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254 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Carlos Polop
6d79e9c46b test: skip long peass checks in PR-tests for workflow-chain validation 2026-02-13 21:13:43 +01:00
SirBroccoli
99111a2844 ci: harden chack rerun flow and restore macos pip compatibility (#593) 2026-02-13 20:47:41 +01:00
chack-agent
231dc93ebe Fix CI failures for PR #591 2026-02-13 19:44:24 +00:00
Carlos Polop
f7f4695b5d test: make intentional builder break linux-only 2026-02-13 20:38:33 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a0d3cf3372 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into test/chack-actions-e2e-codex-v2 2026-02-13 20:37:11 +01:00
Carlos Polop
c10f03955d chore: retrigger PR-tests after macOS CI hotfix 2026-02-13 20:35:58 +01:00
SirBroccoli
c3a942fdba ci: remove macOS pip break-system-packages flags (#592) 2026-02-13 20:35:41 +01:00
Carlos Polop
db0adb7e33 test: add subuid/subgid check and inject linpeas builder failure 2026-02-13 18:16:44 +01:00
SirBroccoli
7ca05693ef ci: fix chack agent_config key for task-steps init (#590) 2026-02-13 18:15:25 +01:00
SirBroccoli
0ec20d2512 ci: enable chack workflow_run jobs and use codex backend (#589) 2026-02-13 18:11:02 +01:00
Carlos Polop
3e2af030d4 f 2026-02-12 20:02:37 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ec746e73e3 additions 2026-02-12 03:44:02 +01:00
Carlos Polop
6a1d1efe95 ci: temporarily disable all chack-agent workflows 2026-02-11 19:36:26 +01:00
Carlos Polop
cf3565d7e0 Revert "test: intentional ci break for chack agent workflow validation"
This reverts commit 386ef0642a.
2026-02-11 17:17:46 +01:00
Carlos Polop
386ef0642a test: intentional ci break for chack agent workflow validation 2026-02-11 17:05:14 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0680509774 Use CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL repository secret in workflows 2026-02-11 16:42:13 +01:00
Carlos Polop
3b0a8fd616 Set CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL for chack-agent workflows 2026-02-11 16:40:59 +01:00
Carlos Polop
62ef61af0f Do not fail workflow when token cannot push workflow-touching refs 2026-02-11 15:57:06 +01:00
Carlos Polop
b6c4474c27 Skip auto-push when workflow files remain staged 2026-02-11 15:46:13 +01:00
Carlos Polop
4650d6b8ad Exclude untracked workflow files from chack-agent auto-fix commits 2026-02-11 15:35:18 +01:00
Carlos Polop
354e3b81fb Harden chack-agent auto-commit against workflow permission rejects 2026-02-11 15:26:27 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2848feda9b Remove max_turns caps and harden triage output parsing 2026-02-11 15:08:27 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0bec3535dc Remove timeout limits from chack-agent workflow steps 2026-02-11 14:26:32 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2b1ab21f66 Disable self-critique and enforce task-list init in workflows 2026-02-11 14:24:43 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a8c5967d21 Bound chack-agent runtime and use faster model 2026-02-11 14:11:25 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1e68040be3 Cap chack-agent workflow runs with max_turns 2026-02-11 14:00:03 +01:00
Carlos Polop
143a20f17e Fallback to github.token when CHACK_AGENT_FIXER_TOKEN is unset 2026-02-11 13:39:57 +01:00
Carlos Polop
de542f05a4 Use chack-agent default branch in workflows 2026-02-11 13:32:19 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a10675d58f Migrate Codex workflows to Chack Agent 2026-02-11 13:31:28 +01:00
SirBroccoli
5c110bd4f8 Fix/systemd generated vars ci (#584)
* Fix Systemd module generated vars metadata

* add auto master fix

* f
2026-02-11 11:43:32 +01:00
SirBroccoli
c1bf38a8ab Auto-merge PR #581 (Codex) 2026-02-03 23:34:53 +00:00
Carlos Polop
04c0b8aab3 f 2026-02-03 18:11:07 +01:00
SirBroccoli
a6c0491438 Auto-merge PR #578 (Codex)
Co-authored-by: HackTricks PEASS Autoimprover <peass-autoimprover@hacktricks.xyz>
2026-01-31 12:54:24 +00:00
SirBroccoli
fce28d2b81 Auto-merge PR #579 (Codex)
* autoimprover: simplify linpeas checks

* Fix CI failures for PR #579

---------

Co-authored-by: HackTricks PEASS Autoimprover <peass-autoimprover@hacktricks.xyz>
Co-authored-by: codex-action <codex-action@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-31 12:54:18 +00:00
Carlos Polop
fcc78b919a Fix Codex workflow gh usage 2026-01-31 13:19:50 +01:00
Martin Frandel
29d350fa79 Fixed binding error (#577)
Co-authored-by: Martin <git@frandel.eu>
2026-01-29 00:55:42 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1473fedcbf Fix linPEAS module section path matching 2026-01-21 15:21:50 +01:00
Carlos Polop
f8f4250b81 Add stronger winPEAS/linPEAS tests 2026-01-21 15:14:08 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1fb419fa0c Reduce CI warnings (actions versions, outputs, ruleset) 2026-01-21 13:52:20 +01:00
Carlos Polop
651dc9cd7d Force-copy TestPlatform framework for MSTest 2026-01-21 12:53:49 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0808fb7f1b Ensure MSTest adapter finds TestPlatform framework 2026-01-21 12:24:56 +01:00
Carlos Polop
c332fab519 Fix MSTest adapter dependency load 2026-01-21 11:55:35 +01:00
Carlos Polop
577dcc9964 Fix MSTest framework copy-local for CI 2026-01-21 11:27:00 +01:00
Carlos Polop
b591f3d524 Fix winPEAS argument parsing tests 2026-01-21 10:57:32 +01:00
Carlos Polop
b3ac8c6d22 Stabilize winPEAS MSBuild in CI 2026-01-21 01:47:37 +01:00
Carlos Polop
83580fcd8a Re-enable winPEAS tests and add linPEAS builder checks 2026-01-21 01:15:38 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ab3a5899de Gate codex fixer job on PR author 2026-01-21 01:04:06 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0fac664048 Fix winPEAS build break in Program.Main 2026-01-21 00:32:09 +01:00
SirBroccoli
db30e3bd7d Fix Browser_profiles module ID casing (#576) 2026-01-20 23:54:30 +01:00
SirBroccoli
7ad87a85e6 Use PAT for fixer pushes and limit to one attempt (#575)
* Test CI failure flow

* Use PAT for fixer pushes and run only once per PR
2026-01-20 23:54:19 +01:00
Carlos Polop
b24694f00b Gate codex triage on successful PR tests 2026-01-20 23:23:42 +01:00
Carlos Polop
e777c81eba Run Codex triage after PR tests succeed 2026-01-20 23:23:42 +01:00
SirBroccoli
21a86bc365 Auto-merge PR #573 (Codex) 2026-01-20 22:17:38 +00:00
SirBroccoli
ac7cb9c73c Auto-merge PR #572 (Codex) 2026-01-20 22:17:02 +00:00
SirBroccoli
d054715fbd Merge pull request #564 from peass-ng/fix/issue-410-printnightmare
Check PrintNightmare PointAndPrint policy
2026-01-20 23:06:58 +01:00
SirBroccoli
b4c1043a93 Merge branch 'master' into fix/issue-410-printnightmare 2026-01-20 23:06:29 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1b8706aac6 Handle missing PointAndPrint values in PS1 2026-01-20 23:04:35 +01:00
SirBroccoli
3371be7bd6 Merge pull request #557 from peass-ng/fix/issue-474-service-timeout
Add timeout to service enumeration
2026-01-20 23:02:35 +01:00
SirBroccoli
2344f5b106 Auto-merge PR #570 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:25:25 +00:00
SirBroccoli
485f91d46c Auto-merge PR #569 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:25:00 +00:00
SirBroccoli
018e8866e6 Auto-merge PR #568 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:24:04 +00:00
SirBroccoli
d707317278 Auto-merge PR #567 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:23:33 +00:00
SirBroccoli
f4ef371afc Auto-merge PR #566 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:22:47 +00:00
SirBroccoli
61f6282b5f Auto-merge PR #565 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:22:35 +00:00
codex-action
a363541d77 Fix CI failures for PR #564 2026-01-20 17:09:07 +00:00
Carlos Polop
6fc41c9a23 Add PrintNightmare PointAndPrint policy check 2026-01-20 18:03:55 +01:00
SirBroccoli
170a4b2c70 Auto-merge PR #563 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:03:45 +00:00
codex-action
710709834a Fix CI failures for PR #557 2026-01-20 17:03:40 +00:00
SirBroccoli
21b2bac892 Auto-merge PR #562 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:03:14 +00:00
SirBroccoli
5fdb99b38e Auto-merge PR #561 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:02:17 +00:00
SirBroccoli
787bc8fa8a Auto-merge PR #560 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:01:24 +00:00
SirBroccoli
c5401bd33d Auto-merge PR #559 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:00:50 +00:00
SirBroccoli
bd18d96837 Auto-merge PR #558 (Codex) 2026-01-20 17:00:10 +00:00
SirBroccoli
ede5960b7c Auto-merge PR #556 (Codex) 2026-01-20 16:59:18 +00:00
Carlos Polop
c54f483648 Add timeout to service enumeration in extra checks 2026-01-20 17:58:36 +01:00
SirBroccoli
e533bf3ba5 Auto-merge PR #555 (Codex) 2026-01-20 16:58:29 +00:00
SirBroccoli
66c3d4e342 Merge pull request #554 from peass-ng/fix-pr-failure-dispatch-context-2
Fix pr failure dispatch context 2
2026-01-20 17:46:27 +01:00
Carlos Polop
917f88b76c f 2026-01-20 17:45:55 +01:00
Carlos Polop
21a967acb5 fix urls 2026-01-20 13:59:32 +01:00
Carlos Polop
4155093e56 fix 2026-01-19 13:28:51 +01:00
Carlos Polop
be1b0cdbd0 f 2026-01-19 01:27:47 +01:00
SirBroccoli
89a55bde9b Auto-merge PR #553 (Codex) 2026-01-18 23:11:38 +00:00
Carlos Polop
4308caddf1 Fix PR context parsing in failure dispatch 2026-01-19 00:10:42 +01:00
SirBroccoli
54fc62d29b Auto-merge PR #552 (Codex) 2026-01-18 23:06:21 +00:00
SirBroccoli
9216b31b10 Auto-merge PR #550 (Codex)
* f

* new actions

* Doc tweak for Codex merge test
2026-01-18 22:59:38 +00:00
SirBroccoli
9d8a14d2ec Merge pull request #545 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-ECS_on_EC2__Covering_Gaps_in_IMDS_Ha_20251229_015718
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: ECS on EC2 Covering Gaps in IMDS Hardeni...
2026-01-17 16:25:39 +01:00
SirBroccoli
9c49dfd2bb Merge pull request #529 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Pwning_ASUS_DriverHub__MSI_Center__A_20251207_130236
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer ...
2026-01-17 16:06:06 +01:00
SirBroccoli
9acc2ef61d Merge pull request #540 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: The Windows Registry Adventure, Part 8 E...
2026-01-17 16:05:46 +01:00
Carlos Polop
e7663381f2 Merge master into PR 529 and resolve ServicesInfo conflict 2026-01-17 15:52:44 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ce5bd84575 Merge ECS IMDS checks into ECS module 2026-01-17 15:48:55 +01:00
SirBroccoli
c447ca993d Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635 2026-01-17 15:45:17 +01:00
SirBroccoli
a1aa60faf8 Merge pull request #544 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Kerberoasting__Low-Tech__High-Impact_20251229_013424
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Kerberoasting Low-Tech, High-Impact Atta...
2026-01-17 15:42:18 +01:00
SirBroccoli
e81c436d80 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Kerberoasting__Low-Tech__High-Impact_20251229_013424 2026-01-17 15:42:10 +01:00
SirBroccoli
f4883f814e Merge pull request #543 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-CVE-2025-38352___In-the-wild_Android_20251222_130932
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: CVE-2025-38352 – In-the-wild Android Ker...
2026-01-17 15:38:51 +01:00
SirBroccoli
4a7fb83165 Merge pull request #541 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-From_Chrome_Renderer_Code_Execution__20251217_020557
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: From Chrome Renderer Code Execution to L...
2026-01-17 15:36:28 +01:00
SirBroccoli
ff13e8bebb Merge pull request #534 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-SOAPwn__Pwning__NET_Framework_Applic_20251211_184735
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: SOAPwn Pwning .NET Framework Application...
2026-01-17 15:35:26 +01:00
SirBroccoli
e80425aa3d Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-SOAPwn__Pwning__NET_Framework_Applic_20251211_184735 2026-01-17 15:35:19 +01:00
SirBroccoli
dc5ae45cc3 Merge pull request #535 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-HTB_WhiteRabbit__n8n_HMAC_Forgery__S_20251213_183617
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB WhiteRabbit n8n HMAC Forgery, SQL In...
2026-01-17 15:35:02 +01:00
SirBroccoli
ff21b3dcb9 Delete linPEAS/builder/linpeas_parts/6_users_information/19_Sudo_restic.sh 2026-01-17 15:34:34 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2f44379713 Fix registry hive resolution in ACL scanner 2026-01-17 15:33:09 +01:00
SirBroccoli
2c6cbfa43d Updating sudoB.sh with variables information 2026-01-17 15:32:29 +01:00
SirBroccoli
8ae2667800 Merge pull request #539 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Windows_Exploitation_Technique__Ampl_20251217_012647
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Windows Exploitation Technique Amplifyin...
2026-01-17 15:30:39 +01:00
SirBroccoli
43a7684621 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Windows_Exploitation_Technique__Ampl_20251217_012647 2026-01-17 15:30:32 +01:00
SirBroccoli
182c8974fd Merge pull request #538 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Inside_Ink_Dragon__Revealing_the_Rel_20251216_185841
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Inside Ink Dragon Revealing the Relay Ne...
2026-01-17 15:29:36 +01:00
SirBroccoli
7b4a83d51d Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Inside_Ink_Dragon__Revealing_the_Rel_20251216_185841 2026-01-17 15:29:29 +01:00
SirBroccoli
8aa05e13a4 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-SOAPwn__Pwning__NET_Framework_Applic_20251211_184735 2026-01-17 15:27:28 +01:00
Carlos Polop
4559fd09ea Fix SOAP service enumeration yield in try/catch 2026-01-17 15:25:23 +01:00
SirBroccoli
4f8a3b3f25 Merge pull request #531 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-pipetap___A_Windows_Named_Pipe_Multi_20251209_013140
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: pipetap – A Windows Named Pipe Multi-too...
2026-01-17 15:24:20 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0ed7a39a7d Fix unassigned out vars in OEM pipe check 2026-01-17 15:21:50 +01:00
SirBroccoli
974cfe028f Merge pull request #533 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Cracking_ValleyRAT__From_Builder_Sec_20251210_185002
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Cracking ValleyRAT From Builder Secrets ...
2026-01-17 15:20:38 +01:00
SirBroccoli
f627e80a1b Merge pull request #528 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-LDAP_BOF_Collection___In_Memory_LDAP_20251207_013625
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: LDAP BOF Collection – In‑Memory LDAP Too...
2026-01-17 15:15:36 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a83d33d409 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-LDAP_BOF_Collection___In_Memory_LDAP_20251207_013625 2026-01-17 13:36:53 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1cdd473d79 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Pwning_ASUS_DriverHub__MSI_Center__A_20251207_130236 2026-01-17 13:36:49 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0e29450869 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-pipetap___A_Windows_Named_Pipe_Multi_20251209_013140 2026-01-17 13:36:45 +01:00
Carlos Polop
efe9c1625f Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Cracking_ValleyRAT__From_Builder_Sec_20251210_185002 2026-01-17 13:36:41 +01:00
Carlos Polop
4255330728 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-SOAPwn__Pwning__NET_Framework_Applic_20251211_184735 2026-01-17 13:36:38 +01:00
Carlos Polop
8f928f8c5d Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-linpeas-HTB_WhiteRabbit__n8n_HMAC_Forgery__S_20251213_183617 2026-01-17 13:36:34 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0e8959a6db Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Inside_Ink_Dragon__Revealing_the_Rel_20251216_185841 2026-01-17 13:36:30 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ea787df91c Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Windows_Exploitation_Technique__Ampl_20251217_012647 2026-01-17 13:36:26 +01:00
Carlos Polop
c14f9aeb30 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635 2026-01-17 13:36:22 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a86dedb553 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-linpeas-From_Chrome_Renderer_Code_Execution__20251217_020557 2026-01-17 13:36:18 +01:00
Carlos Polop
7e4743d9be Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-linpeas-CVE-2025-38352___In-the-wild_Android_20251222_130932 2026-01-17 13:36:10 +01:00
Carlos Polop
14aa117a0e Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Kerberoasting__Low-Tech__High-Impact_20251229_013424 2026-01-17 13:36:06 +01:00
Carlos Polop
7016e5a0b4 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-linpeas-ECS_on_EC2__Covering_Gaps_in_IMDS_Ha_20251229_015718 2026-01-17 13:36:02 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2046d18e5d chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:44 +01:00
Carlos Polop
7a5aa8dcae chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:40 +01:00
Carlos Polop
34d0f18aad chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:37 +01:00
Carlos Polop
b66eebcc3d chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:33 +01:00
Carlos Polop
49644a9813 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:29 +01:00
Carlos Polop
35eb4f5be7 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:25 +01:00
Carlos Polop
13656ba172 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:21 +01:00
Carlos Polop
8c043b6164 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:18 +01:00
Carlos Polop
aca58f36b9 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:14 +01:00
Carlos Polop
dc7ce70104 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:10 +01:00
Carlos Polop
a5114ef5dd chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:02 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ff41d5b0e7 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:16:58 +01:00
Carlos Polop
fa58c6688b chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:16:54 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2f9115f97d chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:24 +01:00
Carlos Polop
3aa04a53fc chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:20 +01:00
Carlos Polop
373ed3cce2 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:17 +01:00
Carlos Polop
8eec7cf7f9 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:13 +01:00
Carlos Polop
79d53de4cf chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:09 +01:00
Carlos Polop
3a89398e39 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:05 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1d4b748cbc Fix builder GTFOBins parsing and protections metadata 2026-01-16 18:07:04 +01:00
Carlos Polop
69371f825e Fix GTFOBins list fetch for linpeas builder 2026-01-16 18:01:40 +01:00
Carlos Polop
72dbd9ef28 Fix PR tests Go setup and update linpeas parts 2026-01-16 17:56:34 +01:00
SirBroccoli
32e9bf657a Merge pull request #537 from Apursuit/fix-busybox-su-false-positive
Fix `su` bruteforce false positives on BusyBox systems (bbsuid)
2026-01-16 17:47:57 +01:00
SirBroccoli
d6bd661460 Merge pull request #525 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-HTB__Era___IDORs__PHP_ssh2_exec_Wrap_20251129_184039
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB Era – IDORs, PHP ssh2.exec Wrapper R...
2026-01-16 17:38:44 +01:00
SirBroccoli
ed6263a4b3 Merge pull request #524 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-Metasploit_Wrap-Up_11_28_2025_20251129_012934
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Metasploit Wrap-Up 11/28/2025
2026-01-16 17:34:21 +01:00
SirBroccoli
93bb3e1a64 Merge pull request #523 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Metasploit_Wrap-Up_11_14_2025_20251127_132610
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Metasploit Wrap-Up 11/14/2025
2026-01-16 17:33:05 +01:00
SirBroccoli
bf9d474cd3 Merge pull request #546 from JohannesLks/fix/ssh-key-regex-false-positive
fix: SSH key regex false positive with ImageMagick mime.xml
2026-01-16 17:31:28 +01:00
SirBroccoli
f856f0b588 Merge pull request #547 from JohannesLks/fix/rdcman-credentials-highlight
fix: Highlight stored credentials in RDCMan.settings
2026-01-14 16:57:35 +01:00
JohannesLks
9d35195c56 fix: Highlight stored credentials in RDCMan.settings
RDCMan.settings files can contain encrypted credentials in
credentialsProfiles sections. This change enables content
inspection to highlight:

- credentialsProfiles (indicates stored credentials)
- password (encrypted password value)
- encryptedPassword (alternative password field)

Previously, just_list_file only showed the file path without
inspecting contents, causing stored credentials to be missed.
2026-01-01 22:53:40 +01:00
JohannesLks
4abbf37cc0 fix: SSH key regex false positive with ImageMagick mime.xml
The regex '-----BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*-----' was matching
'-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----' in /etc/ImageMagick-6/mime.xml,
causing a false positive for SSH keys.

Fixed by removing the trailing .* before ----- so the regex now requires
the key header to end directly with -----, which excludes PGP key
definitions that have 'BLOCK-----' at the end.

