Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: HackTheBox Mirage: Chaining NFS Leaks, Dynamic DNS Abuse, NATS Credential Theft,

2025-12-06 00:51:28 +00:00 · 2025-11-22 18:54:22 +00:00
parent 80318c5005
commit 11c0d14561
2 changed files with 335 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/winPEAS/winPEASps1/README.md
+++ b/winPEAS/winPEASps1/README.md
@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ Download the **[latest releas from here](https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/re
 powershell "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/master/winPEAS/winPEASps1/winPEAS.ps1')"
 ```

+
+## Recent Updates
+
+- Added Active Directory awareness checks to highlight Kerberos-only environments (NTLM restrictions) and time skew issues before attempting ticket-based attacks.
+- winPEAS.ps1 now reviews AD-integrated DNS ACLs to flag zones where low-privileged users can register/modify records (dynamic DNS hijack risk).
+- Enumerates high-value SPN accounts and weak gMSA password readers so you can immediately target Kerberoastable admins or abused service accounts.
+- Surfaces Schannel certificate mapping settings to warn about ESC10-style certificate abuse opportunities when UPN mapping is enabled.
+
 ## Advisory

 All the scripts/binaries of the PEAS Suite should be used for authorized penetration testing and/or educational purposes only. Any misuse of this software will not be the responsibility of the author or of any other collaborator. Use it at your own networks and/or with the network owner's permission.
--- a/winPEAS/winPEASps1/winPEAS.ps1
+++ b/winPEAS/winPEASps1/winPEAS.ps1
@@ -148,6 +148,244 @@ function Get-ClipBoardText {
  }
 }

+function Get-DomainContext {
+  try {
+    return [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetComputerDomain()
+  }
+  catch {
+    return $null
+  }
+}
+
+function Convert-SidToName {
+  param(
+    $SidInput
+  )
+  if ($null -eq $SidInput) { return $null }
+  try {
+    if ($SidInput -is [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) {
+      $sidObject = $SidInput
+    }
+    else {
+      $sidObject = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($SidInput)
+    }
+    return $sidObject.Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value
+  }
+  catch {
+    try { return $sidObject.Value }
+    catch { return [string]$SidInput }
+  }
+}
+
+function Get-WeakDnsUpdateFindings {
+  param(
+    [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]$DomainContext
+  )
+  if (-not $DomainContext) { return @() }
+  $domainDN = $DomainContext.GetDirectoryEntry().distinguishedName
+  $forestDN = $DomainContext.Forest.RootDomain.GetDirectoryEntry().distinguishedName
+  $paths = @(
+    "LDAP://CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,$domainDN",
+    "LDAP://CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,$forestDN",
+    "LDAP://CN=MicrosoftDNS,$domainDN"
+  )
+  $weakPatterns = @(
+    "authenticated users",
+    "everyone",
+    "domain users"
+  )
+  $dangerousRights = @("GenericAll", "GenericWrite", "CreateChild", "WriteProperty", "WriteDacl", "WriteOwner")
+  $findings = @()
+  foreach ($path in $paths) {
+    try {
+      $container = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry($path)
+      $null = $container.NativeGuid
+    }
+    catch { continue }
+    $searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher($container)
+    $searcher.Filter = "(objectClass=dnsZone)"
+    $searcher.PageSize = 500
+    $results = $searcher.FindAll()
+    foreach ($result in $results) {
+      try {
+        $zoneEntry = $result.GetDirectoryEntry()
+        $zoneEntry.Options.SecurityMasks = [System.DirectoryServices.SecurityMasks]::Dacl
+        $sd = $zoneEntry.ObjectSecurity
+        foreach ($ace in $sd.Access) {
+          if ($ace.AccessControlType -ne 'Allow') { continue }
+          $principal = Convert-SidToName $ace.IdentityReference
+          if (-not $principal) { continue }
+          $principalLower = $principal.ToLower()
+          if (-not ($weakPatterns | Where-Object { $principalLower -like "*${_}*" })) { continue }
+          $rights = $ace.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString()
+          if (-not ($dangerousRights | Where-Object { $rights -like "*${_}*" })) { continue }
+          $findings += [pscustomobject]@{
+            Zone      = $zoneEntry.Properties["name"].Value
+            Partition = $path.Split(',')[1]
+            Principal = $principal
+            Rights    = $rights
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      catch { continue }
+    }
+  }
+  return ($findings | Sort-Object Zone, Principal -Unique)
+}
+
+function Get-GmsaReadersReport {
+  param(
+    [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]$DomainContext
+  )
+  if (-not $DomainContext) { return @() }
+  $domainDN = $DomainContext.GetDirectoryEntry().distinguishedName
+  try {
+    $searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
+    $searcher.SearchRoot = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://$domainDN")
+    $searcher.Filter = "(&(objectClass=msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount))"
+    $searcher.PageSize = 500
+    [void]$searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add("sAMAccountName")
+    [void]$searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add("msDS-GroupMSAMembership")
+    $results = $searcher.FindAll()
+  }
+  catch { return @() }
+  $report = @()
+  foreach ($result in $results) {
+    $name = $result.Properties["samaccountname"]
+    $blobs = $result.Properties["msds-groupmsamembership"]
+    if (-not $blobs) { continue }
+    $principals = @()
+    foreach ($blob in $blobs) {
+      try {
+        $raw = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor (, $blob)
