_append_str(buf, size, offset, "\"");
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return *size;
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}
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/* n is the size of src. dest must have at least n * 2 + 1 allocated bytes. */
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static char *enhex(char *dest, const unsigned char *src, size_t n)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
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Snprintf(dest + i * 2, 3, "%02x", src[i]);
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return dest;
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}
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/* Initialize the server secret used in generating nonces. Return -1 on
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failure. */
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int http_digest_init_secret(void)
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{
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if (!RAND_status())
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return -1;
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if (RAND_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret)) != 1)
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return -1;
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secret_initialized = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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static char *make_nonce(const struct timeval *tv)
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{
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char *buf = NULL;
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size_t size = 0, offset = 0;
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MD5_CTX md5;
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unsigned char hashbuf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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char hash_hex[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
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char time_buf[32];
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/* Crash if someone forgot to call http_digest_init_secret. */
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if (!secret_initialized)
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bye("Server secret not initialized for Digest authentication. Call http_digest_init_secret.");
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Snprintf(time_buf, sizeof(time_buf), "%lu.%06lu",
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(long unsigned) tv->tv_sec, (long unsigned) tv->tv_usec);
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MD5_Init(&md5);
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MD5_Update(&md5, secret, sizeof(secret));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, time_buf, strlen(time_buf));
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MD5_Final(hashbuf, &md5);
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enhex(hash_hex, hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
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strbuf_sprintf(&buf, &size, &offset, "%s-%s", time_buf, hash_hex);
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return buf;
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}
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/* Arguments are assumed to be non-NULL, with the exception of nc and cnonce,
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which may be garbage only if qop == QOP_NONE. */
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static void make_response(char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1],
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const char *username, const char *realm, const char *password,
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const char *method, const char *uri, const char *nonce,
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enum http_digest_qop qop, const char *nc, const char *cnonce)
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{
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char HA1_hex[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1], HA2_hex[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
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unsigned char hashbuf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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MD5_CTX md5;
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/* Calculate H(A1). */
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MD5_Init(&md5);
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MD5_Update(&md5, username, strlen(username));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, realm, strlen(realm));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, password, strlen(password));
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MD5_Final(hashbuf, &md5);
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enhex(HA1_hex, hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
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/* Calculate H(A2). */
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MD5_Init(&md5);
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MD5_Update(&md5, method, strlen(method));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, uri, strlen(uri));
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MD5_Final(hashbuf, &md5);
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enhex(HA2_hex, hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
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/* Calculate response. */
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MD5_Init(&md5);
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MD5_Update(&md5, HA1_hex, strlen(HA1_hex));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, nonce, strlen(nonce));
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if (qop == QOP_AUTH) {
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, nc, strlen(nc));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, cnonce, strlen(cnonce));
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, "auth", strlen("auth"));
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}
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MD5_Update(&md5, ":", 1);
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MD5_Update(&md5, HA2_hex, strlen(HA2_hex));
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MD5_Final(hashbuf, &md5);
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enhex(buf, hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
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}
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/* Extract the issuance time from a nonce (without checking other aspects of
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validity. If the time can't be extracted, returns -1, 0 otherwise. */
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int http_digest_nonce_time(const char *nonce, struct timeval *tv)
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{
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unsigned long sec, usec;
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if (sscanf(nonce, "%lu.%lu", &sec, &usec) != 2)
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return -1;
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tv->tv_sec = sec;
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tv->tv_usec = usec;
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return 0;
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}
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char *http_digest_proxy_authenticate(const char *realm, int stale)
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{
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char *buf = NULL;
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size_t size = 0, offset = 0;
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struct timeval tv;
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char *nonce;
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if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1)
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return NULL;
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, "Digest realm=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, realm);
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nonce = make_nonce(&tv);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", nonce=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, nonce);
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free(nonce);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", qop=\"auth\"");
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if (stale)
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", stale=true");
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return buf;
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}
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char *http_digest_proxy_authorization(const struct http_challenge *challenge,
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const char *username, const char *password,
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const char *method, const char *uri)
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{
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/* For now we authenticate successfully at most once, so we don't need a
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varying client nonce count. */
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static const u32 nc = 0x00000001;
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char response_hex[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
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unsigned char cnonce[CNONCE_LENGTH];
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char cnonce_buf[CNONCE_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
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char nc_buf[8 + 1];
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char *buf = NULL;
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size_t size = 0, offset = 0;
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enum http_digest_qop qop;
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if (challenge->scheme != AUTH_DIGEST || challenge->realm == NULL
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|| challenge->digest.nonce == NULL
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|| challenge->digest.algorithm != ALGORITHM_MD5)
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return NULL;
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if (challenge->digest.qop & QOP_AUTH) {
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Snprintf(nc_buf, sizeof(nc_buf), "%08x", nc);
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if (!RAND_status())
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return NULL;
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if (RAND_bytes(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce)) != 1)
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return NULL;
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enhex(cnonce_buf, cnonce, sizeof(cnonce));
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qop = QOP_AUTH;
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} else {
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qop = QOP_NONE;
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}
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, " Digest");
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, " username=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, username);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", realm=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, challenge->realm);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", nonce=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, challenge->digest.nonce);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", uri=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, uri);
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if (qop == QOP_AUTH) {
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", qop=auth");
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", cnonce=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, cnonce_buf);
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strbuf_sprintf(&buf, &size, &offset, ", nc=%s", nc_buf);
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}
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make_response(response_hex, username, challenge->realm, password,
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method, uri, challenge->digest.nonce, qop, nc_buf, cnonce_buf);
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", response=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, response_hex);
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if (challenge->digest.opaque != NULL) {
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, ", opaque=");
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append_quoted_string(&buf, &size, &offset, challenge->digest.opaque);
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}
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strbuf_append_str(&buf, &size, &offset, "\r\n");
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return buf;
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}
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/* Check that a nonce is one that we issued, and that the response is what is
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expected. This doesn't do any checking aginst the lifetime of the nonce. */
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int http_digest_check_credentials(const char *username, const char *realm,
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const char *password, const char *method,
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const struct http_credentials *credentials)
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{
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char response_hex[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
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struct timeval tv;
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char *nonce;
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if (credentials->scheme != AUTH_DIGEST
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|| credentials->u.digest.username == NULL
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|| credentials->u.digest.realm == NULL
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|| credentials->u.digest.nonce == NULL
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|| credentials->u.digest.uri == NULL
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|| credentials->u.digest.response == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (credentials->u.digest.qop != QOP_NONE && credentials->u.digest.qop != QOP_AUTH)
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return 0;
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if (credentials->u.digest.qop == QOP_AUTH
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&& (credentials->u.digest.nc == NULL
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|| credentials->u.digest.cnonce == NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(username, credentials->u.digest.username) != 0)
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return 0;
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if (strcmp(realm, credentials->u.digest.realm) != 0)
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return 0;
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if (http_digest_nonce_time(credentials->u.digest.nonce, &tv) == -1)
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return 0;
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nonce = make_nonce(&tv);
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if (strcmp(nonce, credentials->u.digest.nonce) != 0) {
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/* We could not have handed out this nonce. */
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free(nonce);
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return 0;
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}
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free(nonce);
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make_response(response_hex, credentials->u.digest.username, realm,
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password, method, credentials->u.digest.uri,
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credentials->u.digest.nonce, credentials->u.digest.qop,
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credentials->u.digest.nc, credentials->u.digest.cnonce);
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return strcmp(response_hex, credentials->u.digest.response) == 0;
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}
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