Tested key types still detected:
- RSA PRIVATE KEY
- EC PRIVATE KEY
- OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY
- DSA PRIVATE KEY
2026-01-01 14:07:08 +01:00
HackTricks News Bot
e77867b2d3 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: ECS on EC2: Covering Gaps in IMDS Hardening 2025-12-29 02:02:46 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
be72fecfa8 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Kerberoasting: Low-Tech, High-Impact Attacks from Legacy Kerberos Crypto 2025-12-29 01:42:21 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
0e52c2feea Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: CVE-2025-38352 – In-the-wild Android Kernel Vulnerability Analysis and PoC 2025-12-22 13:20:16 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
1039cc2eff Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: From Chrome Renderer Code Execution to Linux Kernel RCE via AF_UNIX MSG_OOB (CVE 2025-12-17 02:19:32 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
3268701ed6 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: The Windows Registry Adventure, Part 8: Exploitation of Hive-based Memory Corrup 2025-12-17 02:00:18 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
488d388830 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Windows Exploitation Technique: Amplifying Race Windows via Slow Object Manager 2025-12-17 01:34:41 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
85aa98a841 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Inside Ink Dragon: Revealing the Relay Network and Inner Workings of a Stealthy 2025-12-16 19:11:20 +00:00
npc
10b087febf Fix su bruteforce false positives on BusyBox systems (bbsuid)
Fix su bruteforce false positives on BusyBox systems (bbsuid)
2025-12-15 20:23:52 +08:00
SirBroccoli
b4a1382e8a Merge pull request #536 from DotNetRussell/patch-1
Fix wording in privilege escalation checklist
2025-12-15 09:52:13 +01:00
DNR
877b9b81ce Fix wording in privilege escalation checklist 2025-12-14 12:45:02 -05:00
HackTricks News Bot
74521345f6 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB WhiteRabbit: n8n HMAC Forgery, SQL Injection, restic Abuse, and Time-Seeded 2025-12-13 18:41:50 +00:00
carlospolop
0277e447f0 f 2025-12-12 16:25:36 +01:00
carlospolop
b09bd92116 f 2025-12-12 14:28:17 +01:00
SirBroccoli
8f017f98d3 Merge pull request #532 from compass-dexter/fix/ssh-AuthorizedKeysFile
[LINPEAS] fix(linPEAS): grep for AuthorizedKeysFile
2025-12-12 00:44:51 +01:00
SirBroccoli
17cfc6c56e Merge pull request #530 from Xyniath/master
[WINPEAS] Fix misspelling of SeDebugPrivilege in winPEAS output
2025-12-12 00:44:30 +01:00
HackTricks News Bot
6100bfaceb Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: SOAPwn: Pwning .NET Framework Applications Through HTTP Client Proxies and WSDL 2025-12-11 19:05:05 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
9123910f9d Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Cracking ValleyRAT: From Builder Secrets to Kernel Rootkits 2025-12-10 19:18:07 +00:00
compass-dexter
7e0f678f33 fix(linPEAS): grep for AuthorizedKeysFile
According to sshd_config(5) this is the correct setting
2025-12-10 16:58:13 +01:00
HackTricks News Bot
b7b7aebf1c Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: pipetap – A Windows Named Pipe Multi-tool and Proxy for Intercepting and Replayi 2025-12-09 02:07:57 +00:00
Matt
595e021864 fix: correct typo of SeDebugPrivilege 2025-12-08 00:27:02 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
6c75f10fae Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and Razer Synapse 4 2025-12-07 13:22:49 +00:00
SirBroccoli
94e84dec91 Merge pull request #521 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-HackTheBox_Mirage__Chaining_NFS_Leak_20251122_183905
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HackTheBox Mirage Chaining NFS Leaks, Dy...
2025-12-07 13:23:17 +01:00
SirBroccoli
ac80ce3a9a Merge pull request #520 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-SupaPwn__Hacking_Our_Way_into_Lovabl_20251119_184112
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: SupaPwn Hacking Our Way into Lovable’s O...
2025-12-07 13:22:12 +01:00
SirBroccoli
313fe6bef5 Update README.md 2025-12-07 13:21:52 +01:00
HackTricks News Bot
4dad7599e6 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: LDAP BOF Collection – In‑Memory LDAP Toolkit for Active Directory Exploitation 2025-12-07 01:59:18 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
b188ac34b6 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB: Era – IDORs, PHP ssh2.exec Wrapper RCE, and Custom-Signed Binary Privilege 2025-11-29 18:48:21 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
e99e64cddf Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: Metasploit Wrap-Up 11/28/2025 2025-11-29 01:41:29 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
dd220af544 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Metasploit Wrap-Up 11/14/2025 2025-11-27 13:44:39 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
11c0d14561 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: HackTheBox Mirage: Chaining NFS Leaks, Dynamic DNS Abuse, NATS Credential Theft, 2025-11-22 18:54:22 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
49db1df468 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: SupaPwn: Hacking Our Way into Lovable’s Office and Helping Secure Supabase 2025-11-19 18:59:41 +00:00
SirBroccoli
80318c5005 Merge pull request #514 from moscowchill/bat-pr
Fix ANSI escape codes displaying as literal text in winPEAS.bat
2025-11-15 15:45:38 +01:00
SirBroccoli
7af6c33d39 Merge pull request #513 from sttlr/patch-1
Fix: LinPEASS doesn't run via metasploit module
2025-11-15 15:44:50 +01:00
moscow chill
336c53a163 Fix ANSI escape codes displaying as literal text in winPEAS.bat
The script was setting E=0x1B[ as a literal string instead of the actual
ESC character (ASCII 27), causing color codes to display as text like
"0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m" instead of rendering as colors.

Changed the SetOnce subroutine to properly capture the ESC character using
the 'prompt $E' technique before building the ANSI escape sequence prefix.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-29 20:16:34 +01:00
Max K.
6877f39193 Fix: LinPEASS doesn't run via metasploit module
If you set "WINPEASS" to "false" - it's a string, and therefore "true". So it would run WinPEASS anyway.

The fix converts value of the variable to string before comparing it.
2025-10-28 13:19:03 +02:00
SirBroccoli
d75525ebbc Merge pull request #512 from moscowchill/pr-bat-fix
Fix winPEAS.bat compatibility with Windows 11 and modern Windows 10
2025-10-28 01:51:48 +01:00
moscow chill
29d8132d93 Fix winPEAS.bat compatibility with Windows 11 and modern Windows 10
WMIC has been deprecated since Windows 10 20H1 and removed in Windows 11.
The script was exiting early when WMIC commands failed instead of continuing.

Changes:
- Add proper WMIC existence checks using 'where wmic' before execution
- Implement PowerShell fallbacks for all WMIC commands
- Fix hotfix enumeration (Get-HotFix)
- Fix antivirus detection (Get-CimInstance)
- Fix mounted disk enumeration (Get-PSDrive)
- Fix running process checks (Get-Process)
- Fix service binary permission checks (Get-CimInstance Win32_Service)
- Add error suppression (2>nul) to conditional WMIC exploit checks

The script now properly detects WMIC availability and falls back to
PowerShell equivalents, ensuring full functionality on modern Windows
systems while maintaining backward compatibility with older systems.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-27 16:10:42 +01:00
carlospolop
c16c5de36f f 2025-10-18 00:59:40 +02:00
SirBroccoli
be3fe91da4 Merge pull request #507 from CravateRouge/master
Add ADCS ESC DC registry checks
2025-10-07 10:50:43 +02:00
CravateRouge
b8b4a0fc14 Fix InterfaceFlags syntax 2025-10-07 11:14:45 +08:00
CravateRouge
7042a182df Add ADCS ESC DC registry checks 2025-10-06 17:18:44 +02:00
SirBroccoli
c83eef9cd8 Merge pull request #502 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-HTB_Planning__Grafana_CVE-2024-9264__20250913_182726
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB Planning Grafana CVE-2024-9264 to Co...
2025-10-04 10:38:22 +02:00
SirBroccoli
e15a1f2e12 Update 16_Crontab_UI_misconfig.sh 2025-10-04 10:38:02 +02:00
SirBroccoli
24e9c54290 Merge pull request #505 from jtothef/patch-1
Update README.md
2025-10-04 10:36:24 +02:00
SirBroccoli
bdb5c61dad Merge pull request #504 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-Forgotten_20250917_063428
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Forgotten
2025-10-04 10:36:09 +02:00
SirBroccoli
ee83c23a74 Update 16_Crontab_UI_misconfig.sh 2025-10-04 10:34:04 +02:00
SirBroccoli
7b36014699 Merge pull request #499 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-HTB_Environment__Laravel_env_overrid_20250907_013120
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB Environment Laravel env override (CV...
2025-10-04 10:29:32 +02:00
SirBroccoli
6fe8304783 Merge pull request #506 from tropkal/tropkal-patch-1
Update the regex for the sudo version
2025-10-04 10:29:01 +02:00
tropkal
262feb9896 Updated the sudo regex to catch 2 more CVE's. 2025-10-04 08:43:00 +02:00
tropkal
40cf08af85 Update sudovB.sh
Modified the regex that checks for vulnerable sudo versions to include sudo version 1.9.17 (not including 1.9.17p1), which is vulnerable to CVE-2025-32463 (https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/52352).
2025-10-04 09:08:37 +03:00
jtothef
7c9f431649 Update README.md
Fix typo
2025-09-23 12:49:05 -05:00
HackTricks News Bot
31bdb339d7 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: Forgotten 2025-09-17 06:48:40 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
bdcebadde0 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB Planning: Grafana CVE-2024-9264 to Container Root, Env-Creds Pivot, Crontab 2025-09-13 18:33:45 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
4b3f4aa19e Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB Environment: Laravel env override (CVE‑2024‑52301) → LFM upload RCE (CVE‑202 2025-09-07 01:38:03 +00:00
carlospolop
7c7884fb72 f tf 2025-09-05 01:04:53 +02:00
carlospolop
35300e499b tf 2025-09-05 01:04:18 +02:00
carlospolop
147de0fc88 f 2025-09-03 14:19:59 +02:00
carlospolop
afaf596342 f 2025-09-03 13:39:15 +02:00
SirBroccoli
215c5d074e Merge pull request #456 from peass-ng/dependabot/nuget/winPEAS/winPEASexe/Tests/System.Text.RegularExpressions-4.3.1
Bump System.Text.RegularExpressions from 4.3.0 to 4.3.1 in /winPEAS/winPEASexe/Tests
2025-09-03 13:36:40 +02:00
SirBroccoli
ca383a4548 Merge pull request #496 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-Case_study__Backup_leak___CI_abuse___20250827_193408
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Case study Backup leak → CI abuse → inte...
2025-09-03 13:36:13 +02:00
SirBroccoli
46264bf239 Merge pull request #497 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-HTB_Sendai__From_password_spray_to_g_20250828_184040
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB Sendai From password spray to gMSA d...
2025-09-03 13:31:10 +02:00
SirBroccoli
642c33304f Merge pull request #494 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-HTB__TheFrizz__High-level__redacted__20250827_190719
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: HTB TheFrizz (High-level, redacted for s...
2025-09-03 13:27:06 +02:00
HackTricks News Bot
54d861ab04 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB Sendai: From password spray to gMSA dump, then ADCS ESC4 or SQL+Silver Ticke 2025-08-28 18:51:59 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
bbb932d6d3 feat(winpeas): add ActiveDirectoryInfo check (gMSA readable passwords, AD CS template rights) and include in project 2025-08-28 18:50:51 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
626ea2d298 docs(usage): add activedirectoryinfo option to usage output 2025-08-28 18:50:22 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
ed01b32a95 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: Case study: Backup leak → CI abuse → internal trust misconfigurations → escalati 2025-08-27 19:45:02 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
c314cfd23d Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: HTB: TheFrizz (High-level, redacted for safety) 2025-08-27 19:14:43 +00:00
SirBroccoli
cc5ab76991 Merge pull request #486 from soobinrho/fix-typo-on-color-explanations
docs: fix typo (conten -> content)
2025-08-27 12:12:28 +02:00
carlospolop
36001d644e Merge branch 'master' of github.com:peass-ng/PEASS-ng 2025-08-25 11:18:18 +02:00
carlospolop
fdd414f4aa new workflow 2025-08-25 11:18:16 +02:00
Soobin Rho
c3e50dbdbf docs: fix typo (conten -> content) 2025-08-08 17:56:41 -05:00
SirBroccoli
41128808a6 Merge pull request #483 from securitytime/patch-1
Update Beaprint.cs
2025-07-01 16:23:13 +02:00
carlospolop
6fd96f4bdb f 2025-07-01 12:12:01 +02:00
carlospolop
a745f00dd7 fix 2025-07-01 11:10:21 +02:00
securitytime
933e12d7f1 Update Beaprint.cs
A space character is missing here:
"... educational purposes only.Any misuse of this software  ..."
2025-06-28 09:12:40 +02:00
SirBroccoli
4061cef7e8 Merge pull request #476 from peass-ng/codex/fix-url-reference-in-linpeasbuilder.py
Fix url variable reference in linpeasBuilder
2025-06-25 01:59:43 +02:00
SirBroccoli
b66ced3c63 Merge pull request #475 from peass-ng/codex/find-and-fix-a-bug
Fix parser global state reuse
2025-06-25 01:59:03 +02:00
SirBroccoli
cde725dacc Merge pull request #477 from peass-ng/codex/update-docstring-and-fix-typo
Fix docstring and comment in linpeasBuilder
2025-06-25 01:57:58 +02:00
SirBroccoli
f0f829890c Merge pull request #479 from peass-ng/codex/replace--parth--with--path--in-argparse
Fix typo in linpeas builder arg help
2025-06-25 01:57:11 +02:00
SirBroccoli
99c36b8562 Merge pull request #480 from Signum21/master
Fixed multiple bugs in Vulnerable Leaked Handlers
2025-06-25 01:56:58 +02:00
SirBroccoli
a74c6c820f Merge pull request #482 from Aarav-Juneja/builder-exclude-fix
Fix exclude modules on linPEASS
2025-06-25 01:55:48 +02:00
SirBroccoli
53fd4d8dc8 Merge pull request #481 from ertaku12/master
Added a privilege escalation vulnerability for MySQL 4.x/5.x versions.
2025-06-25 01:55:25 +02:00
Aarav Juneja
9b37fd4ef4 Fix exclude modules on linPEASS 2025-06-24 13:05:10 -07:00
John Doe
f27b1d4816 Added a privilege escalation vulnerability for MySQL 4.x/5.x versions. 2025-06-23 22:37:44 +03:00
Signum21
d335b9254f Fixed multiple bugs in Vulnerable Leaked Handlers 2025-06-15 20:59:20 +02:00
SirBroccoli
d5e3c2a885 Fix typo in linpeas builder output argument 2025-06-06 00:38:05 +02:00
SirBroccoli
4af321d138 Fix docstring and comment typo 2025-06-06 00:01:29 +02:00
SirBroccoli
4e556fd594 Fix variable reference when parsing URLs 2025-06-06 00:01:17 +02:00
SirBroccoli
39066f6867 Fix leftover debug code and reset state in parser 2025-06-06 00:00:39 +02:00
SirBroccoli
c3a93a57fe Merge pull request #473 from Signum21/master
Fix IdentityNotMappedException in Vulnerable Leaked Handlers
2025-05-31 22:36:49 +02:00
Signum21
f62d9fc550 Fix System.Security.Principal.IdentityNotMappedException in Vulnerable Leaked Handlers 2025-05-31 04:56:14 +02:00
SirBroccoli
11e9b8dde6 Merge pull request #472 from Jack-Vaughn/NoEnvVars-Update
Add 4 noisy environment variables to NoEnvVars.sh
2025-05-26 23:57:40 +02:00
Jack Vaughn
b9a9ad5ddf Add 4 noisy and useless environment variables to NoEnvVars.sh
These variables (^PATH=|^INVOCATION_ID=|^WATCHDOG_PID=|^LISTEN_PID=) frequently appear across processes 
on busy systems (10+ each on tested system) and produce a large volume of irrelevant output
2025-05-25 21:32:51 -04:00
carlospolop
88f08a405e l 2025-05-26 02:55:07 +02:00
SirBroccoli
322792c4ec Merge pull request #471 from Jack-Vaughn/environ-check
Add module to check for sensitive environment variables via /proc/*/environ
2025-05-26 02:33:43 +02:00
Jack
c150e63b52 This module scans /proc/*/environ for potentially sensitive environment variables on Linux systems.
It targets common keywords like token, password, secret, AWS, API, etc.

Uses 'tr' instead of 'strings' to improve compatibility in minimal environments like containers.

The check is skipped entirely on MacPEAS.
2025-05-25 12:55:34 -04:00
carlospolop
7b8dcfbe8d f 2025-05-25 08:17:07 +02:00
carlospolop
aac3667247 f l 2025-05-25 08:15:48 +02:00
carlospolop
64ab193d25 f linpeas 2025-05-25 07:05:48 +02:00
carlospolop
aab8241ede f 2025-05-25 02:21:39 +02:00
dependabot[bot]
859a44230d Bump System.Text.RegularExpressions in /winPEAS/winPEASexe/Tests
Bumps System.Text.RegularExpressions from 4.3.0 to 4.3.1.

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: System.Text.RegularExpressions
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2025-01-24 18:29:38 +00:00
125 changed files with 20169 additions and 2091 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"decision": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["merge", "comment"]
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"confidence": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["low", "medium", "high"]
}
},
"required": ["decision", "message", "confidence"]
}

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
name: CI-PR_from_dev
on:
push:
branches:
- winpeas_dev
- linpeas_dev
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
create_pull_request:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# checkout
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
# PR
- name: Pull Request
uses: repo-sync/pull-request@v2
with:
destination_branch: "master"
github_token: ${{ secrets.PULL_REQUEST_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# checkout
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@master
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ jobs:
# Add MSBuild to the PATH: https://github.com/microsoft/setup-msbuild
- name: Setup MSBuild.exe
uses: microsoft/setup-msbuild@v1.0.2
uses: microsoft/setup-msbuild@v2
# Setup NuGet
- name: Setup NuGet.exe
uses: nuget/setup-nuget@v1
uses: nuget/setup-nuget@v2
# Restore the packages for testing
- name: Restore the application
@@ -48,23 +48,23 @@ jobs:
# build
- name: run MSBuild
run: msbuild $env:Solution_Path
run: msbuild $env:Solution_Path /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
# Execute all unit tests in the solution
#- name: Execute unit tests
# run: dotnet test $env:Solution_Path
- name: Execute unit tests
run: dotnet test $env:Solution_Path --configuration $env:Configuration
# Build & update all versions
- name: Build all versions
run: |
echo "build x64"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x64"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x64" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
echo "build x86"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x86"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x86" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
echo "build Any CPU"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="Any CPU"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="Any CPU" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
- name: Execute winPEAS -h
shell: pwsh
@@ -212,15 +212,15 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Download repo
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}
# Setup go
- uses: actions/setup-go@v2
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: 1.17.0-rc1
stable: false
go-version: '1.23'
cache: false
- run: go version
# Build linpeas
@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ jobs:
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --all --output linpeas_fat.sh
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --all-no-fat --output linpeas.sh
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --small --output linpeas_small.sh
- name: Run linPEAS builder tests
run: python3 -m unittest discover -s linPEAS/tests -p "test_*.py"
# Build linpeas binaries
- name: Build linpeas binaries
@@ -363,7 +366,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Download repo
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
# Build linpeas
- name: Build macpeas
@@ -470,11 +473,11 @@ jobs:
- name: Get current date
id: date
run: echo "::set-output name=date::$(date +'%Y%m%d')"
run: echo "date=$(date +'%Y%m%d')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Generate random
id: random_n
run: echo "::set-output name=some_rand::$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
run: echo "some_rand=$(openssl rand -hex 4)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Create the release
- name: Create Release

213
.github/workflows/PR-tests.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
name: PR-tests
on:
pull_request:
branches:
- master
- main
paths-ignore:
- '.github/**'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
Build_and_test_winpeas_pr:
runs-on: windows-latest
# environment variables
env:
Solution_Path: 'winPEAS\winPEASexe\winPEAS.sln'
Configuration: 'Release'
steps:
# checkout
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}
- name: Download regexes
run: |
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File build_lists/download_regexes.ps1
# Add MSBuild to the PATH
- name: Setup MSBuild.exe
uses: microsoft/setup-msbuild@v2
# Setup NuGet
- name: Setup NuGet.exe
uses: nuget/setup-nuget@v2
# Restore the packages for testing
- name: Restore the application
run: nuget restore $env:Solution_Path
# build
- name: run MSBuild
run: msbuild $env:Solution_Path /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
# Execute unit tests in the solution
- name: Execute unit tests
run: dotnet test $env:Solution_Path --configuration $env:Configuration
# Build all versions
- name: Build all versions
run: |
echo "build x64"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x64" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
echo "build x86"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="x86" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
echo "build Any CPU"
msbuild -m $env:Solution_Path /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=$env:Configuration /p:Platform="Any CPU" /p:UseSharedCompilation=false
- name: Execute winPEAS -h
shell: pwsh
run: |
$Configuration = "Release"
$exePath = "winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/bin/$Configuration/winPEAS.exe"
if (Test-Path $exePath) {
& $exePath -h
} else {
Write-Error "winPEAS.exe not found at $exePath"
}
- name: Execute winPEAS cloudinfo
shell: pwsh
run: |
$Configuration = "Release"
$exePath = "winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/bin/$Configuration/winPEAS.exe"
if (Test-Path $exePath) {
& $exePath cloudinfo
} else {
Write-Error "winPEAS.exe not found at $exePath"
}
- name: Execute winPEAS systeminfo
shell: pwsh
run: |
$Configuration = "Release"
$exePath = "winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/bin/$Configuration/winPEAS.exe"
if (Test-Path $exePath) {
& $exePath systeminfo
} else {
Write-Error "winPEAS.exe not found at $exePath"
}
- name: Execute winPEAS networkinfo
shell: pwsh
run: |
$Configuration = "Release"
$exePath = "winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/bin/$Configuration/winPEAS.exe"
if (Test-Path $exePath) {
& $exePath networkinfo
} else {
Write-Error "winPEAS.exe not found at $exePath"
}
Build_and_test_linpeas_pr:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# Download repo
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}
# Setup go
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.23'
cache: false
- run: go version
# Build linpeas
- name: Build linpeas
run: |
python3 -m pip install PyYAML
cd linPEAS
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --all --output linpeas_fat.sh
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --all-no-fat --output linpeas.sh
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --small --output linpeas_small.sh
- name: Run linPEAS builder tests
run: python3 -m unittest discover -s linPEAS/tests -p "test_*.py"
# Run linpeas help as quick test
- name: Run linpeas help
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -h && linPEAS/linpeas.sh -h && linPEAS/linpeas_small.sh -h
# Run linpeas as a test
- name: Run linpeas system_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o system_information -a
- name: Run linpeas container
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o container -a
- name: Run linpeas cloud
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o cloud -a
- name: Run linpeas procs_crons_timers_srvcs_sockets
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o procs_crons_timers_srvcs_sockets -a
- name: Run linpeas network_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o network_information -t -a
- name: Run linpeas users_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o users_information -a
- name: Run linpeas software_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o software_information -a
- name: Run linpeas interesting_perms_files
if: ${{ false }}
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o interesting_perms_files -a
- name: Run linpeas interesting_files
if: ${{ false }}
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o interesting_files -a
Build_and_test_macpeas_pr:
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
# Download repo
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}
# Build linpeas (macpeas)
- name: Build macpeas
run: |
python3 -m pip install PyYAML --break-system-packages
python3 -m pip install requests --break-system-packages
cd linPEAS
python3 -m builder.linpeas_builder --all --output linpeas_fat.sh
# Run linpeas help as quick test
- name: Run macpeas help
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -h
# Run macpeas parts to test it
- name: Run macpeas system_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o system_information -a
- name: Run macpeas container
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o container -a
- name: Run macpeas cloud
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o cloud -a
- name: Run macpeas procs_crons_timers_srvcs_sockets
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o procs_crons_timers_srvcs_sockets -a
- name: Run macpeas network_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o network_information -t -a
- name: Run macpeas users_information
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o users_information -a
- name: Run macpeas software_information
if: ${{ false }}
run: linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh -o software_information -a