+        foreach ($ace in $raw.DiscretionaryAcl) {
+          $sid = Convert-SidToName $ace.SecurityIdentifier
+          if ($sid) { $principals += $sid }
+        }
+      }
+      catch { continue }
+    }
+    if ($principals.Count -eq 0) { continue }
+    $principals = $principals | Sort-Object -Unique
+    $weak = $principals | Where-Object { $_ -match 'Domain Users|Authenticated Users|Everyone' }
+    $report += [pscustomobject]@{
+      Account        = ($name | Select-Object -First 1)
+      Allowed        = ($principals -join ", ")
+      WeakPrincipals = if ($weak) { $weak -join ", " } else { "" }
+    }
+  }
+  return $report
+}
+
+function Get-PrivilegedSpnTargets {
+  param(
+    [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]$DomainContext
+  )
+  if (-not $DomainContext) { return @() }
+  $domainDN = $DomainContext.GetDirectoryEntry().distinguishedName
+  $keywords = @(
+    "Domain Admin",
+    "Enterprise Admin",
+    "Administrators",
+    "Exchange",
+    "IT_",
+    "Schema Admin",
+    "Account Operator",
+    "Server Operator",
+    "Backup Operator",
+    "DnsAdmin"
+  )
+  try {
+    $searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
+    $searcher.SearchRoot = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://$domainDN")
+    $searcher.Filter = "(&(objectClass=user)(servicePrincipalName=*))"
+    $searcher.PageSize = 500
+    [void]$searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add("sAMAccountName")
+    [void]$searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add("memberOf")
+    $results = $searcher.FindAll()
+  }
+  catch { return @() }
+  $findings = @()
+  foreach ($res in $results) {
+    $groups = $res.Properties["memberof"]
+    if (-not $groups) { continue }
+    $matchedGroups = @()
+    foreach ($group in $groups) {
+      $cn = ($group -split ',')[0] -replace '^CN=',''
+      if ($keywords | Where-Object { $cn -like "*${_}*" }) {
+        $matchedGroups += $cn
+      }
+    }
+    if ($matchedGroups.Count -gt 0) {
+      $findings += [pscustomobject]@{
+        User   = ($res.Properties["samaccountname"] | Select-Object -First 1)
+        Groups = ($matchedGroups | Sort-Object -Unique) -join ', '
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return ($findings | Sort-Object User | Select-Object -First 12)
+}
+
+function Get-NtlmPolicySummary {
+  try {
+    $msv = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0' -ErrorAction Stop
+  }
+  catch { return $null }
+  $lsa = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+  return [pscustomobject]@{
+    RestrictReceiving = $msv.RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic
+    RestrictSending   = $msv.RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic
+    LmCompatibility   = if ($lsa) { $lsa.LmCompatibilityLevel } else { $null }
+  }
+}
+
+function Get-TimeSkewInfo {
+  param(
+    [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]$DomainContext
+  )
+  if (-not $DomainContext) { return $null }
+  try {
+    $pdc = $DomainContext.PdcRoleOwner.Name
+  }
+  catch { return $null }
+  try {
+    $stripchart = w32tm /stripchart /computer:$pdc /dataonly /samples:3 2>$null
+    $sample = $stripchart | Where-Object { $_ -match ',' } | Select-Object -Last 1
+    if (-not $sample) { return $null }
+    $parts = $sample.Split(',')
+    if ($parts.Count -lt 2) { return $null }
+    $offsetString = $parts[1].Trim().TrimEnd('s')
+    [double]$offsetSeconds = 0
+    if (-not [double]::TryParse($offsetString, [ref]$offsetSeconds)) { return $null }
+    return [pscustomobject]@{
+      Source        = $pdc
+      OffsetSeconds = $offsetSeconds
+      RawSample     = $sample
+    }
+  }
+  catch {
+    return $null
+  }
+}
+
+function Get-AdcsSchannelInfo {
+  $info = [ordered]@{
+    MappingValue = $null
+    UpnMapping   = $false
+    ServiceState = $null
+  }
+  try {
+    $schannel = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL' -Name 'CertificateMappingMethods' -ErrorAction Stop
+    $info.MappingValue = $schannel.CertificateMappingMethods
+    if (($schannel.CertificateMappingMethods -band 0x4) -eq 0x4) { $info.UpnMapping = $true }
+  }
+  catch { }
+  $svc = Get-Service -Name certsrv -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+  if ($svc) { $info.ServiceState = $svc.Status }
+  return [pscustomobject]$info
+}
+
+
 function Search-Excel {
  [cmdletbinding()]
  Param (
@@ -1226,6 +1464,95 @@ Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| LISTENING PORTS"
 Start-Process NETSTAT.EXE -ArgumentList "-ano" -Wait -NoNewWindow


+######################## ACTIVE DIRECTORY / IDENTITY MISCONFIG CHECKS ########################
+Write-Host ""
+if ($TimeStamp) { TimeElapsed }
+Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| ACTIVE DIRECTORY / IDENTITY MISCONFIG CHECKS"
+
+$domainContext = Get-DomainContext
+if (-not $domainContext) {
+  Write-Host "Host appears to be in a workgroup or the AD context could not be resolved. Skipping domain-specific checks." -ForegroundColor DarkGray
+}
+else {
+  $ntlmStatus = Get-NtlmPolicySummary
+  if ($ntlmStatus) {
+    $recvValue = if ($ntlmStatus.RestrictReceiving -ne $null) { [int]$ntlmStatus.RestrictReceiving } else { -1 }
+    $sendValue = if ($ntlmStatus.RestrictSending -ne $null) { [int]$ntlmStatus.RestrictSending } else { -1 }
+    $lmValue = if ($ntlmStatus.LmCompatibility -ne $null) { [int]$ntlmStatus.LmCompatibility } else { -1 }
+    $ntlmMsg = "Receiving:{0} Sending:{1} LMCompat:{2}" -f $recvValue, $sendValue, $lmValue
+    if ($recvValue -ge 1 -or $sendValue -ge 1 -or $lmValue -ge 5) {
+      Write-Host "[!] NTLM is restricted/disabled ($ntlmMsg). Expect Kerberos-only auth paths (sync time before Kerberoasting)." -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    }
+    else {
+      Write-Host "[i] NTLM restrictions appear relaxed ($ntlmMsg)."
