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Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: bloodyAD: Active Directory Privilege Escalation Swiss Army Knife

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HackTricks News Bot
2025-11-15 12:56:39 +00:00
parent d75525ebbc
commit 9dc23cf01d
2 changed files with 325 additions and 1 deletions
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4
winPEAS/winPEASexe/README.md
View File

@@ -279,3 +279,7 @@ If you find any issue, please report it using **[github issues](https://github.c
## Advisory
All the scripts/binaries of the PEAS Suite should be used for authorized penetration testing and/or educational purposes only. Any misuse of this software will not be the responsibility of the author or of any other collaborator. Use it at your own networks and/or with the network owner's permission.
- AD ACL opportunities for bloodyAD:
- Password reset rights over privileged users and computers (Reset Password extended right or equivalent GenericAll/WriteDacl/WriteOwner/property writes).
- Shadow credentials possible where msDS-KeyCredentialLink is writable on user/computer objects.
- AD-integrated DNS zones writable by the current principal (zone ACLs) and DnsAdmins membership.

322
winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/Checks/ActiveDirectoryInfo.cs
View File

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
new List<Action>
{
PrintGmsaReadableByCurrentPrincipal,
PrintAdcsMisconfigurations
PrintAdcsMisconfigurations,
PrintAdAclPrivescCandidates
}.ForEach(action => CheckRunner.Run(action, isDebug));
}
@@ -64,6 +65,32 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
? r.Properties[name][0]?.ToString()
: null;
}
private static Guid? GetAttributeSchemaGuid(string ldapDisplayName)
{
try
{
var schemaNC = GetRootDseProp("schemaNamingContext");
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(schemaNC)) return null;
using (var baseDe = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + schemaNC))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(baseDe))
{
ds.PageSize = 50;
ds.Filter = "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(lDAPDisplayName=" + ldapDisplayName + "))";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("schemaIDGUID");
var res = ds.FindOne();
if (res == null) return null;
var guidBytes = res.Properties["schemaIDGUID"]?.Count > 0 ? res.Properties["schemaIDGUID"][0] as byte[] : null;
if (guidBytes == null || guidBytes.Length != 16) return null;
return new Guid(guidBytes);
}
}
catch
{
return null;
}
}
// Detect gMSA objects where the current principal (or one of its groups) can retrieve the managed password
private void PrintGmsaReadableByCurrentPrincipal()
@@ -341,6 +368,299 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
Beaprint.PrintException(ex.Message);
}
// Enumerate quick, high-signal AD ACL opportunities that tools like bloodyAD can abuse
// - Password reset rights over privileged users (Reset Password ER or equivalent)
// - Shadow credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink writable) on users/computers
// - AD-Integrated DNS zones where we can write/create records; DnsAdmins membership
private void PrintAdAclPrivescCandidates()
{
try
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("AD ACL-based escalation opportunities (bloodyAD)");
Beaprint.LinkPrint(
"https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD",
"Detect objects where you could reset passwords, write shadow credentials, or modify AD‑integrated DNS");
if (!Checks.IsPartOfDomain)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Host is not domain-joined. Skipping.");
return;
}
var defaultNC = GetRootDseProp("defaultNamingContext");
var rootDomainNC = GetRootDseProp("rootDomainNamingContext") ?? defaultNC;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(defaultNC))
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Could not resolve defaultNamingContext.");
return;
}
var currentSidSet = GetCurrentSidSet();
// Resolve attribute/extended-right GUIDs we care about
var resetPwdGuid = new Guid("00299570-246D-11D0-A768-00AA006E0529");
var unicodePwdGuid = GetAttributeSchemaGuid("unicodePwd");
var userPasswordGuid = GetAttributeSchemaGuid("userPassword");
var kclGuid = GetAttributeSchemaGuid("msDS-KeyCredentialLink");
// Build a small set of high-value targets
var targets = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase); // dn -> name
// 1) Members of Domain Admins
try
{
using (var baseDe = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + defaultNC))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(baseDe))
{
ds.Filter = "(&(objectClass=group)(sAMAccountName=Domain Admins))";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("distinguishedName");
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("member");
var g = ds.FindOne();
if (g != null)
{
var members = g.Properties["member"];
if (members != null)
{
foreach (var m in members)
{
var dn = m.ToString();
try
{
using (var de = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + dn))
{
var name = de.Properties["sAMAccountName"]?.Value as string ?? dn;
if (!targets.ContainsKey(dn)) targets.Add(dn, name);
}
}
catch { }
}
}
}
}
}
catch { }
// 2) AdminSDHolder-protected users (adminCount=1)
try
{
using (var baseDe = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + defaultNC))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(baseDe))
{
ds.PageSize = 300;
ds.Filter = "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person)(adminCount=1))";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("distinguishedName");
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("sAMAccountName");
foreach (SearchResult r in ds.FindAll())
{
var dn = GetProp(r, "distinguishedName");
var name = GetProp(r, "sAMAccountName") ?? dn;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(dn) && !targets.ContainsKey(dn)) targets.Add(dn, name);
}
}
}
catch { }
// 3) Domain Controllers (computer objects)
try
{
using (var baseDe = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + defaultNC))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(baseDe))
{
ds.PageSize = 100;
// UAC bit 8192 = SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