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name: Chack-Agent PR Triage
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["PR-tests"]
types: [completed]
jobs:
chack_agent_triage:
if: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
env:
CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL: ${{ secrets.CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL }}
outputs:
should_run: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run }}
pr_number: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_number }}
pr_title: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_title }}
pr_body: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_body }}
base_ref: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.base_ref }}
head_ref: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.head_ref }}
base_sha: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.base_sha }}
head_sha: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.head_sha }}
decision: ${{ steps.parse.outputs.decision }}
message: ${{ steps.parse.outputs.message }}
steps:
- name: Resolve PR context
id: gate
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number }}
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
pr_number="${PR_NUMBER}"
if [ -z "$pr_number" ] && [ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]; then
pr_number="$(gh pr list --state open --head "$HEAD_BRANCH" --json number --jq '.[0].number')"
fi
if [ -z "$pr_number" ]; then
echo "No pull request found for this workflow_run; skipping."
echo "should_run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_number=" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
author="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json author --jq .author.login)"
if [ "$author" != "carlospolop" ]; then
echo "PR author is $author; skipping."
echo "should_run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_number=$pr_number" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
pr_title="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json title --jq .title)"
pr_body="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json body --jq .body)"
base_ref="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json baseRefName --jq .baseRefName)"
head_ref="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json headRefName --jq .headRefName)"
base_sha="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json baseRefOid --jq .baseRefOid)"
head_sha="$(gh pr view "$pr_number" --json headRefOid --jq .headRefOid)"
echo "should_run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_number=$pr_number" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_title<<EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "$pr_title" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_body<<EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "$pr_body" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "base_ref=$base_ref" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "head_ref=$head_ref" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "base_sha=$base_sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "head_sha=$head_sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Checkout PR merge ref
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_number }}/merge
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
- name: Pre-fetch base and head refs
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
run: |
git fetch --no-tags origin \
${{ steps.gate.outputs.base_ref }} \
+refs/pull/${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_number }}/head
- name: Set up Node.js for Codex
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "20"
- name: Install Codex CLI
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
run: |
npm install -g @openai/codex
codex --version
- name: Run Chack Agent
id: run_chack
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
uses: carlospolop/chack-agent@master
with:
provider: codex
model_primary: CHEAP_BUT_QUALITY
main_action: peass-ng
sub_action: Chack-Agent PR Triage
system_prompt: |
You are Chack Agent, an elite PR reviewer for PEASS-ng.
Be conservative: merge only if changes are simple, safe, and valuable accoding to the uers give guidelines.
If in doubt, comment with clear questions or concerns.
Remember taht you are an autonomouts agent, use the exec tool to run the needed commands to list, read, analyze, modify, test...
tools_config_json: "{\"exec_enabled\": true}"
session_config_json: "{\"long_term_memory_enabled\": false}"
agent_config_json: "{\"self_critique_enabled\": false, \"require_task_steps_manager_init_first\": true}"
output_schema_file: .github/chack-agent/pr-merge-schema.json
user_prompt: |
You are reviewing PR #${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_number }} for ${{ github.repository }}.
Decide whether to merge or comment. Merge only if all of the following are true:
- Changes are simple and safe (no DoS, no long operations, no backdoors).
- Changes follow common PEASS syntax and style without breaking anything and add useful checks or value.
- Changes simplify code or add new useful checks without breaking anything.
If you don't have any doubts, and all the previous conditions are met, decide to merge.
If you have serious doubts, choose "comment" and include your doubts or questions.
If you decide to merge, include a short rationale.
Pull request title and body:
----
${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_title }}
${{ steps.gate.outputs.pr_body }}
Review ONLY the changes introduced by the PR:
git log --oneline ${{ steps.gate.outputs.base_sha }}...${{ steps.gate.outputs.head_sha }}
Output JSON only, following the provided schema:
.github/chack-agent/pr-merge-schema.json
openai_api_key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
- name: Parse Chack Agent decision
id: parse
if: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
env:
CHACK_MESSAGE: ${{ steps.run_chack.outputs.final-message }}
run: |
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
raw = (os.environ.get('CHACK_MESSAGE', '') or '').strip()
decision = 'comment'
message = 'Chack Agent did not provide details.'
try:
data = json.loads(raw or '{}')
if isinstance(data, dict):
decision = data.get('decision', 'comment')
message = data.get('message', '').strip() or message
else:
message = raw or message
except Exception:
message = raw or message
with open(os.environ['GITHUB_OUTPUT'], 'a') as handle:
handle.write(f"decision={decision}\n")
handle.write("message<<EOF\n")
handle.write(message + "\n")
handle.write("EOF\n")
PY
merge_or_comment:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: chack_agent_triage
if: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' && needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.should_run == 'true' && needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.decision != '' }}
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
steps:
- name: Merge PR when approved
if: ${{ needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.decision == 'merge' }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.pr_number }}
run: |
gh api \
-X PUT \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/merge \
-f merge_method=squash \
-f commit_title="Auto-merge PR #${PR_NUMBER} (Chack Agent)"
- name: Comment with doubts
if: ${{ needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.decision == 'comment' }}
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.pr_number }}
CHACK_MESSAGE: ${{ needs.chack_agent_triage.outputs.message }}
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
script: |
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: Number(process.env.PR_NUMBER),
body: process.env.CHACK_MESSAGE,
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
name: CI-master Failure Chack-Agent PR
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["CI-master_test"]
types: [completed]
jobs:
chack_agent_fix_master_failure:
if: >
${{ github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'failure' &&
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch == 'master' &&
!startsWith(github.event.workflow_run.head_commit.message, 'Fix CI-master failures for run #') }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
issues: write
actions: read
env:
TARGET_BRANCH: master
FIX_BRANCH: chack-agent/ci-master-fix-${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL: ${{ secrets.CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL }}
steps:
- name: Checkout failing commit
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: true
token: ${{ secrets.CHACK_AGENT_FIXER_TOKEN || github.token }}
- name: Configure git author
run: |
git config user.name "chack-agent"
git config user.email "chack-agent@users.noreply.github.com"
- name: Create fix branch
run: git checkout -b "$FIX_BRANCH"
- name: Fetch failure summary and failed-step logs
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
run: |
failed_logs_file="$(pwd)/chack_failed_steps_logs.txt"
if gh run view "$RUN_ID" --repo "${{ github.repository }}" --log-failed > "$failed_logs_file"; then
if [ ! -s "$failed_logs_file" ]; then
echo "No failed step logs were returned by gh run view --log-failed." > "$failed_logs_file"
fi
else
echo "Failed to download failed step logs with gh run view --log-failed." > "$failed_logs_file"
fi
echo "FAILED_LOGS_PATH=$failed_logs_file" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/$RUN_ID/jobs \
--paginate > /tmp/jobs.json
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
data = json.load(open('/tmp/jobs.json'))
lines = []
for job in data.get('jobs', []):
if job.get('conclusion') == 'failure':
lines.append(f"Job: {job.get('name')} (id {job.get('id')})")
lines.append(f"URL: {job.get('html_url')}")
for step in job.get('steps', []):
if step.get('conclusion') == 'failure':
lines.append(f" Step: {step.get('name')}")
lines.append("")
summary = "\n".join(lines).strip() or "No failing job details found."
with open('chack_failure_summary.txt', 'w') as handle:
handle.write(summary)
PY
- name: Create Chack Agent prompt
env:
RUN_URL: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.html_url }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
run: |
{
echo "You are fixing a failing CI-master_test run in ${{ github.repository }}."
echo "The failing workflow run is: ${RUN_URL}"
echo "The failing commit SHA is: ${HEAD_SHA}"
echo "The target branch for the final PR is: ${TARGET_BRANCH}"
echo ""
echo "Failure summary:"
cat chack_failure_summary.txt
echo ""
echo "Failed-step logs file absolute path (local runner): ${FAILED_LOGS_PATH}"
echo "Read that file to inspect the exact failing logs."
echo ""
echo "Please identify the cause, apply an easy, simple and minimal fix, and update files accordingly."
echo "Run any fast checks you can locally (no network)."
echo "Leave the repo in a state ready to commit; changes will be committed and pushed automatically."
} > chack_prompt.txt
- name: Set up Node.js for Codex
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "20"
- name: Install Codex CLI
run: |
npm install -g @openai/codex
codex --version
- name: Run Chack Agent
id: run_chack
uses: carlospolop/chack-agent@master
with:
provider: codex
model_primary: CHEAP_BUT_QUALITY
main_action: peass-ng
sub_action: CI-master Failure Chack-Agent PR
system_prompt: |
Diagnose the failing gh actions workflow, propose the minimal and effective safe fix, and implement it.
Run only fast, local checks (no network). Leave the repo ready to commit.
prompt_file: chack_prompt.txt
tools_config_json: "{\"exec_enabled\": true}"
session_config_json: "{\"long_term_memory_enabled\": false}"
agent_config_json: "{\"self_critique_enabled\": false, \"require_task_steps_manager_init_first\": true}"
openai_api_key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
- name: Commit and push fix branch if changed
id: push_fix
run: |
if git diff --quiet; then
echo "No changes to commit."
echo "pushed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
rm -f chack_failure_summary.txt chack_prompt.txt chack_failed_steps_logs.txt
git add -A
# Avoid workflow-file pushes with token scopes that cannot write workflows.
git reset -- .github/workflows || true
git checkout -- .github/workflows || true
git clean -fdx -- .github/workflows || true
git reset -- chack_failure_summary.txt chack_prompt.txt chack_failed_steps_logs.txt
if git diff --cached --name-only | grep -q '^.github/workflows/'; then
echo "Workflow-file changes are still staged; skipping push without workflows permission."
echo "pushed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "No committable changes left after filtering."
echo "pushed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
git commit -m "Fix CI-master failures for run #${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}"
if ! git push origin HEAD:"$FIX_BRANCH"; then
echo "Push failed (likely token workflow permission limits); skipping PR creation."
echo "pushed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "pushed=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Create PR to master
if: ${{ steps.push_fix.outputs.pushed == 'true' }}
id: create_pr
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CHACK_AGENT_FIXER_TOKEN || github.token }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.html_url }}
run: |
pr_url=$(gh pr create \
--title "Fix CI-master_test failure (run #${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }})" \
--body "Automated Chack Agent fix for failing CI-master_test run: ${RUN_URL}" \
--base "$TARGET_BRANCH" \
--head "$FIX_BRANCH")
echo "url=$pr_url" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Comment on created PR with Chack Agent result
if: ${{ steps.push_fix.outputs.pushed == 'true' && steps.run_chack.outputs.final-message != '' }}
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
PR_URL: ${{ steps.create_pr.outputs.url }}
CHACK_MESSAGE: ${{ steps.run_chack.outputs.final-message }}
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
script: |
const prUrl = process.env.PR_URL;
const match = prUrl.match(/\/pull\/(\d+)$/);
if (!match) {
core.info(`Could not parse PR number from URL: ${prUrl}`);
return;
}
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: Number(match[1]),
body: process.env.CHACK_MESSAGE,
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
name: PR Failure Chack-Agent Dispatch
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["PR-tests"]
types: [completed]
jobs:
resolve_pr_context:
if: >
${{ github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'failure' &&
!startsWith(github.event.workflow_run.head_commit.message || '', 'Fix CI failures for PR #') }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
pull-requests: read
issues: read
outputs:
number: ${{ steps.pr_context.outputs.number }}
author: ${{ steps.pr_context.outputs.author }}
head_repo: ${{ steps.pr_context.outputs.head_repo }}
head_branch: ${{ steps.pr_context.outputs.head_branch }}
should_run: ${{ steps.pr_context.outputs.should_run }}
steps:
- name: Resolve PR context
id: pr_context
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number }}
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ] && [ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]; then
PR_NUMBER="$(gh pr list --state open --head "$HEAD_BRANCH" --json number --jq '.[0].number')"
fi
if [ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]; then
echo "No pull request found for workflow_run; skipping."
{
echo "number="
echo "author="
echo "head_repo="
echo "head_branch=${HEAD_BRANCH}"
echo "should_run=false"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
pr_author=$(gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER} \
--jq '.user.login')
pr_head_repo=$(gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER} \
--jq '.head.repo.full_name')
pr_head_branch=$(gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER} \
--jq '.head.ref')
pr_labels=$(gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/issues/${PR_NUMBER} \
--jq '.labels[].name')
if echo "$pr_labels" | grep -q "^chack-agent-fix-attempted$"; then
echo "chack-agent fix already attempted for PR #${PR_NUMBER}; skipping."
should_run=false
else
should_run=true
fi
{
echo "number=${PR_NUMBER}"
echo "author=${pr_author}"
echo "head_repo=${pr_head_repo}"
echo "head_branch=${pr_head_branch}"
echo "should_run=${should_run}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
chack_agent_on_failure:
needs: resolve_pr_context
if: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.author == 'carlospolop' && needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.should_run == 'true' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
issues: write
actions: write
env:
CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL: ${{ secrets.CHACK_LOGS_HTTP_URL }}
steps:
- name: Comment on PR with failure info
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.number }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.html_url }}
WORKFLOW_NAME: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.name }}
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
script: |
const prNumber = Number(process.env.PR_NUMBER);
const body = `PR #${prNumber} had a failing workflow "${process.env.WORKFLOW_NAME}".\n\nRun: ${process.env.RUN_URL}\n\nLaunching Chack Agent to attempt a fix.`;
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: prNumber,
body,
});
- name: Mark fix attempt
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.number }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
gh api -X POST -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/labels \
-f labels[]=chack-agent-fix-attempted
- name: Checkout PR head
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
repository: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.head_repo }}
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: true
token: ${{ secrets.CHACK_AGENT_FIXER_TOKEN || github.token }}
- name: Configure git author
run: |
git config user.name "chack-agent"
git config user.email "chack-agent@users.noreply.github.com"
- name: Fetch failure summary
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
run: |
gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/$RUN_ID/jobs \
--paginate > /tmp/jobs.json
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
data = json.load(open('/tmp/jobs.json'))
lines = []
for job in data.get('jobs', []):
if job.get('conclusion') == 'failure':
lines.append(f"Job: {job.get('name')} (id {job.get('id')})")
lines.append(f"URL: {job.get('html_url')}")
for step in job.get('steps', []):
if step.get('conclusion') == 'failure':
lines.append(f" Step: {step.get('name')}")
lines.append("")
summary = "\n".join(lines).strip() or "No failing job details found."
with open('chack_failure_summary.txt', 'w') as handle:
handle.write(summary)
PY
- name: Create Chack Agent prompt
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.number }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.html_url }}
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.head_branch }}
run: |
{
echo "You are fixing CI failures for PR #${PR_NUMBER} in ${{ github.repository }}."
echo "The failing workflow run is: ${RUN_URL}"
echo "The PR branch is: ${HEAD_BRANCH}"
echo ""
echo "Failure summary:"
cat chack_failure_summary.txt
echo ""
echo "Please identify the cause, apply a easy, simple and minimal fix, and update files accordingly."
echo "Run any fast checks you can locally (no network)."
echo "Leave the repo in a state ready to commit as when you finish, it'll be automatically committed and pushed."
} > chack_prompt.txt
- name: Set up Node.js for Codex
uses: actions/setup-node@v5
with:
node-version: "20"
- name: Install Codex CLI
run: |
npm install -g @openai/codex
codex --version
- name: Run Chack Agent
id: run_chack
uses: carlospolop/chack-agent@master
with:
provider: codex
model_primary: CHEAP_BUT_QUALITY
main_action: peass-ng
sub_action: PR Failure Chack-Agent Dispatch
system_prompt: |
You are Chack Agent, an elite CI-fix engineer.
Diagnose the failing workflow, propose the minimal safe fix, and implement it.
Run only fast, local checks (no network). Leave the repo ready to commit.
prompt_file: chack_prompt.txt
tools_config_json: "{\"exec_enabled\": true}"
session_config_json: "{\"long_term_memory_enabled\": false}"
agent_config_json: "{\"self_critique_enabled\": false, \"require_task_steps_manager_init_first\": true}"
openai_api_key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
- name: Commit and push if changed
env:
TARGET_BRANCH: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.head_branch }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.number }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
if git diff --quiet; then
echo "No changes to commit."
exit 0
fi
rm -f chack_failure_summary.txt chack_prompt.txt
git add -A
# Avoid workflow-file pushes with token scopes that cannot write workflows.
git reset -- .github/workflows || true
git checkout -- .github/workflows || true
git clean -fdx -- .github/workflows || true
git reset -- chack_failure_summary.txt chack_prompt.txt
if git diff --cached --name-only | grep -q '^.github/workflows/'; then
echo "Workflow-file changes are still staged; skipping push without workflows permission."
exit 0
fi
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "No committable changes left after filtering."
exit 0
fi
git commit -m "Fix CI failures for PR #${PR_NUMBER}"
if ! git push origin HEAD:${TARGET_BRANCH}; then
echo "Push failed (likely token workflow permission limits); leaving run successful without push."
exit 0
fi
gh workflow run PR-tests.yml --ref "${TARGET_BRANCH}"
- name: Comment with Chack Agent result
if: ${{ steps.run_chack.outputs.final-message != '' }}
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve_pr_context.outputs.number }}
CHACK_MESSAGE: ${{ steps.run_chack.outputs.final-message }}
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
script: |
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: Number(process.env.PR_NUMBER),
body: process.env.CHACK_MESSAGE,
});

0
LICENSE Executable file → Normal file
View File

3
README.md Executable file → Normal file
View File

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Check the **[parsers](./parsers/)** directory to **transform PEASS outputs to JS
If you are a **PEASS & Hacktricks enthusiast**, you can get your hands now on **our [custom swag](https://peass.creator-spring.com/) and show how much you like our projects!**
You can also, join the 💬 [Discord group](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [telegram group](https://t.me/peass) to learn about latest news in cybersecurity and meet other cybersecurity enthusiasts, or follow me on Twitter 🐦 [@hacktricks_live](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live).
You can also, join the 💬 [Discord group](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [telegram group](https://t.me/peass) to learn about the latest news in cybersecurity and meet other cybersecurity enthusiasts, or follow me on Twitter 🐦 [@hacktricks_live](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live).
## Let's improve PEASS together
@@ -37,4 +37,3 @@ If you want to **add something** and have **any cool idea** related to this proj
## Advisory
All the scripts/binaries of the PEAS suite should be used for authorized penetration testing and/or educational purposes only. Any misuse of this software will not be the responsibility of the author or of any other collaborator. Use it at your own machines and/or with the owner's permission.

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -813,6 +813,12 @@ search:
bad_regex: "auth|accessfile=|secret=|user"
remove_regex: "^#|^@"
type: f
- name: "*"
value:
bad_regex: "nullok|nullok_secure|pam_permit\\.so|pam_rootok\\.so|pam_exec\\.so|pam_unix\\.so.*(nullok|remember=0)|sufficient\\s+pam_unix\\.so"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_regex: "^#|^@"
type: f
type: d
search_in:
- ${ROOT_FOLDER}etc
@@ -895,6 +901,14 @@ search:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "credentials.tfrc.json"
value:
type: f
bad_regex: ".*"
search_in:
- common
- name: Racoon
value:
@@ -1227,12 +1241,20 @@ search:
auto_check: False
files:
- name: "agent*"
- name: "agent.*"
value:
type: f
remove_path: ".dll"
search_in:
- ${ROOT_FOLDER}tmp
- ${ROOT_FOLDER}run
- name: "ssh-agent.sock"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- ${ROOT_FOLDER}tmp
- ${ROOT_FOLDER}run
- name: SSH_CONFIG
value:
@@ -1265,7 +1287,7 @@ search:
type: f
bad_regex: ".*"
search_in:
- common
- common
- name: Cloud Credentials
value:
@@ -1697,7 +1719,7 @@ search:
auto_check: True
exec:
- '( redis-server --version || echo_not_found "redis-server") 2>/dev/null'
- if [ "`redis-cli INFO 2>/dev/null`" ] && ! [ "`redis-cli INFO 2>/dev/null | grep -i NOAUTH`" ]; then echo "Redis isn't password protected" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"; fi
- redis_info="$(if [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then $TIMEOUT 2 redis-cli INFO 2>/dev/null; else redis-cli INFO 2>/dev/null; fi)"; if [ "$redis_info" ] && ! echo "$redis_info" | grep -i NOAUTH; then echo "Redis isn't password protected" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"; fi
files:
- name: "redis.conf"
@@ -2060,6 +2082,50 @@ search:
search_in:
- common
- name: "*.asc"
value:
type: f
remove_path: "/usr/share/|/usr/lib/|/lib/|/man/"
search_in:
- common
- name: "secring.gpg"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "pubring.kbx"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "trustdb.gpg"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "gpg-agent.conf"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "secret.asc"
value:
type: f
just_list_file: True
search_in:
- common
- name: "private-keys-v1.d/*.key"
value:
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "*.gnupg"
value:
type: f
@@ -2831,6 +2897,85 @@ search:
remove_path: "example"
search_in:
- common
- name: Proxy_Config
value:
config:
auto_check: True
files:
- name: "environment"
value:
bad_regex: "(http|https|ftp|all)_proxy|no_proxy"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_empty_lines: True
remove_regex: '^#'
type: f
check_extra_path: "^/etc/environment$"
search_in:
- common
- name: "apt.conf"
value:
bad_regex: "Acquire::http::Proxy|Acquire::https::Proxy|proxy"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_empty_lines: True
remove_regex: '^#'
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "apt.conf.d"
value:
type: d
files:
- name: "*"
value:
bad_regex: "Acquire::http::Proxy|Acquire::https::Proxy|proxy"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_empty_lines: True
remove_regex: '^#'
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: Sniffing_Artifacts
value:
config:
auto_check: True
files:
- name: "*.pcap"
value:
just_list_file: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "*.pcapng"
value:
just_list_file: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "keys.log"
value:
bad_regex: "CLIENT_RANDOM|SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET|CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET|EXPORTER_SECRET|RESUMPTION_MASTER_SECRET"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_empty_lines: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "sslkeylog.log"
value:
bad_regex: "CLIENT_RANDOM|SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET|CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET|EXPORTER_SECRET|RESUMPTION_MASTER_SECRET"
only_bad_lines: True
remove_empty_lines: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: Msmtprc
value:
@@ -3339,7 +3484,7 @@ search:
- name: "credentials.xml"
value:
bad_regex: "secret.*|password.*"
bad_regex: "secret.*|password.*|token.*|SecretKey.*|credentialId.*"
remove_empty_lines: True
type: f
search_in:
@@ -3347,7 +3492,7 @@ search:
- name: "config.xml"
value:
bad_regex: "secret.*|password.*"
bad_regex: "secret.*|password.*|token.*|SecretKey.*|credentialId.*"
only_bad_lines: True
type: f
search_in:
@@ -3533,7 +3678,7 @@ search:
- name: "RDCMan.settings"
value:
just_list_file: True
bad_regex: "credentialsProfiles|password|encryptedPassword"
type: f
search_in:
- common
@@ -3935,9 +4080,37 @@ search:
search_in:
- common
- name: "*.maintenance*"
value:
just_list_file: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "*.key"
value:
just_list_file: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: Crontab-UI
value:
config:
auto_check: True
files:
- name: "crontab.db"
value:
bad_regex: "-P[[:space:]]+\\S+|--password[[:space:]]+\\S+|[Pp]ass(word)?|[Tt]oken|[Ss]ecret"
only_bad_lines: True
type: f
search_in:
- common
- name: "crontab-ui.service"
value:
just_list_file: True
type: f
search_in:
- common