+    }
+  }
+
+  $timeSkew = Get-TimeSkewInfo -DomainContext $domainContext
+  if ($timeSkew) {
+    $offsetAbs = [math]::Abs($timeSkew.OffsetSeconds)
+    $timeMsg = "Offset vs {0}: {1:N3}s (sample: {2})" -f $timeSkew.Source, $timeSkew.OffsetSeconds, $timeSkew.RawSample.Trim()
+    if ($offsetAbs -gt 5) {
+      Write-Host "[!] Significant Kerberos time skew detected - $timeMsg" -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    }
+    else {
+      Write-Host "[i] Kerberos time offset looks OK - $timeMsg"
+    }
+  }
+
+  $dnsFindings = @(Get-WeakDnsUpdateFindings -DomainContext $domainContext)
+  if ($dnsFindings.Count -gt 0) {
+    Write-Host "[!] AD-integrated DNS zones allow low-priv principals to write records (dynamic DNS hijack / service MITM risk)." -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    $dnsFindings | Format-Table Zone,Partition,Principal,Rights -AutoSize | Out-String | Write-Host
+  }
+  else {
+    Write-Host "[i] No obvious insecure dynamic DNS ACLs found with current privileges."
+  }
+
+  $spnFindings = @(Get-PrivilegedSpnTargets -DomainContext $domainContext)
+  if ($spnFindings.Count -gt 0) {
+    Write-Host "[!] High-value SPN accounts identified (prime Kerberoast targets):" -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    $spnFindings | Format-Table User,Groups -AutoSize | Out-String | Write-Host
+  }
+  else {
+    Write-Host "[i] No privileged SPN users detected via quick LDAP search."
+  }
+
+  $gmsaReport = @(Get-GmsaReadersReport -DomainContext $domainContext)
+  if ($gmsaReport.Count -gt 0) {
+    $weakGmsa = $gmsaReport | Where-Object { $_.WeakPrincipals -ne "" }
+    if ($weakGmsa) {
+      Write-Host "[!] gMSA passwords readable by low-priv groups/principals: " -ForegroundColor Yellow
+      $weakGmsa | Select-Object Account, WeakPrincipals | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String | Write-Host
+    }
+    else {
+      Write-Host "[i] gMSA accounts discovered (review allowed readers below)."
+      $gmsaReport | Select-Object Account, Allowed | Sort-Object Account | Select-Object -First 5 | Format-Table -Wrap | Out-String | Write-Host
+    }
+  }
+  else {
+    Write-Host "[i] No gMSA objects found via LDAP."
+  }
+
+  $adcsInfo = Get-AdcsSchannelInfo
+  if ($adcsInfo.MappingValue -ne $null) {
+    $hex = ('0x{0:X}' -f [int]$adcsInfo.MappingValue)
+    if ($adcsInfo.UpnMapping) {
+      Write-Host ("[!] Schannel CertificateMappingMethods={0} (UPN mapping allowed) - ESC10 certificate abuse possible if you can edit another user's UPN." -f $hex) -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    }
+    else {
+      Write-Host ("[i] Schannel CertificateMappingMethods={0} (UPN mapping flag not set)." -f $hex)
+    }
+    if ($adcsInfo.ServiceState) {
+      Write-Host ("[i] AD CS service state: {0}" -f $adcsInfo.ServiceState)
+    }
+  }
+  else {
+    Write-Host "[i] Could not read Schannel certificate mapping configuration." -ForegroundColor DarkGray
+  }
+}
+
+
 Write-Host ""
 if ($TimeStamp) { TimeElapsed }
 Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| ARP Table"