ds.Filter = "(&(objectClass=computer)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192))";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("distinguishedName");
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("sAMAccountName");
foreach (SearchResult r in ds.FindAll())
{
var dn = GetProp(r, "distinguishedName");
var name = GetProp(r, "sAMAccountName") ?? dn;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(dn) && !targets.ContainsKey(dn)) targets.Add(dn, name);
}
}
}
catch { }
int pwdResetHits = 0, shadowHits = 0;
var maxToShow = 10;
foreach (var kv in targets)
{
DirectoryEntry de = null;
try
{
de = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + kv.Key);
de.Options.SecurityMasks = SecurityMasks.Dacl;
de.RefreshCache(new[] { "ntSecurityDescriptor" });
}
catch
{
de?.Dispose();
continue;
}
try
{
var sd = de.ObjectSecurity;
var rules = sd.GetAccessRules(true, true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier));
bool canPwdReset = false;
bool canShadow = false;
var hitRightsPwd = new HashSet<string>();
var hitRightsKcl = new HashSet<string>();
foreach (ActiveDirectoryAccessRule rule in rules)
{
if (rule.AccessControlType != AccessControlType.Allow) continue;
var sid = (rule.IdentityReference as SecurityIdentifier)?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sid) || !currentSidSet.Contains(sid)) continue;
var rights = rule.ActiveDirectoryRights;
// Password reset via ER or powerful rights
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.GenericAll))
{
canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("GenericAll");
}
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.WriteOwner)) { canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("WriteOwner"); }
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.WriteDacl)) { canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("WriteDacl"); }
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.ExtendedRight) && rule.ObjectType == resetPwdGuid)
{ canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("ResetPassword"); }
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.WriteProperty))
{
if (unicodePwdGuid.HasValue && rule.ObjectType == unicodePwdGuid.Value) { canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("Write unicodePwd"); }
if (userPasswordGuid.HasValue && rule.ObjectType == userPasswordGuid.Value) { canPwdReset = true; hitRightsPwd.Add("Write userPassword"); }
}
// Shadow credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink)
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.GenericAll))
{
canShadow = true; hitRightsKcl.Add("GenericAll");
}
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.WriteProperty) && kclGuid.HasValue && rule.ObjectType == kclGuid.Value)
{
canShadow = true; hitRightsKcl.Add("Write msDS-KeyCredentialLink");
}
}
if (canPwdReset)
{
pwdResetHits++;
if (pwdResetHits <= maxToShow)
Beaprint.BadPrint($" [PasswordReset] {kv.Value} -> {kv.Key} ({string.Join(", ", hitRightsPwd)})");
}
if (canShadow)
{
shadowHits++;
if (shadowHits <= maxToShow)
Beaprint.BadPrint($" [ShadowCreds] {kv.Value} -> {kv.Key} ({string.Join(", ", hitRightsKcl)})");
}
}
catch { }
finally { de?.Dispose(); }
}
if (pwdResetHits == 0) Beaprint.GoodPrint(" No obvious password reset rights over high-value objects found.");
else Beaprint.BadPrint($" => {pwdResetHits} potential password reset target(s) over high-value objects.");
if (shadowHits == 0) Beaprint.GoodPrint(" No writable msDS-KeyCredentialLink found on high-value objects.");
else Beaprint.BadPrint($" => {shadowHits} potential shadow credentials target(s) over high-value objects.");
// DNS: membership + zone ACLs
try
{
using (var baseDe = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://" + defaultNC))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(baseDe))
{
ds.Filter = "(&(objectClass=group)(sAMAccountName=DnsAdmins))";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("objectSid");
var res = ds.FindOne();
if (res != null && res.Properties["objectSid"].Count > 0)
{
var sid = new SecurityIdentifier((byte[])res.Properties["objectSid"][0], 0).Value;
if (currentSidSet.Contains(sid))
Beaprint.BadPrint(" [DNS] Current principal is a member of DnsAdmins.");
}
}
}
catch { }
int dnsAclHits = 0;
foreach (var partition in new[] { $"DC=DomainDnsZones,{defaultNC}", $"DC=ForestDnsZones,{rootDomainNC}" })
{
try
{
using (var msDns = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=MicrosoftDNS," + partition))
using (var ds = new DirectorySearcher(msDns))
{
ds.PageSize = 200;
ds.Filter = "(objectClass=dnsZone)";
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("distinguishedName");
ds.PropertiesToLoad.Add("name");
foreach (SearchResult r in ds.FindAll())
{
DirectoryEntry zone = null;
try
{
zone = r.GetDirectoryEntry();
zone.Options.SecurityMasks = SecurityMasks.Dacl;
zone.RefreshCache(new[] { "ntSecurityDescriptor" });
}
catch
{
zone?.Dispose();
continue;
}
try
{
bool canWriteZone = false;
var sd = zone.ObjectSecurity;
var rules = sd.GetAccessRules(true, true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier));
foreach (ActiveDirectoryAccessRule rule in rules)
{
if (rule.AccessControlType != AccessControlType.Allow) continue;
var sid = (rule.IdentityReference as SecurityIdentifier)?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sid) || !currentSidSet.Contains(sid)) continue;
var rights = rule.ActiveDirectoryRights;
if (rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.GenericAll) ||
rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.WriteProperty) ||
rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.CreateChild) ||
rights.HasFlag(ActiveDirectoryRights.DeleteChild))
{
canWriteZone = true;
break;
}
}
if (canWriteZone)
{
dnsAclHits++;
var zname = GetProp(r, "name") ?? GetProp(r, "distinguishedName") ?? "<zone>";
if (dnsAclHits <= maxToShow)
Beaprint.BadPrint($" [DNS] Writable AD‑integrated zone: {zname}");
}
}
catch { }
finally { zone?.Dispose(); }
}
}
}
catch { }
}
if (dnsAclHits == 0) Beaprint.GoodPrint(" No writable AD‑integrated DNS zones detected for current principal.");
else Beaprint.BadPrint($" => {dnsAclHits} AD‑integrated DNS zone(s) appear writable.");
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [!] Error during AD ACL checks: " + ex.Message);
}
}
}
}
}