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
Check the **Local Linux Privilege Escalation checklist** from **[book.hacktricks.wiki](https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/linux-privilege-escalation-checklist.html)**.
> **Dec 2025 update:** linpeas now inspects Linux kernels for CVE-2025-38352 (POSIX CPU timers race) by combining CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK state with kernel build information, so you immediately know if publicly available PoCs might succeed.
[![asciicast](https://asciinema.org/a/250532.png)](https://asciinema.org/a/309566)
## MacPEAS
@@ -98,10 +100,17 @@ The goal of this script is to search for possible **Privilege Escalation Paths**
This script doesn't have any dependency.
### Recent updates
- **Dec 2025**: Added detection for sudo configurations that expose restic's `--password-command` helper, a common privilege escalation vector observed in real environments.
It uses **/bin/sh** syntax, so can run in anything supporting `sh` (and the binaries and parameters used).
By default, **linpeas won't write anything to disk and won't try to login as any other user using `su`**.
LinPEAS keeps expanding vendor-specific coverage; as of 29-Nov-2025 it warns when IGEL OS appliances still ship the SUID `setup`/`date` helpers that allow NetworkManager/systemd configuration hijacking (Metasploit module `linux/local/igel_network_priv_esc`).
By default linpeas takes around **4 mins** to complete, but It could take from **5 to 10 minutes** to execute all the checks using **-a** parameter *(Recommended option for CTFs)*:
- From less than 1 min to 2 mins to make almost all the checks
- Almost 1 min to search for possible passwords inside all the accesible files of the system
@@ -170,7 +179,7 @@ LinPEAS uses colors to indicate where does each section begin. But **it also use
- The ![](https://placehold.it/15/b32400/000000?text=+) **Red** color is used for identifing suspicious configurations that could lead to privilege escalation.
- The ![](https://placehold.it/15/66ff33/000000?text=+) **Green** color is used for known good configurations (based on the name not on the conten!)
- The ![](https://placehold.it/15/66ff33/000000?text=+) **Green** color is used for known good configurations (based on the name not on the content!)
- The ![](https://placehold.it/15/0066ff/000000?text=+) **Blue** color is used for: Users without shell & Mounted devices

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
parser.add_argument('--small', action='store_true', help='Build small version of linpeas.')
parser.add_argument('--include', type=str, help='Build linpeas only with the modules indicated you can indicate section names or module IDs).')
parser.add_argument('--exclude', type=str, help='Exclude the given modules (you can indicate section names or module IDs).')
parser.add_argument('--output', required=True, type=str, help='Parth to write the final linpeas file to.')
parser.add_argument('--output', required=True, type=str, help='Path to write the final linpeas file to.')
args = parser.parse_args()
all_modules = args.all
@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
print("You must specify one of the following options: --all, --all-no-fat, --small or --include")
parser.print_help()
exit(1)
main(all_modules, all_no_fat_modules, no_network_scanning, small, include_modules, exclude_modules, output)

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables:
# Global Variables: $NoEnvVars, $EnvVarsRed
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@
print_2title "Environment"
print_info "Any private information inside environment variables?"
(env || printenv || set) 2>/dev/null | grep -v "RELEVANT*|FIND*|^VERSION=|dbuslistG|mygroups|ldsoconfdG|pwd_inside_history|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Precise|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Trusty|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Xenial|kernelDCW_Rhel|^sudovB=|^rootcommon=|^mounted=|^mountG=|^notmounted=|^mountpermsB=|^mountpermsG=|^kernelB=|^C=|^RED=|^GREEN=|^Y=|^B=|^NC=|TIMEOUT=|groupsB=|groupsVB=|knw_grps=|sidG|sidB=|sidVB=|sidVB2=|sudoB=|sudoG=|sudoVB=|timersG=|capsB=|notExtensions=|Wfolders=|writeB=|writeVB=|_usrs=|compiler=|LS_COLORS=|pathshG=|notBackup=|processesDump|processesB|commonrootdirs|USEFUL_SOFTWARE|PSTORAGE_" | sed -${E} "s,[pP][aA][sS][sS][wW]|[aA][pP][iI][kK][eE][yY]|[aA][pP][iI][_][kK][eE][yY]|KRB5CCNAME,${SED_RED},g" || echo_not_found "env || set"
(env || printenv || set) 2>/dev/null | grep -Eiv "$NoEnvVars" | sed -${E} "s,$EnvVarsRed,${SED_RED},g" || echo_not_found "env || set"
echo ""

View File

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
# Title: System Information - Linux Exploit Suggester
# ID: SY_Linux_exploit_suggester
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 07-03-2024
# Description: Execute Linux Exploit Suggester to identify potential kernel exploits:
# - Automated kernel vulnerability detection
# - Common vulnerable scenarios:
# * Known kernel vulnerabilities
# * Unpatched kernel versions
# * Missing security patches
# - Exploitation methods:
# * Kernel exploit execution: Use suggested exploits
# * Common attack vectors:
# - Kernel memory corruption
# - Race conditions
# - Use-after-free
# - Integer overflow
# * Exploit techniques:
# - Kernel memory manipulation
# - Privilege escalation
# - Root access acquisition
# - System compromise
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $les_b64
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if [ "$(command -v bash 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ] && ! [ "$MACPEAS" ]; then
print_2title "Executing Linux Exploit Suggester"
print_info "https://github.com/mzet-/linux-exploit-suggester"
les_b64="peass{https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mzet-/linux-exploit-suggester/master/linux-exploit-suggester.sh}"
echo $les_b64 | base64 -d | bash | sed "s,$(printf '\033')\\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z],,g" | grep -i "\[CVE" -A 10 | grep -Ev "^\-\-$" | sed -${E} "s/\[(CVE-[0-9]+-[0-9]+,?)+\].*/${SED_RED}/g"
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
# Title: System Information - Linux Exploit Suggester 2
# ID: SY_Linux_exploit_suggester_2
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 07-03-2024
# Description: Execute Linux Exploit Suggester 2 (Perl version) to identify potential kernel exploits:
# - Alternative kernel vulnerability detection
# - Perl-based exploit suggestions
# - Common vulnerable scenarios:
# * Known kernel vulnerabilities
# * Unpatched kernel versions
# * Missing security patches
# * Alternative exploit paths
# - Exploitation methods:
# * Kernel exploit execution: Use suggested exploits
# * Common attack vectors:
# - Kernel memory corruption
# - Race conditions
# - Use-after-free
# - Integer overflow
# * Exploit techniques:
# - Kernel memory manipulation
# - Privilege escalation
# - Root access acquisition
# - System compromise
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $les2_b64
# Fat linpeas: 1
# Small linpeas: 0
if [ "$(command -v perl 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ] && ! [ "$MACPEAS" ]; then
print_2title "Executing Linux Exploit Suggester 2"
print_info "https://github.com/jondonas/linux-exploit-suggester-2"
les2_b64="peass{https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jondonas/linux-exploit-suggester-2/master/linux-exploit-suggester-2.pl}"
echo $les2_b64 | base64 -d | perl 2>/dev/null | sed "s,$(printf '\033')\\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z],,g" | grep -iE "CVE" -B 1 -A 10 | grep -Ev "^\-\-$" | sed -${E} "s,CVE-[0-9]+-[0-9]+,${SED_RED},g"
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -30,10 +30,9 @@
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
if apt list --installed 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'polkit.*0\.105-26' || \
yum list installed 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'polkit.*\(0\.117-2\|0\.115-6\)' || \
rpm -qa 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'polkit.*\(0\.117-2\|0\.115-6\)'; then
if apt list --installed 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'polkit.*0\.105-26' | grep -qEv 'ubuntu1\.[1-9]' || \
yum list installed 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'polkit.*\(0\.117-2\|0\.115-6\|0\.11[3-9]\)' || \
rpm -qa 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'polkit.*\(0\.117-2\|0\.115-6\|0\.11[3-9]\)'; then
echo "Vulnerable to CVE-2021-3560" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,33 @@
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_list, warn_exec
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $ASLR, $hypervisorflag, $detectedvirt
# Generated Global Variables: $ASLR, $hypervisorflag, $detectedvirt, $unpriv_userns_clone, $perf_event_paranoid, $mmap_min_addr, $ptrace_scope, $dmesg_restrict, $kptr_restrict, $unpriv_bpf_disabled, $protected_symlinks, $protected_hardlinks, $label, $sysctl_path, $sysctl_var, $zero_color, $nonzero_color, $sysctl_value
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
print_sysctl_eq_zero() {
local label="$1"
local sysctl_path="$2"
local sysctl_var="$3"
local zero_color="$4"
local nonzero_color="$5"
local sysctl_value
print_list "$label" "$NC"
sysctl_value=$(cat "$sysctl_path" 2>/dev/null)
eval "$sysctl_var=\$sysctl_value"
if [ -z "$sysctl_value" ]; then
echo_not_found "$sysctl_path"
else
if [ "$sysctl_value" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${zero_color},"
else
echo "$sysctl_value" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${nonzero_color},g"
fi
fi
}
#-- SY) AppArmor
print_2title "Protections"
print_list "AppArmor enabled? .............. "$NC
@@ -80,10 +102,54 @@ print_list "Seccomp enabled? ............... "$NC
print_list "User namespace? ................ "$NC
if [ "$(cat /proc/self/uid_map 2>/dev/null)" ]; then echo "enabled" | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"; else echo "disabled" | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED},"; fi
#-- SY) Unprivileged user namespaces
print_sysctl_eq_zero "unpriv_userns_clone? ........... " "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone" "unpriv_userns_clone" "$SED_GREEN" "$SED_RED"
#-- SY) Unprivileged eBPF
print_sysctl_eq_zero "unpriv_bpf_disabled? ........... " "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled" "unpriv_bpf_disabled" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
#-- SY) cgroup2
print_list "Cgroup2 enabled? ............... "$NC
([ "$(grep cgroup2 /proc/filesystems 2>/dev/null)" ] && echo "enabled" || echo "disabled") | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED}," | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"
#-- SY) Kernel hardening sysctls
print_sysctl_eq_zero "kptr_restrict? ................. " "/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict" "kptr_restrict" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_sysctl_eq_zero "dmesg_restrict? ................ " "/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict" "dmesg_restrict" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_sysctl_eq_zero "ptrace_scope? .................. " "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope" "ptrace_scope" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_sysctl_eq_zero "protected_symlinks? ............ " "/proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks" "protected_symlinks" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_sysctl_eq_zero "protected_hardlinks? ........... " "/proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks" "protected_hardlinks" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "perf_event_paranoid? ........... "$NC
perf_event_paranoid=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$perf_event_paranoid" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
else
if [ "$perf_event_paranoid" -le 1 ]; then echo "$perf_event_paranoid" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"; else echo "$perf_event_paranoid" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "mmap_min_addr? ................. " "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr" "mmap_min_addr" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "lockdown mode? ................. "$NC
if [ -f "/sys/kernel/security/lockdown" ]; then
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,none,${SED_RED},g; s,integrity|confidentiality,${SED_GREEN},g"
else
echo_not_found "/sys/kernel/security/lockdown"
fi
#-- SY) Kernel hardening config flags
print_list "Kernel hardening flags? ........ "$NC
if [ -f "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
grep -E 'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE|CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR|CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_|CONFIG_KASAN' /boot/config-$(uname -r) 2>/dev/null
elif [ -f "/proc/config.gz" ]; then
zcat /proc/config.gz 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE|CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR|CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_|CONFIG_KASAN'
else
echo_not_found "kernel config"
fi
#-- SY) Gatekeeper
if [ "$MACPEAS" ]; then
print_list "Gatekeeper enabled? .......... "$NC
@@ -136,4 +202,4 @@ else
if [ "$hypervisorflag" ]; then printf $RED"Yes"$NC; else printf $GREEN"No"$NC; fi
fi
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -58,5 +58,23 @@ else
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/modules_disabled"
fi
# Check for module signature enforcement
print_3title "Module signature enforcement? "
if [ -f "/proc/sys/kernel/module_sig_enforce" ]; then
if [ "$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/module_sig_enforce)" = "1" ]; then
echo "Enforced" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
else
echo "Not enforced" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
elif [ -f "/sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce" ]; then
if [ "$(cat /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce)" = "Y" ]; then
echo "Enforced" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
else
echo "Not enforced" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
else
echo_not_found "module_sig_enforce"
fi
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
# Title: System Information - CVE_2025_38236
# ID: SY_CVE_2025_38236
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 17-12-2025
# Description: Detect Linux kernels exposed to CVE-2025-38236 (AF_UNIX MSG_OOB UAF) that allow local privilege escalation:
# - Vulnerable scope:
# * Linux kernels 6.9+ before commit 32ca245464e1479bfea8592b9db227fdc1641705
# * AF_UNIX stream sockets with MSG_OOB enabled (CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB or implicit support)
# - Exploitation summary:
# * send/recv MSG_OOB pattern leaves zero-length SKBs in the receive queue
# * manage_oob() skips cleanup, freeing the OOB SKB while u->oob_skb still points to it
# * Subsequent recv(MSG_OOB) dereferences the dangling pointer → kernel UAF → LPE
# - Mitigations:
# * Update to a kernel that includes commit 32ca245464e1479bfea8592b9db227fdc1641705 (or newer)
# * Disable CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB or block MSG_OOB in sandboxed processes
# * Backport vendor fixes or follow Chrome's MSG_OOB filtering approach
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $SED_GREEN, $E
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $cve38236_kernel_release, $cve38236_kernel_version, $cve38236_oob_line, $cve38236_unix_line, $cve38236_oob_status, $CVE38236_CONFIG_SOURCE, $cve38236_conf_file, $cve38236_config_key, $cve38236_release, $cve38236_cfg, $cve38236_config_line
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
_cve38236_version_to_number() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
printf '0\n'
return
fi
echo "$1" | awk -F. '{
major=$1+0
if (NF>=2) minor=$2+0; else minor=0
if (NF>=3) patch=$3+0; else patch=0
printf "%d\n", (major*1000000)+(minor*1000)+patch
}'
}
_cve38236_version_ge() {
local v1 v2
v1=$(_cve38236_version_to_number "$1")
v2=$(_cve38236_version_to_number "$2")
[ "$v1" -ge "$v2" ]
}
_cve38236_cat_config_file() {
local cve38236_conf_file="$1"
if [ -z "$cve38236_conf_file" ] || ! [ -r "$cve38236_conf_file" ]; then
return 1
fi
if printf '%s' "$cve38236_conf_file" | grep -q '\\.gz$'; then
if command -v zcat >/dev/null 2>&1; then
zcat "$cve38236_conf_file" 2>/dev/null
elif command -v gzip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
gzip -dc "$cve38236_conf_file" 2>/dev/null
else
cat "$cve38236_conf_file" 2>/dev/null
fi
else
cat "$cve38236_conf_file" 2>/dev/null
fi
}
_cve38236_read_config_line() {
local cve38236_config_key="$1"
local cve38236_release cve38236_config_line cve38236_cfg
cve38236_release="$(uname -r 2>/dev/null)"
for cve38236_cfg in /proc/config.gz \
"/boot/config-${cve38236_release}" \
"/usr/lib/modules/${cve38236_release}/build/.config" \
"/lib/modules/${cve38236_release}/build/.config"; do
if [ -r "$cve38236_cfg" ]; then
cve38236_config_line=$(_cve38236_cat_config_file "$cve38236_cfg" | grep -E "^(${cve38236_config_key}=|# ${cve38236_config_key} is not set)" | head -n1)
if [ -n "$cve38236_config_line" ]; then
CVE38236_CONFIG_SOURCE="$cve38236_cfg"
printf '%s\n' "$cve38236_config_line"
return 0
fi
fi
done
return 1
}
if [ ! "$MACPEAS" ]; then
cve38236_kernel_release="$(uname -r 2>/dev/null)"
cve38236_kernel_version="$(printf '%s' "$cve38236_kernel_release" | sed 's/[^0-9.].*//')"
if [ -n "$cve38236_kernel_version" ] && _cve38236_version_ge "$cve38236_kernel_version" "6.9.0"; then
print_2title "CVE-2025-38236 - AF_UNIX MSG_OOB UAF"
cve38236_oob_line=$(_cve38236_read_config_line "CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB")
cve38236_oob_status="unknown"
if printf '%s' "$cve38236_oob_line" | grep -q '=y\|=m'; then
cve38236_oob_status="enabled"
elif printf '%s' "$cve38236_oob_line" | grep -q 'not set'; then
cve38236_oob_status="disabled"
fi
if [ "$cve38236_oob_status" = "unknown" ]; then
cve38236_unix_line=$(_cve38236_read_config_line "CONFIG_UNIX")
if printf '%s' "$cve38236_unix_line" | grep -q 'not set'; then
cve38236_oob_status="disabled"
elif printf '%s' "$cve38236_unix_line" | grep -q '=y\|=m'; then
cve38236_oob_status="enabled"
fi
fi
if [ "$cve38236_oob_status" = "disabled" ]; then
printf 'Kernel %s >= 6.9 but MSG_OOB support is disabled (%s).\n' "$cve38236_kernel_release" "${cve38236_oob_line:-CONFIG_AF_UNIX disabled}" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
print_info "CVE-2025-38236 requires AF_UNIX MSG_OOB; disabling CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB/CONFIG_UNIX mitigates it."
else
printf 'Kernel %s (parsed %s) may be vulnerable to CVE-2025-38236 - AF_UNIX MSG_OOB UAF.\n' "$cve38236_kernel_release" "$cve38236_kernel_version" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
[ -n "$cve38236_oob_line" ] && print_info "Config hint: $cve38236_oob_line"
if [ "$cve38236_oob_status" = "unknown" ]; then
print_info "Could not read CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB directly; AF_UNIX appears enabled, so assume MSG_OOB reachable."
fi
print_info "Exploit chain: crafted MSG_OOB send/recv frees the OOB SKB while u->oob_skb still points to it, enabling kernel UAF → arbitrary read/write primitives (Project Zero 2025/08)."
print_info "Mitigations: update to a kernel containing commit 32ca245464e1479bfea8592b9db227fdc1641705, disable CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB, or filter MSG_OOB in sandbox policies."
print_info "Heuristic detection: based solely on uname -r and kernel config; vendor kernels with backported fixes should be verified manually."
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
# Title: System Information - CVE_2025_38352
# ID: SY_CVE_2025_38352
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 22-12-2025
# Description: Detect Linux kernels that may still be vulnerable to CVE-2025-38352 (race-condition UAF in POSIX CPU timers)
# - Highlights kernels built without CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK
# - Flags 6.12.x builds older than the fix commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca (first shipped in 6.12.34)
# - Provides quick risk scoring so operators can decide whether to attempt the publicly available PoC
# - Core requirements for exploitation:
# * CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK disabled (common on 32-bit Android / custom kernels)
# * Lack of the upstream exit_state guard in run_posix_cpu_timers()
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_list
# Global Variables: $E, $SED_GREEN, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $SED_YELLOW
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $cve38352_kernel_release, $cve38352_kernel_version_cmp, $cve38352_symbol, $cve38352_task_work_state, $cve38352_config_status, $cve38352_config_source, $cve38352_config_candidates, $cve38352_cfg, $cve38352_line, $cve38352_patch_state, $cve38352_patch_label, $cve38352_fix_tag, $cve38352_last_vuln_tag, $cve38352_risk_msg, $cve38352_risk_color, $cve38352_task_line, $cve38352_patch_line, $cve38352_risk_line
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
cve38352_version_lt(){
awk -v v1="$1" -v v2="$2" '
function cleannum(val) {
gsub(/[^0-9].*/, "", val)
if (val == "") {
val = 0
}
return val + 0
}
BEGIN {
n = split(v1, a, ".")
m = split(v2, b, ".")
max = (n > m ? n : m)
for (i = 1; i <= max; i++) {
av = (i <= n ? cleannum(a[i]) : 0)
bv = (i <= m ? cleannum(b[i]) : 0)
if (av < bv) {
exit 0
}
if (av > bv) {
exit 1
}
}
exit 1
}'
}
cve38352_sanitize_version(){
printf "%s" "$1" | tr '-' '.' | sed 's/[^0-9.].*$//' | sed 's/\.\./\./g' | sed 's/^\.//' | sed 's/\.$//'
}
print_2title "CVE-2025-38352 - POSIX CPU timers race"
cve38352_kernel_release=$(uname -r 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$cve38352_kernel_release" ]; then
echo_not_found "uname -r"
echo ""
else
cve38352_kernel_version_cmp=$(cve38352_sanitize_version "$cve38352_kernel_release")
if [ -z "$cve38352_kernel_version_cmp" ]; then
cve38352_kernel_version_cmp="unknown"
fi
cve38352_symbol="CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK"
cve38352_task_work_state="unknown"
cve38352_config_status="Unknown ($cve38352_symbol not found)"
cve38352_config_source=""
cve38352_config_candidates="/boot/config-$cve38352_kernel_release /proc/config.gz /lib/modules/$cve38352_kernel_release/build/.config /usr/lib/modules/$cve38352_kernel_release/build/.config /usr/src/linux/.config"
for cve38352_cfg in $cve38352_config_candidates; do
[ -r "$cve38352_cfg" ] || continue
if printf "%s" "$cve38352_cfg" | grep -q '\\.gz$'; then
cve38352_line=$(gzip -dc "$cve38352_cfg" 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^(# )?$cve38352_symbol" | head -n1)
else
cve38352_line=$(grep -E "^(# )?$cve38352_symbol" "$cve38352_cfg" 2>/dev/null | head -n1)
fi
[ -z "$cve38352_line" ] && continue
cve38352_config_source="$cve38352_cfg"
case "$cve38352_line" in
"$cve38352_symbol=y")
cve38352_task_work_state="enabled"
cve38352_config_status="Enabled (y)"
;;
"$cve38352_symbol=m")
cve38352_task_work_state="enabled"
cve38352_config_status="Built as module (m)"
;;
"$cve38352_symbol=n")
cve38352_task_work_state="disabled"
cve38352_config_status="Disabled (n)"
;;
"# $cve38352_symbol is not set")
cve38352_task_work_state="disabled"
cve38352_config_status="Not set"
;;
*)
cve38352_config_status="Found: $cve38352_line"
;;
esac
break
done
cve38352_patch_state="unknown_branch"
cve38352_patch_label="Unable to determine kernel train"
cve38352_fix_tag="6.12.34"
cve38352_last_vuln_tag="6.12.33"
case "$cve38352_kernel_version_cmp" in
6.12|6.12.*)
if cve38352_version_lt "$cve38352_kernel_version_cmp" "$cve38352_fix_tag"; then
cve38352_patch_state="pre_fix"
cve38352_patch_label="6.12.x build < $cve38352_fix_tag (last known vulnerable LTS: $cve38352_last_vuln_tag)"
else
cve38352_patch_state="post_fix"
cve38352_patch_label="6.12.x build >= $cve38352_fix_tag (should include fix f90fff1e152d)"
fi
;;
unknown)
cve38352_patch_label="Kernel version string could not be parsed"
;;
*)
cve38352_patch_label="Kernel train $cve38352_kernel_version_cmp (verify commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca manually)"
;;
esac
cve38352_risk_msg="Unknown - missing configuration data"
cve38352_risk_color=""
if [ "$cve38352_task_work_state" = "enabled" ]; then
cve38352_risk_msg="Low - CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK is enabled"
cve38352_risk_color="green"
elif [ "$cve38352_task_work_state" = "disabled" ]; then
if [ "$cve38352_patch_state" = "pre_fix" ]; then
cve38352_risk_msg="High - task_work disabled & kernel predates fix f90fff1e152d"
cve38352_risk_color="red"
else
cve38352_risk_msg="Review - task_work disabled, ensure fix f90fff1e152d is backported"
cve38352_risk_color="yellow"
fi
fi
print_list "Kernel release ............... $cve38352_kernel_release\n"
print_list "Comparable version ........... $cve38352_kernel_version_cmp\n"
cve38352_task_line="Task_work config ............. $cve38352_config_status"
if [ -n "$cve38352_config_source" ]; then
cve38352_task_line="$cve38352_task_line (from $cve38352_config_source)"
fi
cve38352_task_line="$cve38352_task_line\n"
if [ "$cve38352_task_work_state" = "disabled" ]; then
print_list "$cve38352_task_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
elif [ "$cve38352_task_work_state" = "enabled" ]; then
print_list "$cve38352_task_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
else
print_list "$cve38352_task_line"
fi
cve38352_patch_line="Patch status ................. $cve38352_patch_label\n"
if [ "$cve38352_patch_state" = "pre_fix" ]; then
print_list "$cve38352_patch_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
elif [ "$cve38352_patch_state" = "post_fix" ]; then
print_list "$cve38352_patch_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
else
print_list "$cve38352_patch_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_YELLOW},"
fi
cve38352_risk_line="CVE-2025-38352 risk .......... $cve38352_risk_msg\n"
case "$cve38352_risk_color" in
red)
print_list "$cve38352_risk_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
;;
green)
print_list "$cve38352_risk_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
;;
yellow)
print_list "$cve38352_risk_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_YELLOW},"
;;
*)
print_list "$cve38352_risk_line"
;;
esac
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
# Last Update: 07-03-2024
# Description: Check for additional disk information and system resources relevant to privilege escalation:
# - Disk utilization
# - Inode usage
# - System resources
# - Storage statistics
# - Common vulnerable scenarios:
@@ -44,4 +45,8 @@ if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
(df -h || lsblk) 2>/dev/null || echo_not_found "df and lsblk"
warn_exec free 2>/dev/null
echo ""
fi
print_2title "Inode usage"
warn_exec df -i 2>/dev/null
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ print_2title "Container details"
print_list "Is this a container? ...........$NC $containerType"
if [ -e "/proc/vz" ] && ! [ -e "/proc/bc" ]; then
print_list "Container Runtime ..............$NC OpenVZ"
fi
if [ -f "/run/systemd/container" ]; then
print_list "Systemd Container ..............$NC $(cat /run/systemd/container)"
fi
# Get container runtime info
if [ "$(command -v docker || echo -n '')" ]; then
print_list "Docker version ...............$NC "

View File

@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@
# - Container escape tool execution
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: checkContainerExploits, checkProcSysBreakouts, containerCheck, print_2title, print_3title, print_info, print_list, warn_exec
# Functions Used: checkContainerExploits, checkProcSysBreakouts, containerCheck, enumerateDockerSockets, print_2title, print_3title, print_info, print_list, warn_exec
# Global Variables: $binfmt_misc_breakout, $containercapsB, $containerType, $core_pattern_breakout, $dev_mounted, $efi_efivars_writable, $efi_vars_writable, $GREP_IGNORE_MOUNTS, $inContainer, $kallsyms_readable, $kcore_readable, $kmem_readable, $kmem_writable, $kmsg_readable, $mem_readable, $mem_writable, $modprobe_present, $mountinfo_readable, $panic_on_oom_dos, $panic_sys_fs_dos, $proc_configgz_readable, $proc_mounted, $run_unshare, $release_agent_breakout1, $release_agent_breakout2, $release_agent_breakout3, $sched_debug_readable, $security_present, $security_writable, $sysreq_trigger_dos, $uevent_helper_breakout, $vmcoreinfo_readable, $VULN_CVE_2019_5021, $self_mem_readable
# Initial Functions: containerCheck
# Generated Global Variables: $defautl_docker_caps, $containerd_version, $runc_version, $containerd_version
# Generated Global Variables: $defautl_docker_caps, $containerd_version, $runc_version, $seccomp_mode_num, $seccomp_mode_desc
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
@@ -57,14 +57,34 @@ if [ "$inContainer" ]; then
# Security mechanisms
print_3title "Security Mechanisms"
print_list "Seccomp enabled? ............... "$NC
([ "$(grep Seccomp /proc/self/status | grep -v 0)" ] && echo "enabled" || echo "disabled") | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED}," | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"
seccomp_mode_num="$(awk '/^Seccomp:/{print $2}' /proc/self/status 2>/dev/null)"
seccomp_mode_desc="unknown"
case "$seccomp_mode_num" in
0) seccomp_mode_desc="disabled" ;;
1) seccomp_mode_desc="strict" ;;
2) seccomp_mode_desc="filtering" ;;
esac
print_list "Seccomp mode ................... "$NC
(printf "%s (%s)\n" "$seccomp_mode_desc" "${seccomp_mode_num:-?}") | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED}," | sed "s,strict,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed "s,filtering,${SED_GREEN},"
if grep -q "^Seccomp_filters:" /proc/self/status 2>/dev/null; then
print_list "Seccomp filters ............... "$NC
awk '/^Seccomp_filters:/{print $2}' /proc/self/status 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,^[0-9]+$,${SED_GREEN}&,"
fi
print_list "AppArmor profile? .............. "$NC
(cat /proc/self/attr/current 2>/dev/null || echo "disabled") | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED}," | sed "s,kernel,${SED_GREEN},"
print_list "User proc namespace? ........... "$NC
if [ "$(cat /proc/self/uid_map 2>/dev/null)" ]; then (printf "enabled"; cat /proc/self/uid_map) | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"; else echo "disabled" | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED},"; fi
if [ "$(cat /proc/self/uid_map 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
(printf "enabled"; cat /proc/self/uid_map) | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},";
echo ""
echo " Mappings (Container -> Host -> Range):"
cat /proc/self/uid_map | awk '{print " " $1 " -> " $2 " -> " $3}'
else
echo "disabled" | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED},";
fi
# Known vulnerabilities
print_3title "Known Vulnerabilities"
@@ -155,6 +175,9 @@ if [ "$inContainer" ]; then
cat /proc/self/status | tr '\t' ' ' | grep Cap | sed -${E} "s, .*,${SED_RED},g" | sed -${E} "s/00000000a80425fb/$defautl_docker_caps/g" | sed -${E} "s,0000000000000000|00000000a80425fb,${SED_GREEN},g"
echo $ITALIC"Run capsh --decode=<hex> to decode the capabilities"$NC
fi
print_list "Ambient capabilities ........... "$NC
(grep "CapAmb:" /proc/self/status 2>/dev/null | grep -v "0000000000000000" | sed "s,CapAmb:.,," || echo "No") | sed -${E} "s,No,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,[0-9a-fA-F]\+,${SED_RED}&,"
# Additional capability checks
print_list "Dangerous syscalls allowed ... "$NC
@@ -200,6 +223,10 @@ if [ "$inContainer" ]; then
echo "No"
fi
print_list "Looking and enumerating Docker Sockets (if any):\n"$NC
enumerateDockerSockets
# Additional breakout vectors
print_3title "Additional Breakout Vectors"

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Title: Container - Am I Containered
# ID: CT_Am_I_contained
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Description: Am I Containered tool
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, execBin
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $FAT_LINPEAS_AMICONTAINED
# Fat linpeas: 1
# Small linpeas: 0
if [ "$$FAT_LINPEAS_AMICONTAINED" ]; then
print_2title "Am I Containered?"
FAT_LINPEAS_AMICONTAINED="peass{https://github.com/genuinetools/amicontained/releases/latest/download/amicontained-linux-amd64}"
execBin "AmIContainered" "https://github.com/genuinetools/amicontained" "$FAT_LINPEAS_AMICONTAINED"
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# Title: Container - Writable bind mounts without nosuid (SUID risk)
# ID: CT_RW_bind_mounts_nosuid
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 17-09-2025
# Description: Detect writable bind-mounted paths inside containers that are not mounted with nosuid.
# If the container user is root and the mount is a host bind mount without nosuid, an attacker may
# be able to drop a SUID binary on the shared path and execute it from the host to escalate to root
# (classic container-to-host breakout via writable bind mount).
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: containerCheck, print_2title, print_list, print_info
# Global Variables: $inContainer
# Initial Functions: containerCheck
# Generated Global Variables: $CT_RW_bind_mounts_matches
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
containerCheck
if [ "$inContainer" ]; then
echo ""
print_2title "Container - Writable bind mounts w/o nosuid (SUID persistence risk)"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation/index.html#writable-bind-mounts"
if [ -r /proc/self/mountinfo ]; then
CT_RW_bind_mounts_matches=$(grep -E "(^| )bind( |$)" /proc/self/mountinfo 2>/dev/null | grep -E "(^|,)rw(,|$)" | grep -v "nosuid" || true)
else
CT_RW_bind_mounts_matches=$(mount -l 2>/dev/null | grep -E "bind" | grep -E "(^|,)rw(,|$)" | grep -v "nosuid" || true)
fi
if [ -z "$CT_RW_bind_mounts_matches" ]; then
print_list "Writable bind mounts without nosuid ............ No"
else
print_list "Writable bind mounts without nosuid ............ Yes" | sed -${E} "s,Yes,${SED_RED},"
echo "$CT_RW_bind_mounts_matches" | sed -${E} "s,/proc/self/mountinfo,${SED_GREEN},"
echo ""
if [ "$(id -u 2>/dev/null)" = "0" ]; then
print_list "Note"; echo ": You are root inside a container and there are writable bind mounts without nosuid." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
echo " If the path is shared with the host and executable there, you may plant a SUID binary (e.g., copy /bin/bash and chmod 6777)"
echo " and execute it from the host to obtain root. Ensure proper authorization before testing."
else
print_list "Note"; echo ": Current user is not root; if you obtain container root, these mounts may enable host escalation via SUID planting." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
fi
fi
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# Title: Cloud - AWS ECS
# ID: CL_AWS_ECS
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Last Update: 17-01-2026
# Description: AWS ECS Enumeration
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: check_aws_ecs, exec_with_jq, print_2title, print_3title
# Global Variables: $aws_ecs_metadata_uri, $aws_ecs_service_account_uri, $is_aws_ecs
# Initial Functions: check_aws_ecs
# Generated Global Variables: $aws_ecs_req
# Generated Global Variables: $aws_ecs_req, $aws_exec_env, $ecs_task_metadata, $launch_type, $network_modes, $imds_tool, $imds_token, $imds_roles, $imds_http_code, $ecs_block_line, $ecs_host_line, $iptables_cmd, $docker_rules, $first_role
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -44,5 +44,146 @@ if [ "$is_aws_ecs" = "Yes" ]; then
else
echo "I couldn't find AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI env var to get IAM role info (the task is running without a task role probably)"
fi
print_3title "ECS task metadata hints"
aws_exec_env=$(printenv AWS_EXECUTION_ENV 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$aws_exec_env" ]; then
printf "AWS_EXECUTION_ENV=%s\n" "$aws_exec_env"
fi
ecs_task_metadata=""
if [ "$aws_ecs_metadata_uri" ]; then
ecs_task_metadata=$(eval $aws_ecs_req "$aws_ecs_metadata_uri/task" 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ "$ecs_task_metadata" ]; then
launch_type=$(printf "%s" "$ecs_task_metadata" | grep -oE '"LaunchType":"[^"]+"' | head -n 1 | cut -d '"' -f4)
if [ "$launch_type" ]; then
printf "ECS LaunchType reported: %s\n" "$launch_type"
fi
network_modes=$(printf "%s" "$ecs_task_metadata" | grep -oE '"NetworkMode":"[^"]+"' | cut -d '"' -f4 | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$network_modes" ]; then
printf "Reported NetworkMode(s): %s\n" "$network_modes"
fi
else
echo "Unable to fetch task metadata (check ECS_CONTAINER_METADATA_URI)."
fi
echo ""
fi
print_3title "IMDS reachability from this task"
imds_token=""
imds_roles=""
imds_http_code=""
imds_tool=""
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
imds_tool="curl"
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
imds_tool="wget"
fi
if [ "$imds_tool" = "curl" ]; then
imds_token=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$imds_token" ]; then
printf "[!] IMDSv2 token request succeeded (metadata reachable from this task).\n"
imds_roles=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $imds_token" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$imds_roles" ]; then
printf " Instance profile role(s) exposed via IMDS: %s\n" "$imds_roles"
first_role=$(printf "%s" "$imds_roles" | awk '{print $1}')
if [ "$first_role" ]; then
printf " Example: curl -H 'X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: <TOKEN>' http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/%s\n" "$first_role"
fi
else
printf " No IAM role names returned (instance profile might be missing).\n"
fi
else
imds_http_code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" 2>/dev/null)
case "$imds_http_code" in
000|"")
printf "[i] IMDS endpoint did not respond (likely blocked via hop-limit or host firewalling).\n"
;;
401)
printf "[i] IMDS requires v2 tokens but token requests are being blocked (bridge-mode tasks rely on this when hop limit = 1).\n"
;;
*)
printf "[i] IMDS GET returned HTTP %s (investigate host configuration).\n" "$imds_http_code"
;;
esac
fi
elif [ "$imds_tool" = "wget" ]; then
imds_token=$(wget -q -O - --timeout=2 --tries=1 --method=PUT --header="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$imds_token" ]; then
printf "[!] IMDSv2 token request succeeded (metadata reachable from this task).\n"
imds_roles=$(wget -q -O - --timeout=2 --tries=1 --header="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $imds_token" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$imds_roles" ]; then
printf " Instance profile role(s) exposed via IMDS: %s\n" "$imds_roles"
else
printf " No IAM role names returned (instance profile might be missing).\n"
fi
else
wget --server-response -O /dev/null --timeout=2 --tries=1 "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" 2>&1 | awk 'BEGIN{code=""} /^ HTTP/{code=$2} END{ if(code!="") { printf("[i] IMDS GET returned HTTP %s (token could not be retrieved).\n", code); } else { print "[i] IMDS endpoint did not respond (likely blocked)."; } }'
fi
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget were found, I can't test IMDS reachability."
fi
echo ""
print_3title "ECS agent IMDS settings"
if [ -r "/etc/ecs/ecs.config" ]; then
ecs_block_line=$(grep -E "^ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS=" /etc/ecs/ecs.config 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1)
ecs_host_line=$(grep -E "^ECS_ENABLE_TASK_IAM_ROLE_NETWORK_HOST=" /etc/ecs/ecs.config 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1)
if [ "$ecs_block_line" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$ecs_block_line"
if echo "$ecs_block_line" | grep -qi "=true"; then
echo " -> awsvpc-mode tasks should be blocked from IMDS by the ECS agent."
else
echo " -> awsvpc-mode tasks can still reach IMDS (set this to true to block)."
fi
else
echo "ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS not set (awsvpc tasks inherit host IMDS reachability)."
fi
if [ "$ecs_host_line" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$ecs_host_line"
if echo "$ecs_host_line" | grep -qi "=false"; then
echo " -> Host-network tasks lose IAM task roles but IMDS is blocked."
else
echo " -> Host-network tasks keep IAM task roles and retain IMDS access."
fi
else
echo "ECS_ENABLE_TASK_IAM_ROLE_NETWORK_HOST not set (defaults keep IMDS reachable for host-mode tasks)."
fi
else
echo "Cannot read /etc/ecs/ecs.config (file missing or permissions denied)."
fi
echo ""
print_3title "DOCKER-USER IMDS filtering"
iptables_cmd=""
if command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1; then
iptables_cmd=$(command -v iptables)
elif command -v iptables-nft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
iptables_cmd=$(command -v iptables-nft)
fi
if [ "$iptables_cmd" ]; then
docker_rules=$($iptables_cmd -S DOCKER-USER 2>/dev/null)
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
if [ "$docker_rules" ]; then
echo "$docker_rules"
else
echo "(DOCKER-USER chain exists but no rules were found)"
fi
if echo "$docker_rules" | grep -q "169\\.254\\.169\\.254"; then
echo " -> IMDS traffic is explicitly filtered before Docker NAT."
else
echo " -> No DOCKER-USER rule drops 169.254.169.254 traffic (bridge tasks rely on hop limit or host firewalling)."
fi
else
echo "Unable to read DOCKER-USER chain (missing chain or insufficient permissions)."
fi
else
echo "iptables binary not found; cannot inspect DOCKER-USER chain."
fi
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.2
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info, print_3title
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $IAMROOT, $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $IAMROOT, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $TIMEOUT, $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $service_unit, $service_path, $service_content, $finding, $findings, $service_file, $exec_path, $exec_paths, $service, $line, $target_file, $target_exec, $relpath1, $relpath2
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -178,7 +178,11 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ]; then
echo ""
print_3title "Service versions and status:"
(service --status-all || service -e || chkconfig --list || rc-status || launchctl list) 2>/dev/null || echo_not_found "service|chkconfig|rc-status|launchctl"
if [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then
$TIMEOUT 30 sh -c "(service --status-all || service -e || chkconfig --list || rc-status || launchctl list) 2>/dev/null" || echo_not_found "service|chkconfig|rc-status|launchctl"
else
(service --status-all || service -e || chkconfig --list || rc-status || launchctl list) 2>/dev/null || echo_not_found "service|chkconfig|rc-status|launchctl"
fi
fi
# Check systemd path writability
@@ -190,4 +194,4 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_list, echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $Wfolders, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $NC
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH, $line, $service, $file, $version, $user, $caps, $path, $path_line, $service_file, $exec_line, $cmd
# Generated Global Variables: $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH, $line, $service, $file, $version, $user, $caps, $path, $path_line, $service_file, $exec_line, $exec_value, $cmd, $cmd_path, $svc_path_entry, $svc_writable_path
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -113,21 +113,39 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
service=$(echo "$line" | awk '{print $1}')
service_file=$(get_service_file "$service")
if [ -n "$service_file" ]; then
# Check service-specific PATH entries (Environment=PATH=...)
svc_writable_path=$(grep -E '^Environment=.*PATH=' "$service_file" 2>/dev/null | sed -E 's/^Environment=//; s/^"//; s/"$//; s/^PATH=//' | tr ':' '\n' | while read -r svc_path_entry; do
[ -z "$svc_path_entry" ] && continue
if [ -d "$svc_path_entry" ] && [ -w "$svc_path_entry" ]; then
echo "$svc_path_entry"
fi
done)
if [ "$svc_writable_path" ]; then
for svc_path_entry in $svc_writable_path; do
echo "$service: Writable service PATH entry '$svc_path_entry'" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
done
fi
# Check ExecStart paths
grep -E "ExecStart|ExecStartPre|ExecStartPost" "$service_file" 2>/dev/null |
while read -r exec_line; do
# Extract the first word after ExecStart* as the command
cmd=$(echo "$exec_line" | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '"')
# Extract the rest as arguments
args=$(echo "$exec_line" | awk '{$1=$2=""; print $0}' | tr -d '"')
# Extract command from the right side of Exec*=, not from argv
exec_value="${exec_line#*=}"
exec_value=$(echo "$exec_value" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//')
cmd=$(echo "$exec_value" | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '"')
# Strip systemd command prefixes (-, @, :, +, !) before path checks
cmd_path=$(echo "$cmd" | sed -E 's/^[-@:+!]+//')
# Only check the command path, not arguments
if [ -n "$cmd" ] && [ -w "$cmd" ]; then
echo "$service: $cmd (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
if [ -n "$cmd_path" ] && [ -w "$cmd_path" ]; then
echo "$service: $cmd_path (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
# Check for relative paths only in the command, not arguments
if [ -n "$cmd" ] && [ "${cmd#/}" = "$cmd" ] && ! echo "$cmd" | grep -qE '^-|^--'; then
echo "$service: Uses relative path '$cmd' (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
if [ -n "$cmd_path" ] && [ "${cmd_path#/}" = "$cmd_path" ] && [ "${cmd_path#\$}" = "$cmd_path" ]; then
echo "$service: Uses relative path '$cmd_path' (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
if [ "$svc_writable_path" ]; then
echo "$service: Relative Exec path + writable service PATH can allow path hijacking" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
fi
fi
done
fi
@@ -153,4 +171,4 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.1
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $groupsB, $groupsVB, $IAMROOT, $idB, $knw_grps, $knw_usrs, $nosh_usrs, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $sh_usrs, $USER, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN, $NC, $RED
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $groupsB, $groupsVB, $IAMROOT, $idB, $knw_grps, $knw_usrs, $nosh_usrs, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $sh_usrs, $USER, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $NC, $RED
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $unix_scks_list, $unix_scks_list2, $perms, $owner, $owner_info, $response, $socket, $cmd, $mode, $group
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -142,10 +142,13 @@ if ! [ "$IAMROOT" ]; then
# Highlight dangerous ownership
if echo "$owner_info" | grep -q "root"; then
echo " └─(${RED}Owned by root${NC})"
if echo "$perms" | grep -q "Write"; then
echo " └─High risk: root-owned and writable Unix socket" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
fi
fi
fi
fi
done
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# Title: Processes & Cron & Services & Timers - Legacy r-commands and host-based trust
# ID: PR_Rcommands_trust
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 27-08-2025
# Description: Detect legacy r-services (rsh/rlogin/rexec) exposure and dangerous host-based trust (.rhosts/hosts.equiv),
# which can allow passwordless root via hostname/DNS manipulation.
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title, echo_not_found
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $rfile, $perms, $owner, $g, $o, $any_rhosts, $shown, $f, $p
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
print_2title "Legacy r-commands (rsh/rlogin/rexec) and host-based trust"
echo ""
print_3title "Listening r-services (TCP 512-514)"
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ss -ltnp 2>/dev/null | awk '$1 ~ /^LISTEN$/ && $4 ~ /:(512|513|514)$/ {print}' || echo_not_found "ss"
elif command -v netstat >/dev/null 2>&1; then
netstat -ltnp 2>/dev/null | awk '$6 ~ /LISTEN/ && $4 ~ /:(512|513|514)$/ {print}' || echo_not_found "netstat"
else
echo_not_found "ss|netstat"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "systemd units exposing r-services"
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
systemctl list-unit-files 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^(rlogin|rsh|rexec)\.(socket|service)\b' || echo_not_found "rlogin|rsh|rexec units"
systemctl list-sockets 2>/dev/null | grep -E '\b(rlogin|rsh|rexec)\.socket\b' || true
else
echo_not_found "systemctl"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "inetd/xinetd configuration for r-services"
if [ -f /etc/inetd.conf ]; then
grep -vE '^\s*#|^\s*$' /etc/inetd.conf 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei '\b(shell|login|exec|rsh|rlogin|rexec)\b' 2>/dev/null || echo " No r-services found in /etc/inetd.conf"
else
echo_not_found "/etc/inetd.conf"
fi
if [ -d /etc/xinetd.d ]; then
# Print enabled r-services in xinetd
for f in /etc/xinetd.d/*; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
if grep -qiE '\b(service|disable)\b' "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
if grep -qiE 'service\s+(rsh|rlogin|rexec|shell|login|exec)\b' "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
# Only warn if not disabled
if ! grep -qiE '^\s*disable\s*=\s*yes\b' "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " $(basename "$f") may enable r-services:"; grep -iE '^(\s*service|\s*disable)' "$f" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
fi
fi
done
else
echo_not_found "/etc/xinetd.d"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "Installed r-service server packages"
if command -v dpkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
dpkg -l 2>/dev/null | grep -E '\b(rsh-server|rsh-redone-server|krb5-rsh-server|inetutils-inetd|openbsd-inetd|xinetd|netkit-rsh)\b' || echo " No related packages found via dpkg"
elif command -v rpm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
rpm -qa 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei '\b(rsh|rlogin|rexec|xinetd)\b' || echo " No related packages found via rpm"
else
echo_not_found "dpkg|rpm"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "/etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv"
for f in /etc/hosts.equiv /etc/shosts.equiv; do
if [ -f "$f" ]; then
perms=$(stat -c %a "$f" 2>/dev/null)
owner=$(stat -c %U "$f" 2>/dev/null)
echo " $f (perm $perms, owner $owner)"
# Print non-comment lines
awk 'NF && $0 !~ /^\s*#/ {print " " $0}' "$f" 2>/dev/null
if grep -qEv '^\s*#|^\s*$' "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
if grep -qE '(^|\s)\+' "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " [!] Wildcard '+' trust found"
fi
fi
fi
done
echo ""
print_3title "Per-user .rhosts files"
any_rhosts=false
for rfile in /root/.rhosts /home/*/.rhosts; do
if [ -f "$rfile" ]; then
any_rhosts=true
perms=$(stat -c %a "$rfile" 2>/dev/null)
owner=$(stat -c %U "$rfile" 2>/dev/null)
echo " $rfile (perm $perms, owner $owner)"
awk 'NF && $0 !~ /^\s*#/ {print " " $0}' "$rfile" 2>/dev/null
# Warn on insecure perms (group/other write)
g=$(printf "%s" "$perms" | cut -c2)
o=$(printf "%s" "$perms" | cut -c3)
if [ "${g:-0}" -ge 2 ] || [ "${o:-0}" -ge 2 ]; then
echo " [!] Insecure permissions (group/other write)"
fi
fi
done
if ! $any_rhosts; then echo_not_found ".rhosts"; fi
echo ""
print_3title "PAM rhosts authentication"
shown=false
for p in /etc/pam.d/rlogin /etc/pam.d/rsh; do
if [ -f "$p" ]; then
shown=true
echo " $p:"
(grep -nEi 'pam_rhosts|pam_rhosts_auth' "$p" 2>/dev/null || echo " no pam_rhosts* lines") | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
done
if ! $shown; then echo_not_found "/etc/pam.d/rlogin|rsh"; fi
echo ""
print_3title "SSH HostbasedAuthentication"
if [ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ]; then
if grep -qiE '^[^#]*HostbasedAuthentication\s+yes' /etc/ssh/sshd_config 2>/dev/null; then
echo " HostbasedAuthentication yes (check /etc/shosts.equiv or ~/.shosts)"
else
echo " HostbasedAuthentication no or not set"
fi
else
echo_not_found "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "Potential DNS control indicators (local)"
(ps -eo comm,args 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei '(^|/)(pdns|pdns_server|pdns_recursor|powerdns-admin)( |$)' | grep -Ev 'grep|bash' || echo " Not detected")
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
# Title: Processes & Cron & Services & Timers - Crontab UI (root) Misconfiguration
# ID: PR_Crontab_UI_misconfig
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 2025-09-13
# Description: Detect Crontab UI service and risky configurations that can lead to privesc:
# - Root-run Crontab UI exposed on localhost
# - Basic-Auth credentials in systemd Environment= (BASIC_AUTH_USER/PWD)
# - Cron DB path (CRON_DB_PATH) and weak permissions / embedded secrets in jobs
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info, print_list, echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $NC
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $svc, $state, $user, $envvals, $port, $dbpath, $dbfile, $candidates, $procs, $perms, $basic_user, $basic_pwd, $uprint, $pprint, $dir, $found
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
print_2title "Crontab UI (root) misconfiguration checks"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#scheduledcron-jobs"
# Collect candidate services referencing crontab-ui
candidates=""
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
candidates=$(systemctl list-units --type=service --all 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | grep -Ei '^crontab-ui\.service$' 2>/dev/null)
fi
# Fallback: grep service files for ExecStart containing crontab-ui
if [ -z "$candidates" ]; then
for dir in /etc/systemd/system /lib/systemd/system; do
[ -d "$dir" ] || continue
found=$(grep -RIl "^Exec(Start|StartPre|StartPost)=.*crontab-ui" "$dir" 2>/dev/null | xargs -r -I{} basename {} 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$found" ]; then
candidates=$(printf "%s\n%s" "$candidates" "$found" | sort -u)
fi
done
fi
# Also flag if the binary exists or a process seems to be running
if command -v crontab-ui >/dev/null 2>&1; then
print_list "crontab-ui binary found at: $(command -v crontab-ui)"$NC
else
echo_not_found "crontab-ui"
fi
procs=$(ps aux 2>/dev/null | grep -E "(crontab-ui|node .*crontab-ui)" | grep -v grep)
if [ -n "$procs" ]; then
print_list "Processes matching crontab-ui? ..................... "$NC
printf "%s\n" "$procs"
echo ""
fi
# If no candidates detected, exit quietly
if [ "$candidates" ]; then
# Iterate candidates and extract interesting data
printf "%s\n" "$candidates" | while read -r svc; do
[ -n "$svc" ] || continue
# Ensure suffix .service if missing
case "$svc" in
*.service) : ;;
*) svc="$svc.service" ;;
esac
state=""
user=""
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
state=$(systemctl is-active "$svc" 2>/dev/null)
user=$(systemctl show "$svc" -p User 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)
fi
[ -z "$state" ] && state="unknown"
[ -z "$user" ] && user="unknown"
echo "Service: $svc (state: $state, User: $user)" | sed -${E} "s,root,${SED_RED},g"
# Read Environment from systemd (works even if file unreadable in many setups)
envvals=$(systemctl show "$svc" -p Environment 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2-)
if [ -n "$envvals" ]; then
basic_user=$(printf "%s\n" "$envvals" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^BASIC_AUTH_USER=' | head -n1 | cut -d= -f2-)
basic_pwd=$(printf "%s\n" "$envvals" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^BASIC_AUTH_PWD=' | head -n1 | cut -d= -f2-)
dbpath=$(printf "%s\n" "$envvals" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^CRON_DB_PATH=' | head -n1 | cut -d= -f2-)
port=$(printf "%s\n" "$envvals" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^PORT=' | head -n1 | cut -d= -f2-)
if [ -n "$basic_user" ] || [ -n "$basic_pwd" ]; then
uprint="$basic_user"
pprint="$basic_pwd"
[ -n "$basic_pwd" ] && pprint="$basic_pwd"
echo " └─ Basic-Auth credentials in Environment: user='${uprint}' pwd='${pprint}'" | sed -${E} "s,pwd='[^']*',${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
fi
if [ -n "$dbpath" ]; then
echo " └─ CRON_DB_PATH: $dbpath"
fi
# Check listener bound to localhost
[ -z "$port" ] && port=8000
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ss -ltn 2>/dev/null | grep -qE "127\.0\.0\.1:${port}[[:space:]]"; then
echo " └─ Listener detected on 127.0.0.1:${port} (likely Crontab UI)."
fi
else
if netstat -tnl 2>/dev/null | grep -qE "127\.0\.0\.1:${port}[[:space:]]"; then
echo " └─ Listener detected on 127.0.0.1:${port} (likely Crontab UI)."
fi
fi
# If we know DB path, try to read crontab.db for obvious secrets and check perms
if [ -n "$dbpath" ] && [ -d "$dbpath" ] && [ -r "$dbpath" ]; then
dbfile="$dbpath/crontab.db"
if [ -f "$dbfile" ]; then
perms=$(ls -ld "$dbpath" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1, $3, $4}')
echo " └─ DB dir perms: $perms"
if [ -w "$dbpath" ] || [ -w "$dbfile" ]; then
echo " └─ Writable by current user -> potential job injection!" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
echo " └─ Inspecting $dbfile for embedded secrets in commands (zip -P / --password / pass/token/secret)..."
grep -E "-P[[:space:]]+\S+|--password[[:space:]]+\S+|[Pp]ass(word)?|[Tt]oken|[Ss]ecret" "$dbfile" 2>/dev/null | head -n 20 | sed -${E} "s,(${SED_RED_YELLOW}),\1,g"
fi
fi
fi
echo ""
done
fi
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# Title: Processes & Cron & Services & Timers - Deleted open files
# ID: PR_Deleted_open_files
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 2025-01-07
# Description: Identify deleted files still held open by running processes
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $DEBUG, $EXTRA_CHECKS, $E, $SED_RED
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if [ "$(command -v lsof 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
print_2title "Deleted files still open"
print_info "Open deleted files can hide tools and still consume disk space"
lsof +L1 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,\\(deleted\\),${SED_RED},g"
echo ""
elif [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
print_2title "Deleted files still open"
print_info "lsof not found, scanning /proc for deleted file descriptors"
ls -l /proc/[0-9]*/fd 2>/dev/null | grep "(deleted)" | sed -${E} "s,\\(deleted\\),${SED_RED},g" | head -n 200
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
incrontab -l 2>/dev/null
ls -alR /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/crontabs /var/spool/anacron 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$cronjobsG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed "s,$cronjobsB,${SED_RED},g"
cat /etc/cron* /etc/at* /etc/anacrontab /var/spool/cron/crontabs/* /etc/incron.d/* /var/spool/incron/* 2>/dev/null | tr -d "\r" | grep -v "^#" | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g" | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_LIGHT_MAGENTA}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed "s,root,${SED_RED},"
grep -Hn '^PATH=' /etc/crontab /etc/cron.d/* 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
crontab -l -u "$USER" 2>/dev/null | tr -d "\r"
ls -lR /usr/lib/cron/tabs/ /private/var/at/jobs /var/at/tabs/ /etc/periodic/ 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$cronjobsG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed "s,$cronjobsB,${SED_RED},g" #MacOS paths
atq 2>/dev/null
@@ -247,4 +248,4 @@ else
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#scheduledcron-jobs"
find "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" '(' -type d -or -type f ')' '(' -name "cron*" -or -name "anacron" -or -name "anacrontab" -or -name "incron.d" -or -name "incron" -or -name "at" -or -name "periodic" ')' -exec echo {} \; -exec ls -lR {} \;
fi
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
# Description: Check for internet access
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: check_dns, check_icmp, check_tcp_443, check_tcp_443_bin, check_tcp_80, print_2title, check_external_hostname
# Global Variables:
# Functions Used: check_dns, check_icmp, check_tcp_443, check_tcp_443_bin, check_tcp_80, print_2title, print_3title, print_info, check_external_hostname
# Global Variables: $E
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pid4, $pid2, $pid1, $pid3, $pid5, $NOT_CHECK_EXTERNAL_HOSTNAME, $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS
# Generated Global Variables: $pid4, $pid2, $pid1, $pid3, $tcp443_bin_status, $NOT_CHECK_EXTERNAL_HOSTNAME, $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
@@ -19,24 +19,30 @@ print_2title "Internet Access?"
TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS=5
if [ "$SUPERFAST" ]; then
TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS=2
TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS=2.5
fi
# Run all checks in background
check_tcp_80 2>/dev/null & pid1=$!
check_tcp_443 2>/dev/null & pid2=$!
check_tcp_443_bin 2>/dev/null & pid3=$!
check_icmp 2>/dev/null & pid4=$!
check_dns 2>/dev/null & pid5=$!
check_tcp_80 "$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS" 2>/dev/null & pid1=$!
check_tcp_443 "$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS" 2>/dev/null & pid2=$!
check_icmp "$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS" 2>/dev/null & pid3=$!
check_dns "$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS" 2>/dev/null & pid4=$!
# Kill all check workers after timeout + 1s without relying on integer arithmetic
(sleep "$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS"; sleep 1; kill -9 $pid1 $pid2 $pid3 $pid4 2>/dev/null) &
check_tcp_443_bin $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS 2>/dev/null
tcp443_bin_status=$?
wait $pid1 $pid2 $pid3 $pid4 2>/dev/null
# Kill all after 10 seconds
(sleep $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS && kill -9 $pid1 $pid2 $pid3 $pid4 $pid5 2>/dev/null) &
# Wait for all to finish
wait $pid1 $pid2 $pid3 $pid4 $pid5 2>/dev/null
wait 2>/dev/null
if ! [ "$SUPERFAST" ] && ! [ "$NOT_CHECK_EXTERNAL_HOSTNAME" ]; then
if [ "$tcp443_bin_status" -eq 0 ] && \
[ -z "$SUPERFAST" ] && [ -z "$NOT_CHECK_EXTERNAL_HOSTNAME" ]; then
echo ""
print_2title "Is hostname malicious or leaked?"
print_info "This will check the public IP and hostname in known malicious lists and leaks to find any relevant information about the host."
@@ -44,3 +50,9 @@ if ! [ "$SUPERFAST" ] && ! [ "$NOT_CHECK_EXTERNAL_HOSTNAME" ]; then
fi
echo ""
print_3title "Proxy discovery"
print_info "Checking common proxy env vars and apt proxy config"
(env | grep -iE '^(http|https|ftp|all)_proxy=|^no_proxy=') 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,_proxy|no_proxy,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
grep -RinE 'Acquire::(http|https)::Proxy|proxy' /etc/apt/apt.conf /etc/apt/apt.conf.d 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,proxy|Acquire::http::Proxy|Acquire::https::Proxy,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
echo ""

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
# Description: Check network interfaces
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title
# Global Variables:
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title
# Global Variables: $E, $SED_RED_YELLOW
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $iface, $state, $mac, $ip_file, $line
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -73,4 +73,22 @@ else
parse_network_interfaces
fi
echo ""
if command -v ip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
print_3title "Routing & policy quick view"
ip route 2>/dev/null
ip -6 route 2>/dev/null | head -n 30
echo ""
ip rule 2>/dev/null
print_3title "Virtual/overlay interfaces quick view"
ip -d link 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^[0-9]+:|veth|docker|cni|flannel|br-|bridge|vlan|bond|tun|tap|wg|tailscale" | sed -${E} "s,veth|docker|cni|flannel|br-|bridge|vlan|bond|tun|tap|wg|tailscale,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
print_3title "Network namespaces quick view"
ip netns list 2>/dev/null
ls -la /var/run/netns/ 2>/dev/null
fi
print_3title "Forwarding status"
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,=[[:space:]]*1,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
echo ""

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title, print_info
# Global Variables: $E, $SED_RED
# Global Variables: $E, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pid_dir, $tx_queue, $pid, $rem_port, $proc_file, $rem_ip, $local_ip, $rx_queue, $proto, $rem_addr, $program, $state, $header_sep, $proc_info, $inode, $header, $line, $local_addr, $local_port
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -122,6 +122,45 @@ get_open_ports() {
parse_proc_net_ports "udp"
fi
# Focused local service exposure view
print_3title "Local-only listeners (loopback)"
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ss -nltpu 2>/dev/null | grep -E "127\.0\.0\.1:|::1:" | sed -${E} "s,127\.0\.0\.1:|::1:,${SED_RED},g"
elif command -v netstat >/dev/null 2>&1; then
netstat -punta 2>/dev/null | grep -i listen | grep -E "127\.0\.0\.1:|::1:" | sed -${E} "s,127\.0\.0\.1:|::1:,${SED_RED},g"
fi
print_3title "Unique listener bind addresses"
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ss -nltpuH 2>/dev/null | awk '{
a=$5
if (a ~ /^\[/) {
sub(/^\[/, "", a)
sub(/\]:[0-9]+$/, "", a)
} else if (a ~ /:[0-9]+$/) {
sub(/:[0-9]+$/, "", a)
}
sub(/^::ffff:/, "", a)
if (a != "") print a
}' | sort -u | sed -${E} "s,127\.0\.0\.1|::1,${SED_RED},g"
elif command -v netstat >/dev/null 2>&1; then
netstat -punta 2>/dev/null | grep -i listen | awk '{
a=$4
if (a ~ /^\[/) {
sub(/^\[/, "", a)
sub(/\]:[0-9]+$/, "", a)
} else if (a ~ /:[0-9]+$/) {
sub(/:[0-9]+$/, "", a)
}
if (a == ":::" ) a="::"
sub(/^::ffff:/, "", a)
if (a != "") print a
}' | sort -u | sed -${E} "s,127\.0\.0\.1|::1,${SED_RED},g"
fi
print_3title "Potential local forwarders/relays"
ps aux 2>/dev/null | grep -E "[s]ocat|[s]sh .*(-L|-R|-D)|[n]cat|[n]c .*-l" | sed -${E} "s,socat|ssh|-L|-R|-D|ncat|nc,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
# Additional port information
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
print_3title "Additional Port Information"

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title, print_info, warn_exec
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $E, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $E, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN, $SED_RED_YELLOW
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $tools_found, $tool, $interfaces, $interfaces_found, $iface, $cmd, $pattern, $patterns
# Generated Global Variables: $tools_found, $tool, $interfaces, $interfaces_found, $iface, $cmd, $pattern, $patterns, $dumpcap_test_file
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -26,8 +26,17 @@ check_command() {
# Function to check if we can sniff on an interface
check_interface_sniffable() {
local iface=$1
if timeout 1 tcpdump -i "$iface" -c 1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
if check_command tcpdump; then
if timeout 1 tcpdump -i "$iface" -c 1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
fi
elif check_command dumpcap; then
dumpcap_test_file="/tmp/.linpeas_dumpcap_test_$$.pcap"
if timeout 2 dumpcap -i "$iface" -c 1 -q -w "$dumpcap_test_file" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
rm -f "$dumpcap_test_file" 2>/dev/null
return 0
fi
rm -f "$dumpcap_test_file" 2>/dev/null
fi
return 1
}
@@ -55,6 +64,20 @@ check_network_traffic_analysis() {
tools_found=1
# Check tcpdump version and capabilities
warn_exec tcpdump --version 2>/dev/null | head -n 1
getcap "$(command -v tcpdump)" 2>/dev/null
fi
if check_command dumpcap; then
echo "dumpcap is available" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
tools_found=1
warn_exec dumpcap --version 2>/dev/null | head -n 1
getcap "$(command -v dumpcap)" 2>/dev/null
if id -nG 2>/dev/null | grep -qw wireshark; then
echo "Current user is in wireshark group" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
elif getent group wireshark >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "wireshark group exists but current user is not in it" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
fi
fi
if check_command tshark; then
@@ -68,10 +91,28 @@ check_network_traffic_analysis() {
echo "wireshark is available" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
tools_found=1
fi
if check_command ngrep; then
echo "ngrep is available" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
tools_found=1
fi
if check_command tcpflow; then
echo "tcpflow is available" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
tools_found=1
fi
if [ $tools_found -eq 0 ]; then
echo "No sniffing tools found" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
if check_command tcpdump; then
echo "Sniffable interfaces according to tcpdump -D:"
timeout 2 tcpdump -D 2>/dev/null
elif check_command dumpcap; then
echo "Sniffable interfaces according to dumpcap -D:"
timeout 2 dumpcap -D 2>/dev/null
fi
# Check network interfaces
echo ""
@@ -88,25 +129,28 @@ check_network_traffic_analysis() {
fi
for iface in $interfaces; do
if [ "$iface" != "lo" ]; then # Skip loopback
if [ "$iface" = "lo" ]; then
echo -n "Interface $iface (loopback): "
else
echo -n "Interface $iface: "
if check_interface_sniffable "$iface"; then
echo "Sniffable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
interfaces_found=1
# Check promiscuous mode
if check_promiscuous_mode "$iface"; then
echo " - Promiscuous mode enabled" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
# Get interface details
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ]; then
echo " - Interface details:"
warn_exec ip addr show "$iface" 2>/dev/null || ifconfig "$iface" 2>/dev/null
fi
else
echo "Not sniffable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
if check_interface_sniffable "$iface"; then
echo "Sniffable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
interfaces_found=1
# Check promiscuous mode
if [ "$iface" != "lo" ] && check_promiscuous_mode "$iface"; then
echo " - Promiscuous mode enabled" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
# Get interface details
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ]; then
echo " - Interface details:"
warn_exec ip addr show "$iface" 2>/dev/null || ifconfig "$iface" 2>/dev/null
fi
else
echo "Not sniffable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
done
@@ -145,7 +189,12 @@ check_network_traffic_analysis() {
print_info "To capture sensitive traffic, you can use:"
echo "tcpdump -i <interface> -w capture.pcap" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
echo "tshark -i <interface> -w capture.pcap" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
echo "dumpcap -i <interface> -w capture.pcap" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"
fi
echo ""
print_3title "Running sniffing/traffic reconstruction processes"
ps aux 2>/dev/null | grep -E "[t]cpdump|[d]umpcap|[t]shark|[w]ireshark|[n]grep|[t]cpflow" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
# Additional information
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ]; then

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title, warn_exec, echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $E, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN, $SED_YELLOW
# Global Variables: $EXTRA_CHECKS, $E, $SED_RED, $SED_GREEN, $SED_YELLOW, $SED_RED_YELLOW
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $rules_file, $cmd, $tool, $config_file
# Generated Global Variables: $rules_file, $cmd, $tool, $config_file, $sysctl_var
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ analyze_nftables() {
# List all rules
echo -e "\nNftables Ruleset:"
warn_exec nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null
echo -e "\nNftables Ruleset with handles (-a):"
warn_exec nft -a list ruleset 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,\\bdrop\\b|\\breject\\b|handle [0-9]+,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
# Check for saved rules
echo -e "\nSaved Rules:"
@@ -180,6 +183,17 @@ analyze_firewall_rules() {
analyze_nftables
analyze_firewalld
analyze_ufw
echo ""
print_3title "Forwarding and rp_filter"
for sysctl_var in net.ipv4.ip_forward net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter; do
sysctl "$sysctl_var" 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,=[[:space:]]*1,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
done
if check_command conntrack; then
echo -e "\nConntrack state (first 20):"
warn_exec conntrack -L 2>/dev/null | head -n 20
fi
# Additional checks if EXTRA_CHECKS is enabled
if [ "$EXTRA_CHECKS" ]; then
@@ -207,4 +221,4 @@ analyze_firewall_rules() {
}
# Run the main function
analyze_firewall_rules
analyze_firewall_rules

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $Groups, $groupsB, $groupsVB, $nosh_usrs, $sh_usrs, $USER
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pkexec_bin, $policy_dir, $policy_file
# Generated Global Variables: $pkexec_bin, $pkexec_version, $policy_dir, $policy_file
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ if [ -n "$pkexec_bin" ]; then
# Check polkit version for known vulnerabilities
if command -v pkexec >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pkexec --version 2>/dev/null
pkexec_version="$(pkexec --version 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '[0-9]+(\\.[0-9]+)+')"
if [ "$pkexec_version" ] && [ "$(printf '%s\n' "$pkexec_version" "0.120" | sort -V | head -n1)" = "$pkexec_version" ] && [ "$pkexec_version" != "0.120" ]; then
echo "Potentially vulnerable to CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) - check distro patches" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
fi
fi
fi

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS, $sh_usrs, $USER
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS, $sh_usrs, $TIMEOUT, $USER
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $ushell, $no_shells, $unexpected_shells
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -26,8 +26,16 @@ else
no_shells=$(grep -Ev "sh$" /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null | cut -d ':' -f 7 | sort | uniq)
unexpected_shells=""
printf "%s\n" "$no_shells" | while read f; do
if $f -c 'whoami' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$USER"; then
unexpected_shells="$f\n$unexpected_shells"
if [ -x "$f" ]; then
if [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then
if $TIMEOUT 1 "$f" -c 'whoami' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$USER"; then
unexpected_shells="$f\n$unexpected_shells"
fi
else
if "$f" -c 'whoami' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$USER"; then
unexpected_shells="$f\n$unexpected_shells"
fi
fi
fi
done
grep "sh$" /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null | sort | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_LIGHT_MAGENTA}," | sed "s,root,${SED_RED},"
@@ -41,4 +49,4 @@ else
done
fi
fi
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Title: Users Information - subuid/subgid mappings
# ID: UG_Subuid_subgid_mappings
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 13-02-2026
# Description: Show delegated user namespace ID ranges from /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid.
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
print_2title "User namespace mappings (subuid/subgid)"
if [ "$MACPEAS" ]; then
echo "Not applicable on macOS"
else
if [ -r /etc/subuid ]; then
echo "subuid:"
grep -v -E '^\s*#|^\s*$' /etc/subuid 2>/dev/null
else
echo "/etc/subuid not readable or not present"
fi
if [ -r /etc/subgid ]; then
echo ""
echo "subgid:"
grep -v -E '^\s*#|^\s*$' /etc/subgid 2>/dev/null
else
echo "/etc/subgid not readable or not present"
fi
fi
echo ""

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables:$IAMROOT, $PASSWORD, $sudoB, $sudoG, $sudoVB1, $sudoVB2
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Generated Global Variables: $secure_path_line
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -19,14 +19,27 @@ print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation
if [ "$PASSWORD" ]; then
(echo "$PASSWORD" | timeout 1 sudo -S -l | sed "s,_proxy,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,$sudoG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB1,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB2,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoB,${SED_RED},g") 2>/dev/null || echo_not_found "sudo"
fi
(sudo -n -l 2>/dev/null | sed "s,_proxy,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,$sudoG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB1,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB2,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoB,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,\!root,${SED_RED},") 2>/dev/null || echo "No cached sudo token (sudo -n -l)"
secure_path_line=$(sudo -l 2>/dev/null | grep -o "secure_path=[^,]*" | head -n 1 | cut -d= -f2)
if [ "$secure_path_line" ]; then
for p in $(echo "$secure_path_line" | tr ':' ' '); do
if [ -w "$p" ]; then
echo "Writable secure_path entry: $p" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
done
fi
( grep -Iv "^$" cat /etc/sudoers | grep -v "#" | sed "s,_proxy,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,$sudoG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB1,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB2,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoB,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,pwfeedback,${SED_RED},g" ) 2>/dev/null || echo_not_found "/etc/sudoers"
if ! [ "$IAMROOT" ] && [ -w '/etc/sudoers.d/' ]; then
echo "You can create a file in /etc/sudoers.d/ and escalate privileges" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
fi
for f in /etc/sudoers.d/*; do
if [ -w "$f" ]; then
echo "Sudoers file: $f is writable and may allow privilege escalation" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
fi
if [ -r "$f" ]; then
echo "Sudoers file: $f is readable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
grep -Iv "^$" "$f" | grep -v "#" | sed "s,_proxy,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,$sudoG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB1,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoVB2,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sudoB,${SED_RED},g" | sed "s,pwfeedback,${SED_RED},g"
fi
done
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -40,4 +40,18 @@ else
echo "ptrace protection is enabled ($ptrace_scope)" | sed "s,is enabled,${SED_GREEN},g";
fi
if [ -d "/var/run/sudo/ts" ]; then
echo "Sudo token directory perms:" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN},g"
ls -ld /var/run/sudo/ts 2>/dev/null
if [ -w "/var/run/sudo/ts" ]; then
echo "/var/run/sudo/ts is writable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
if [ -f "/var/run/sudo/ts/$USER" ]; then
ls -l "/var/run/sudo/ts/$USER" 2>/dev/null
if [ -w "/var/run/sudo/ts/$USER" ]; then
echo "User sudo token file is writable" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
fi
fi
echo ""

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
# Title: Software Information - Browser Profiles
# ID: SW_Browser_profiles
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 10-03-2025
# Description: List browser profiles that may store credentials/cookies
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title, print_info
# Global Variables: $HOMESEARCH, $SED_RED
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $h, $firefox_ini, $chrome_base, $profiles
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
print_2title "Browser Profiles"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#browser-data"
echo ""
for h in $HOMESEARCH; do
[ -d "$h" ] || continue
firefox_ini="$h/.mozilla/firefox/profiles.ini"
if [ -f "$firefox_ini" ]; then
print_3title "Firefox profiles ($h)"
awk -F= '
/^\[Profile/ { in_profile=1 }
/^Path=/ { path=$2 }
/^IsRelative=/ { isrel=$2 }
/^$/ {
if (path != "") {
if (isrel == "1") {
print base "/.mozilla/firefox/" path
} else {
print path
}
}
path=""; isrel=""
}
END {
if (path != "") {
if (isrel == "1") {
print base "/.mozilla/firefox/" path
} else {
print path
}
}
}
' base="$h" "$firefox_ini" 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
echo ""
fi
for chrome_base in "$h/.config/google-chrome" "$h/.config/chromium" "$h/.config/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser" "$h/.config/microsoft-edge" "$h/.config/microsoft-edge-beta" "$h/.config/microsoft-edge-dev"; do
if [ -d "$chrome_base" ]; then
profiles=$(find "$chrome_base" -maxdepth 1 -type d \( -name "Default" -o -name "Profile *" \) 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$profiles" ]; then
print_3title "Chromium profiles ($chrome_base)"
printf "%s\n" "$profiles" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
echo ""
fi
fi
done
done

View File

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# Title: Software Information - Checking leaks in git repositories
# ID: SI_Leaks_git_repo
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Description: Checking leaks in git repositories
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: execBin, print_2title
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS, $TIMEOUT
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $git_dirname, $FAT_LINPEAS_GITLEAKS
# Fat linpeas: 1
# Small linpeas: 0
if ! [ "$FAST" ] && ! [ "$SUPERFAST" ] && [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then
print_2title "Checking leaks in git repositories"
printf "%s\n" "$PSTORAGE_GITHUB" | while read f; do
if echo "$f" | grep -Eq ".git$"; then
git_dirname=$(dirname "$f")
if [ "$MACPEAS" ]; then
FAT_LINPEAS_GITLEAKS="peass{https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.17.0/gitleaks_8.17.0_darwin_arm64.tar.gz}"
else
FAT_LINPEAS_GITLEAKS="peass{https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.17.0/gitleaks_8.17.0_linux_x64.tar.gz}"
fi
execBin "GitLeaks (checking $git_dirname)" "https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks" "$FAT_LINPEAS_GITLEAKS" "detect -s '$git_dirname' -v | grep -E 'Description|Match|Secret|Message|Date'"
fi
done
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title
# Global Variables: $DEBUG, $knw_usrs, $nosh_usrs, $sh_usrs, $DEBUG, $USER, $STRINGS
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $mysqluser, $mysqlexec, $mysqlconnect, $mysqlconnectnopass
# Generated Global Variables: $mysqluser, $mysqlexec, $mysqlconnect, $mysqlconnectnopass, $mysqluser, $version_output, $major_version, $version, $process_info
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -102,4 +102,42 @@ if [ "$(command -v mysql || echo -n '')" ] || [ "$(command -v mysqladmin || echo
else echo_no
fi
echo ""
fi
### This section checks if MySQL (mysqld) is running as root and if its version is 4.x or 5.x to refer a known local privilege escalation exploit! ###
# Find the mysqld process
process_info=$(ps aux | grep '[m]ysqld' | head -n1)
if [ -z "$process_info" ]; then
echo "MySQL process not found." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
else
# Extract the process user
mysqluser=$(echo "$process_info" | awk '{print $1}')
# Get the MySQL version string
version_output=$(mysqld --version 2>&1)
# Extract the version number (expects format like X.Y.Z)
version=$(echo "$version_output" | grep -oE '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' | head -n1)
if [ -z "$version" ]; then
echo "Unable to determine MySQL version." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
else
# Extract the major version number (X from X.Y.Z)
major_version=$(echo "$version" | cut -d. -f1)
# Check if MySQL is running as root and if the version is either 4.x or 5.x
if [ "$mysqluser" = "root" ] && { [ "$major_version" -eq 4 ] || [ "$major_version" -eq 5 ]; }; then
echo "MySQL is running as root with version $version. This is a potential local privilege escalation vulnerability!" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
echo "\tRefer to: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/1518" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_YELLOW},"
echo "\tRefer to: https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/privilege-escalation-with-mysql-user-defined-functions-996ef7d5ceaf" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_YELLOW},"
else
echo "MySQL is running as user '$mysqluser' with version $version." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
fi
### ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ###
fi
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# Title: Software Information - PostgreSQL Event Triggers
# ID: SI_Postgresql_Event_Triggers
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 19-11-2025
# Description: Detect unsafe PostgreSQL event triggers and postgres_fdw custom scripts that grant temporary SUPERUSER
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $DEBUG, $E, $SED_GREEN, $SED_RED, $SED_YELLOW, $TIMEOUT
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $psql_bin, $psql_evt_output, $psql_evt_status, $psql_evt_err_line, $postgres_fdw_dirs, $postgres_fdw_hits, $old_ifs, $evtname, $enabled, $owner, $owner_is_super, $func, $func_owner, $func_owner_is_super, $IFS
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if [ "$DEBUG" ] || { [ "$TIMEOUT" ] && [ "$(command -v psql 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ]; }; then
print_2title "PostgreSQL event trigger ownership & postgres_fdw hooks"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#postgresql-event-triggers"
psql_bin="$(command -v psql 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')"
if [ "$TIMEOUT" ] && [ "$psql_bin" ]; then
psql_evt_output="$($TIMEOUT 5 "$psql_bin" -w -X -q -A -t -d postgres -c "WITH evt AS ( SELECT e.evtname, e.evtenabled, pg_get_userbyid(e.evtowner) AS trig_owner, tr.rolsuper AS trig_owner_super, n.nspname || '.' || p.proname AS function_name, pg_get_userbyid(p.proowner) AS func_owner, fr.rolsuper AS func_owner_super FROM pg_event_trigger e JOIN pg_proc p ON e.evtfoid = p.oid JOIN pg_namespace n ON p.pronamespace = n.oid LEFT JOIN pg_roles tr ON tr.oid = e.evtowner LEFT JOIN pg_roles fr ON fr.oid = p.proowner ) SELECT evtname || '|' || evtenabled || '|' || COALESCE(trig_owner,'?') || '|' || COALESCE(CASE WHEN trig_owner_super THEN 'yes' ELSE 'no' END,'unknown') || '|' || function_name || '|' || COALESCE(func_owner,'?') || '|' || COALESCE(CASE WHEN func_owner_super THEN 'yes' ELSE 'no' END,'unknown') FROM evt WHERE COALESCE(trig_owner_super,false) = false OR COALESCE(func_owner_super,false) = false;" 2>&1)"
psql_evt_status=$?
if [ $psql_evt_status -eq 0 ]; then
if [ "$psql_evt_output" ]; then
echo "Non-superuser-owned event triggers were found (trigger|enabled?|owner|owner_is_super|function|function_owner|fn_owner_is_super):" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
printf "%s\n" "$psql_evt_output" | while IFS='|' read evtname enabled owner owner_is_super func func_owner func_owner_is_super; do
case "$enabled" in
O) enabled="enabled" ;;
D) enabled="disabled" ;;
*) enabled="status_$enabled" ;;
esac
echo " - $evtname ($enabled) uses $func owned by $func_owner (superuser:$func_owner_is_super); trigger owner: $owner (superuser:$owner_is_super)" | sed -${E} "s,superuser:no,${SED_RED},g"
done
else
echo "No event triggers owned by non-superusers were returned." | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
fi
else
psql_evt_err_line=$(printf '%s\n' "$psql_evt_output" | head -n1)
echo "Could not query pg_event_trigger (psql exit $psql_evt_status): $psql_evt_err_line" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_YELLOW},"
fi
else
if ! [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then
echo_not_found "timeout"
fi
if ! [ "$psql_bin" ]; then
echo_not_found "psql"
fi
fi
postgres_fdw_dirs="/etc/postgresql /var/lib/postgresql /var/lib/postgres /usr/lib/postgresql /usr/local/lib/postgresql /opt/supabase /opt/postgres /srv/postgres"
postgres_fdw_hits=""
for d in $postgres_fdw_dirs; do
if [ -d "$d" ]; then
old_ifs="$IFS"
IFS="\n"
for f in $(find "$d" -maxdepth 5 -type f \( -name '*postgres_fdw*.sql' -o -name '*postgres_fdw*.psql' -o -name 'after-create.sql' \) 2>/dev/null); do
if [ -f "$f" ] && grep -qiE "alter[[:space:]]+role[[:space:]]+postgres[[:space:]]+superuser" "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
postgres_fdw_hits="$postgres_fdw_hits\n$f"
fi
done
IFS="$old_ifs"
fi
done
if [ "$postgres_fdw_hits" ]; then
echo "Detected postgres_fdw custom scripts granting postgres SUPERUSER (check for SupaPwn-style window):" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
printf "%s\n" "$postgres_fdw_hits" | sed "s,^, - ,"
fi
fi
echo ""

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables:$DEBUG, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $USER, $wgroups
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $screensess, $screensess2
# Generated Global Variables: $screensess, $screensess2, $uscreen
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if ([ "$screensess" ] || [ "$screensess2" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]) && ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
if (command -v screen >/dev/null 2>&1 || [ -d "/run/screen" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]) && ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
print_2title "Searching screen sessions"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#open-shell-sessions"
screensess=$(screen -ls 2>/dev/null)
@@ -25,5 +25,16 @@ if ([ "$screensess" ] || [ "$screensess2" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]) && ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_
find /run/screen -type s -path "/run/screen/S-*" -not -user $USER '(' '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null | while read f; do
echo "Other user screen socket is writable: $f" | sed "s,$f,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
done
if [ -r "/etc/passwd" ]; then
print_3title "Checking other users screen sessions"
cut -d: -f1,7 /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null | grep "sh$" | cut -d: -f1 | grep -v "^$USER$" | while read u; do
uscreen=$(screen -ls "${u}/" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "No Sockets found" | grep -v "^$")
if [ "$uscreen" ]; then
echo "User $u screen sessions:"
printf "%s\n" "$uscreen" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
fi
done
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_3title
# Global Variables: $HOME, $HOMESEARCH, $ROOT_FOLDER, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $TIMEOUT, $USER, $wgroups
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $certsb4_grep, $hostsallow, $hostsdenied, $sshconfig, $writable_agents, $privatekeyfilesetc, $privatekeyfileshome, $privatekeyfilesroot, $privatekeyfilesmnt,
# Generated Global Variables: $certsb4_grep, $hostsallow, $hostsdenied, $sshconfig, $writable_agents, $agent_sockets, $privatekeyfilesetc, $privatekeyfileshome, $privatekeyfilesroot, $privatekeyfilesmnt,
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -19,31 +19,37 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
sshconfig="$(ls /etc/ssh/ssh_config 2>/dev/null)"
hostsdenied="$(ls /etc/hosts.denied 2>/dev/null)"
hostsallow="$(ls /etc/hosts.allow 2>/dev/null)"
writable_agents=$(find /tmp /etc /home -type s -name "agent.*" -or -name "*gpg-agent*" '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)
agent_sockets=$(find /run/user /tmp -type s \( -path "/run/user/*/ssh-*/agent.*" -o -name "ssh-agent.sock" -o -path "/tmp/ssh-*" \) 2>/dev/null)
writable_agents=$(find /tmp /etc /home /run/user \
\( -type s -a \( -name "agent.*" -o -name "ssh-agent.sock" -o -path "*/ssh-*/agent.*" -o -name "*gpg-agent*" \) \
-a \( \( -user "$USER" \) -o \( -perm -o=w \) -o \( -perm -g=w -a \( $wgroups \) \) \) \) 2>/dev/null)
else
sshconfig="$(ls ${ROOT_FOLDER}etc/ssh/ssh_config 2>/dev/null)"
hostsdenied="$(ls ${ROOT_FOLDER}etc/hosts.denied 2>/dev/null)"
hostsallow="$(ls ${ROOT_FOLDER}etc/hosts.allow 2>/dev/null)"
writable_agents=$(find ${ROOT_FOLDER} -type s -name "agent.*" -or -name "*gpg-agent*" '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)
agent_sockets=$(find "${ROOT_FOLDER}"tmp "${ROOT_FOLDER}"run -type s \( -name "agent.*" -o -name "ssh-agent.sock" \) 2>/dev/null)
writable_agents=$(find "${ROOT_FOLDER}" \
\( -type s -a \( -name "agent.*" -o -name "ssh-agent.sock" -o -path "*/ssh-*/agent.*" -o -name "*gpg-agent*" \) \
-a \( \( -user "$USER" \) -o \( -perm -o=w \) -o \( -perm -g=w -a \( $wgroups \) \) \) \) 2>/dev/null)
fi
peass{SSH}
grep "PermitRootLogin \|ChallengeResponseAuthentication \|PasswordAuthentication \|UsePAM \|Port\|PermitEmptyPasswords\|PubkeyAuthentication\|ListenAddress\|ForwardAgent\|AllowAgentForwarding\|AuthorizedKeysFiles" /etc/ssh/sshd_config 2>/dev/null | grep -v "#" | sed -${E} "s,PermitRootLogin.*es|PermitEmptyPasswords.*es|ChallengeResponseAuthentication.*es|FordwardAgent.*es,${SED_RED},"
grep "PermitRootLogin \|ChallengeResponseAuthentication \|PasswordAuthentication \|UsePAM \|Port\|PermitEmptyPasswords\|PubkeyAuthentication\|ListenAddress\|ForwardAgent\|AllowAgentForwarding\|AuthorizedKeysFile" /etc/ssh/sshd_config 2>/dev/null | grep -v "#" | sed -${E} "s,PermitRootLogin.*es|PermitEmptyPasswords.*es|ChallengeResponseAuthentication.*es|FordwardAgent.*es,${SED_RED},"
if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
if [ "$TIMEOUT" ]; then
privatekeyfilesetc=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' /etc 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfileshome=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' $HOMESEARCH 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesroot=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' /root 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesmnt=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' /mnt 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesetc=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' /etc 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfileshome=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' $HOMESEARCH 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesroot=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' /root 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesmnt=$(timeout 40 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' /mnt 2>/dev/null)
else
privatekeyfilesetc=$(grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' /etc 2>/dev/null) #If there is tons of files linpeas gets frozen here without a timeout
privatekeyfileshome=$(grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' $HOME/.ssh 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesetc=$(grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' /etc 2>/dev/null) #If there is tons of files linpeas gets frozen here without a timeout
privatekeyfileshome=$(grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' $HOME/.ssh 2>/dev/null)
fi
else
# If $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER lets just search for private keys in the whole firmware
privatekeyfilesetc=$(timeout 120 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY.*\-\-\-\-\-' "$ROOT_FOLDER" 2>/dev/null)
privatekeyfilesetc=$(timeout 120 grep -rl '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\-' "$ROOT_FOLDER" 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ "$privatekeyfilesetc" ] || [ "$privatekeyfileshome" ] || [ "$privatekeyfilesroot" ] || [ "$privatekeyfilesmnt" ] ; then
@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ fi
if [ "$certsb4_grep" ] || [ "$PSTORAGE_CERTSBIN" ]; then
print_3title "Some certificates were found (out limited):"
printf "$certsb4_grep\n" | head -n 20
printf "$$PSTORAGE_CERTSBIN\n" | head -n 20
printf "$PSTORAGE_CERTSBIN\n" | head -n 20
echo ""
fi
if [ "$PSTORAGE_CERTSCLIENT" ]; then
@@ -71,6 +77,11 @@ if [ "$PSTORAGE_SSH_AGENTS" ]; then
printf "$PSTORAGE_SSH_AGENTS\n"
echo ""
fi
if [ "$agent_sockets" ]; then
print_3title "Potential SSH agent sockets were found:"
printf "%s\n" "$agent_sockets" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
echo ""
fi
if ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qv 'no identities'; then
print_3title "Listing SSH Agents"
ssh-add -l

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ if ! [ "$IAMROOT" ]; then
print_2title "Interesting writable files owned by me or writable by everyone (not in Home) (max 200)"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#writable-files"
#In the next file, you need to specify type "d" and "f" to avoid fake link files apparently writable by all
obmowbe=$(find $ROOT_FOLDER '(' -type f -or -type d ')' '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' ')' ! -path "/proc/*" ! -path "/sys/*" ! -path "$HOME/*" 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev "$notExtensions" | sort | uniq | awk -F/ '{line_init=$0; if (!cont){ cont=0 }; $NF=""; act=$0; if (act == pre){(cont += 1)} else {cont=0}; if (cont < 5){ print line_init; } if (cont == "5"){print "#)You_can_write_even_more_files_inside_last_directory\n"}; pre=act }' | head -n 200)
obmowbe=$(find $ROOT_FOLDER '(' -type f -or -type d ')' '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' ')' ! -path "/proc/*" ! -path "/sys/*" ! -path "/dev/*" ! -path "/snap/*" ! -path "$HOME/*" 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev "$notExtensions" | sort | uniq | awk -F/ '{line_init=$0; if (!cont){ cont=0 }; $NF=""; act=$0; if (act == pre){(cont += 1)} else {cont=0}; if (cont < 5){ print line_init; } if (cont == "5"){print "#)You_can_write_even_more_files_inside_last_directory\n"}; pre=act }' | head -n 200)
printf "%s\n" "$obmowbe" | while read l; do
if echo "$l" | grep -q "You_can_write_even_more_files_inside_last_directory"; then printf $ITALIC"$l\n"$NC;
elif echo "$l" | grep -qE "$writeVB"; then

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# Title: Interesting Permissions Files - IGEL OS SUID setup/date abuse
# ID: IP_IGEL_OS_SUID
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 29-11-2025
# Description: Detect IGEL OS environments that expose the SUID-root `setup`/`date` binaries and highlight writable NetworkManager/systemd configs that enable the documented privilege escalation chain (Metasploit linux/local/igel_network_priv_esc).
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $ITALIC, $NC, $SED_GREEN, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $SUPERFAST
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $igel_markers, $igel_marker_sources, $marker, $igel_suid_hits, $candidate, $writable_nm, $writable_systemd, $unitdir, $tmp_units
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
igel_markers=""
igel_marker_sources=""
if [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep -qi "igel" /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null; then
igel_markers="Yes"
igel_marker_sources="/etc/os-release"
fi
if [ -f /etc/issue ] && grep -qi "igel" /etc/issue 2>/dev/null; then
igel_markers="Yes"
igel_marker_sources="${igel_marker_sources} /etc/issue"
fi
for marker in /etc/igel /wfs/igel /userhome/.igel /config/sessions/igel; do
if [ -e "$marker" ]; then
igel_markers="Yes"
igel_marker_sources="${igel_marker_sources} $marker"
fi
done
igel_suid_hits=""
for candidate in /usr/bin/setup /bin/setup /usr/sbin/setup /opt/igel/bin/setup /usr/bin/date /bin/date /usr/lib/igel/date; do
if [ -u "$candidate" ]; then
igel_suid_hits="${igel_suid_hits}$(ls -lah "$candidate" 2>/dev/null)\n"
fi
done
if [ -n "$igel_markers" ] || [ -n "$igel_suid_hits" ]; then
print_2title "IGEL OS SUID setup/date privilege escalation surface"
print_info "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrap-up-11-28-2025"
if [ -n "$igel_markers" ]; then
echo "Potential IGEL OS detected via: $igel_marker_sources" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},"
else
echo "IGEL-specific SUID helpers found but IGEL markers were not detected" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},"
fi
if [ -n "$igel_suid_hits" ]; then
echo "SUID-root helpers exposing configuration primitives:" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
printf "%b" "$igel_suid_hits"
else
echo "No SUID setup/date binaries were located (system may be patched)."
fi
writable_nm=""
writable_systemd=""
if ! [ "$SUPERFAST" ]; then
if [ -d /etc/NetworkManager ]; then
writable_nm=$(find /etc/NetworkManager -maxdepth 3 -type f -writable 2>/dev/null | head -n 25)
fi
for unitdir in /etc/systemd/system /lib/systemd/system /usr/lib/systemd/system; do
if [ -d "$unitdir" ]; then
tmp_units=$(find "$unitdir" -maxdepth 2 -type f -writable 2>/dev/null | head -n 15)
if [ -n "$tmp_units" ]; then
writable_systemd="${writable_systemd}${tmp_units}\n"
fi
fi
done
fi
if [ -n "$writable_nm" ]; then
echo "Writable NetworkManager profiles/hooks (swap Exec path to your payload):" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
echo "$writable_nm"
fi
if [ -n "$writable_systemd" ]; then
echo "Writable systemd unit files (edit ExecStart, then restart via setup/date):" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
printf "%b" "$writable_systemd"
fi
printf "$ITALIC Known exploitation chain: Use the SUID setup/date binaries to edit NetworkManager or systemd configs so ExecStart points to your payload, then trigger a service restart via the same helper to run as root (Metasploit linux/local/igel_network_priv_esc).$NC\n"
fi
echo ""

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Title: Interesting Permissions Files - Writable root-owned executables
# ID: IP_Writable_root_execs
# Author: HT Bot
# Last Update: 29-11-2025
# Description: Locate root-owned executables outside home folders that the current user can modify
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info, echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $DEBUG, $IAMROOT, $ROOT_FOLDER, $HOME, $writeVB
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $writable_root_execs
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if ! [ "$IAMROOT" ]; then
print_2title "Writable root-owned executables I can modify (max 200)"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#writable-files"
writable_root_execs=$(
find "$ROOT_FOLDER" -type f -user root -perm -u=x \
\( -perm -g=w -o -perm -o=w \) \
! -path "/proc/*" ! -path "/sys/*" ! -path "/run/*" ! -path "/dev/*" ! -path "/snap/*" ! -path "$HOME/*" 2>/dev/null \
| while IFS= read -r f; do
if [ -w "$f" ]; then
ls -l "$f" 2>/dev/null
fi
done | head -n 200
)
if [ "$writable_root_execs" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$writable_root_execs" | sed -${E} "s,$writeVB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
else
echo_not_found "Writable root-owned executables"
fi
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ if ! [ "$STRACE" ]; then
fi
suids_files=$(find $ROOT_FOLDER -perm -4000 -type f ! -path "/dev/*" 2>/dev/null)
printf "%s\n" "$suids_files" | while read s; do
[ -z "$s" ] && continue
s=$(ls -lahtr "$s")
#If starts like "total 332K" then no SUID bin was found and xargs just executed "ls" in the current folder
if echo "$s" | grep -qE "^total"; then break; fi
@@ -37,14 +38,14 @@ printf "%s\n" "$suids_files" | while read s; do
else
c="a"
for b in $sidB; do
if echo $s | grep -q $(echo $b | cut -d % -f 1); then
if echo "$sname" | grep -q $(echo $b | cut -d % -f 1); then
echo "$s" | sed -${E} "s,$(echo $b | cut -d % -f 1),${C}[1;31m& ---> $(echo $b | cut -d % -f 2)${C}[0m,"
c=""
break;
fi
done;
if [ "$c" ]; then
if echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidG1" || echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidG2" || echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidG3" || echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidG4" || echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidVB" || echo "$s" | grep -qE "$sidVB2"; then
if echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidG1" || echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidG2" || echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidG3" || echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidG4" || echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidVB" || echo "$sname" | grep -qE "$sidVB2"; then
echo "$s" | sed -${E} "s,$sidG1,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,$sidG2,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,$sidG3,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,$sidG4,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,$sidVB,${SED_RED_YELLOW}," | sed -${E} "s,$sidVB2,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
else
echo "$s (Unknown SUID binary!)" | sed -${E} "s,/.*,${SED_RED},"
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ printf "%s\n" "$suids_files" | while read s; do
if [ -O "$sline_first" ] || [ -w "$sline_first" ]; then #And modifiable
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is using $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can modify it (strings line: $sline) (https://tinyurl.com/suidpath)\n"
fi
elif echo "$sline_first" | grep -q "/" && [ -d "$(dirname "$sline_first")" ] && [ -w "$(dirname "$sline_first")" ]; then #If path does not exist but can be created
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is using $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can create it inside writable dir $RED$(dirname "$sline_first")$NC$ITALIC (strings line: $sline) (https://tinyurl.com/suidpath)\n"
else #If not a path
if [ ${#sline_first} -gt 2 ] && command -v "$sline_first" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '/' && echo "$sline_first" | grep -Eqv "\.\."; then #Check if existing binary
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is executing $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can impersonate it (strings line: $sline) (https://tinyurl.com/suidpath)\n"
@@ -96,4 +99,4 @@ printf "%s\n" "$suids_files" | while read s; do
fi
fi
done;
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ print_2title "SGID"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#sudo-and-suid"
sgids_files=$(find $ROOT_FOLDER -perm -2000 -type f ! -path "/dev/*" 2>/dev/null)
printf "%s\n" "$sgids_files" | while read s; do
[ -z "$s" ] && continue
s=$(ls -lahtr "$s")
#If starts like "total 332K" then no SUID bin was found and xargs just executed "ls" in the current folder
if echo "$s" | grep -qE "^total";then break; fi
@@ -53,6 +54,8 @@ printf "%s\n" "$sgids_files" | while read s; do
if [ -O "$sline_first" ] || [ -w "$sline_first" ]; then #And modifiable
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is using $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can modify it (strings line: $sline)\n"
fi
elif echo "$sline_first" | grep -q "/" && [ -d "$(dirname "$sline_first")" ] && [ -w "$(dirname "$sline_first")" ]; then #If path does not exist but can be created
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is using $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can create it inside writable dir $RED$(dirname "$sline_first")$NC$ITALIC (strings line: $sline)\n"
else #If not a path
if [ ${#sline_first} -gt 2 ] && command -v "$sline_first" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '/'; then #Check if existing binary
printf "$ITALIC --- It looks like $RED$sname$NC$ITALIC is executing $RED$sline_first$NC$ITALIC and you can impersonate it (strings line: $sline)\n"
@@ -90,4 +93,4 @@ printf "%s\n" "$sgids_files" | while read s; do
fi
fi
done;
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $HOMESEARCH, $knw_usrs, $MACPEAS, $nosh_usrs, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $sh_usrs, $USER
# Global Variables: $HOMESEARCH, $knw_usrs, $MACPEAS, $nosh_usrs, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $sh_usrs, $USER, $writeB, $writeVB
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -16,12 +16,12 @@
print_2title "Files with ACLs (limited to 50)"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#acls"
if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
( (getfacl -t -s -R -p /bin /etc $HOMESEARCH /opt /sbin /usr /tmp /root 2>/dev/null) || echo_not_found "files with acls in searched folders" ) | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED},"
( (getfacl -t -s -R -p /bin /etc $HOMESEARCH /opt /sbin /usr /tmp /root 2>/dev/null) || echo_not_found "files with acls in searched folders" ) | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED}," | sed -${E} "s,$writeVB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g" | sed -${E} "s,$writeB,${SED_RED},g"
else
( (getfacl -t -s -R -p $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER 2>/dev/null) || echo_not_found "files with acls in searched folders" ) | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED},"
( (getfacl -t -s -R -p $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER 2>/dev/null) || echo_not_found "files with acls in searched folders" ) | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED}," | sed -${E} "s,$writeVB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g" | sed -${E} "s,$writeB,${SED_RED},g"
fi
if [ "$MACPEAS" ] && ! [ "$FAST" ] && ! [ "$SUPERFAST" ] && ! [ "$(command -v getfacl || echo -n '')" ]; then #Find ACL files in macos (veeeery slow)
ls -RAle / 2>/dev/null | grep -v "group:everyone deny delete" | grep -E -B1 "\d: " | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED},"
ls -RAle / 2>/dev/null | grep -v "group:everyone deny delete" | grep -E -B1 "\d: " | head -n 70 | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED}," | sed -${E} "s,$writeVB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g" | sed -${E} "s,$writeB,${SED_RED},g"
fi
echo ""
echo ""

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info, print_3title
# Global Variables: $capsB, $capsVB, $IAMROOT, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $cap_name, $cap_value, $cap_line, $capVB, $capname, $capbins, $capsVB_vuln
# Generated Global Variables: $cap_name, $cap_value, $cap_line, $capVB, $capname, $capbins, $capsVB_vuln, $proc_status, $proc_pid, $proc_name, $proc_uid, $user_name, $proc_inh, $proc_prm, $proc_eff, $proc_bnd, $proc_amb, $proc_inh_dec, $proc_prm_dec, $proc_eff_dec, $proc_bnd_dec, $proc_amb_dec
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -69,6 +69,40 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
fi
done
echo ""
print_3title "Processes with capability sets (non-zero CapEff/CapAmb, limit 40)"
find /proc -maxdepth 2 -path "/proc/[0-9]*/status" 2>/dev/null | head -n 400 | while read -r proc_status; do
proc_pid=$(echo "$proc_status" | cut -d/ -f3)
proc_name=$(awk '/^Name:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
proc_uid=$(awk '/^Uid:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
user_name=$(awk -F: -v uid="$proc_uid" '$3==uid{print $1; exit}' /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$user_name" ] && user_name="$proc_uid"
proc_inh=$(awk '/^CapInh:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
proc_prm=$(awk '/^CapPrm:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
proc_eff=$(awk '/^CapEff:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
proc_bnd=$(awk '/^CapBnd:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
proc_amb=$(awk '/^CapAmb:/{print $2}' "$proc_status" 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$proc_eff" ] && continue
if [ "$proc_eff" != "0000000000000000" ] || [ "$proc_amb" != "0000000000000000" ]; then
echo "PID $proc_pid ($proc_name) user=$user_name"
proc_inh_dec=$(capsh --decode=0x"$proc_inh" 2>/dev/null)
proc_prm_dec=$(capsh --decode=0x"$proc_prm" 2>/dev/null)
proc_eff_dec=$(capsh --decode=0x"$proc_eff" 2>/dev/null)
proc_bnd_dec=$(capsh --decode=0x"$proc_bnd" 2>/dev/null)
proc_amb_dec=$(capsh --decode=0x"$proc_amb" 2>/dev/null)
echo " CapInh: $proc_inh_dec" | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED},g"
echo " CapPrm: $proc_prm_dec" | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED},g"
echo " CapEff: $proc_eff_dec" | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
echo " CapBnd: $proc_bnd_dec" | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED},g"
echo " CapAmb: $proc_amb_dec" | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
echo ""
fi
done | head -n 240
echo ""
else
print_3title "Current shell capabilities"

View File

@@ -6,19 +6,27 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $DEBUG, $knw_usrs, $nosh_usrs, $sh_usrs, $USER
# Global Variables: $capsB, $DEBUG, $knw_usrs, $nosh_usrs, $sh_usrs, $USER
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Generated Global Variables: $pam_cap_lines
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
if [ -f "/etc/security/capability.conf" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ]; then
if [ -f "/etc/security/capability.conf" ] || [ "$DEBUG" ] || grep -Rqs "pam_cap\.so" /etc/pam.d /etc/pam.conf 2>/dev/null; then
print_2title "Users with capabilities"
print_info "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#capabilities"
if [ -f "/etc/security/capability.conf" ]; then
grep -v '^#\|none\|^$' /etc/security/capability.conf 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED},"
grep -v '^#\|none\|^$' /etc/security/capability.conf 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$sh_usrs,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN}," | sed -${E} "s,$nosh_usrs,${SED_BLUE}," | sed -${E} "s,$knw_usrs,${SED_GREEN}," | sed "s,$USER,${SED_RED}," | sed -${E} "s,$capsB,${SED_RED},g"
else echo_not_found "/etc/security/capability.conf"
fi
echo ""
fi
print_info "Checking if PAM loads pam_cap.so"
pam_cap_lines=$(grep -RIn "pam_cap\.so" /etc/pam.d /etc/pam.conf 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$pam_cap_lines" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$pam_cap_lines" | sed -${E} "s,pam_cap\\.so,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
else
echo_not_found "pam_cap.so in /etc/pam.d or /etc/pam.conf"
fi
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_info
# Global Variables: $IAMROOT, $ITALIC, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $USER, $Wfolders, $wgroups
# Global Variables: $IAMROOT, $ITALIC, $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $USER, $Wfolders, $ldsoconfdG, $wgroups
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $ini_path, $fpath
# Fat linpeas: 0
@@ -26,40 +26,53 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ] && ! [ "$IAMROOT" ]; then
echo "Content of /etc/ld.so.conf:"
cat /etc/ld.so.conf 2>/dev/null | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
# Check each configured folder
cat /etc/ld.so.conf 2>/dev/null | while read l; do
if echo "$l" | grep -q include; then
# Check each configured folder and include directives
cat /etc/ld.so.conf 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r l; do
l=$(echo "$l" | sed 's/#.*$//' | xargs 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$l" ] && continue
if echo "$l" | grep -qE '^include[[:space:]]+'; then
ini_path=$(echo "$l" | cut -d " " -f 2)
fpath=$(dirname "$ini_path")
if [ -d "/etc/ld.so.conf" ] && [ -w "$fpath" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $fpath" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
if [ -d "$fpath" ] && [ -w "$fpath" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $fpath" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
printf $RED_YELLOW$ITALIC"$fpath\n"$NC;
else
printf $GREEN$ITALIC"$fpath\n"$NC;
fi
if [ "$(find $fpath -type f '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $(find $fpath -type f '(' '(' -user $USER ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
if [ "$(find "$fpath" -type f '(' '(' -user "$USER" ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $(find "$fpath" -type f '(' '(' -user "$USER" ')' -or '(' -perm -o=w ')' -or '(' -perm -g=w -and '(' $wgroups ')' ')' ')' 2>/dev/null)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
fi
for f in $fpath/*; do
if [ -w "$f" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $f" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
for f in $ini_path; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
if [ -w "$f" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $f" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
printf $RED_YELLOW$ITALIC"$f\n"$NC;
else
printf $GREEN$ITALIC" $f\n"$NC;
fi
cat "$f" | grep -v "^#" | while read l2; do
if [ -f "$l2" ] && [ -w "$l2" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $l2" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "^#" | while IFS= read -r l2; do
l2=$(echo "$l2" | xargs 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$l2" ] && continue
if [ -d "$l2" ] && [ -w "$l2" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $l2" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
printf $RED_YELLOW$ITALIC" - $l2\n"$NC;
else
echo $ITALIC" - $l2"$NC | sed -${E} "s,$l2,${SED_GREEN}," | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g";
elif [ -d "$l2" ]; then
echo $ITALIC" - $l2"$NC | sed -${E} "s,$ldsoconfdG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g";
fi
done
done
elif [ -d "$l" ] && [ -w "$l" ]; then
echo "You have write privileges over $l" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},";
printf $RED_YELLOW$ITALIC"$l\n"$NC;
else
echo $ITALIC"$l"$NC | sed -${E} "s,$ldsoconfdG,${SED_GREEN},g" | sed -${E} "s,$Wfolders,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g";
fi
done
echo ""
@@ -75,4 +88,4 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ] && ! [ "$IAMROOT" ]; then
if [ -f "$l" ] && [ -w "$l" ]; then echo "You have write privileges over $l" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"; fi
done
fi
fi

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# Title: Interesting Files - Interesting Environment Variables
# ID: IF_Interesting_environment_variables
# Author: Jack Vaughn
# Last Update: 25-05-2025
# Description: Searching possible sensitive environment variables inside of /proc/*/environ
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: print_2title
# Global Variables: $MACPEAS, $NoEnvVars, $EnvVarsRed
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
if [ -z "$MACPEAS" ]; then
print_2title "Checking all env variables in /proc/*/environ removing duplicates and filtering out useless env vars"
cat /proc/[0-9]*/environ 2>/dev/null | \
tr '\0' '\n' | \
grep -Eiv "$NoEnvVars" | \
sort -u | \
sed -${E} "s,$EnvVarsRed,${SED_RED},g"
fi

View File

@@ -8,25 +8,19 @@
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pid, $pids
# Generated Global Variables: $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_DNS, $local_pid
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
check_dns(){
local TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_DNS=$1
if ! [ -f "/bin/bash" ]; then
echo " /bin/bash not found"
return
fi
/bin/bash -c '
for ip in 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8 ; do
(( echo cfc9 0100 0001 0000 0000 0000 0a64 7563 6b64 7563 6b67 6f03 636f 6d00 0001 0001 | xxd -p -r >&3; dd bs=9000 count=1 <&3 2>/dev/null | xxd ) 3>/dev/udp/$ip/53 && echo "DNS available" && exit 0) &
pids+=($!)
done
for pid in ${pids[@]}; do
wait $pid && exit 0
done
echo "DNS not available"
' 2>/dev/null | grep "available" || echo "DNS not available"
# example.com
(bash -c '((( echo cfc9 0100 0001 0000 0000 0000 0a64 7563 6b64 7563 6b67 6f03 636f 6d00 0001 0001 | xxd -p -r >&3; dd bs=9000 count=1 <&3 2>/dev/null | xxd ) 3>/dev/udp/1.1.1.1/53 && echo "DNS accessible") | grep "accessible" && exit 0 ) 2>/dev/null || echo "DNS is not accessible"') & local_pid=$!
sleep $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_DNS && kill -9 $local_pid 2>/dev/null && echo "DNS is not accessible"
}

View File

@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ check_external_hostname(){
INTERNET_SEARCH_TIMEOUT=15
# wget or curl?
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl "https://2e6ppt7izvuv66qmx2r3et2ufi0mxwqs.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/" -H "User-Agent: linpeas" -d "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --max-time "$INTERNET_SEARCH_TIMEOUT"
curl "https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/api/host-checker" -H "User-Agent: linpeas" -d "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --max-time "$INTERNET_SEARCH_TIMEOUT"
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
wget -q -O - "https://2e6ppt7izvuv66qmx2r3et2ufi0mxwqs.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/" --header "User-Agent: linpeas" --post-data "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --timeout "$INTERNET_SEARCH_TIMEOUT"
wget -q -O - "https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/api/host-checker" --header "User-Agent: linpeas" --post-data "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --timeout "$INTERNET_SEARCH_TIMEOUT"
else
echo "wget or curl not found"
fi
}
}

View File

@@ -8,11 +8,20 @@
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Generated Global Variables: $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_ICMP, $local_pid
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
check_icmp(){
(ping -c 1 1.1.1.1 | grep -E "1 received|1 packets received" && echo "Ping is available" || echo "Ping is not available" 2>/dev/null) | grep -i "available"
local TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_ICMP=$1
if ! [ "$(command -v ping 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ]; then
echo " ping not found"
return
fi
# example.com
((ping -c 1 1.1.1.1 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei "1 received|1 packets received" && echo "ICMP is accessible" || echo "ICMP is not accessible" 2>/dev/null) | grep "accessible" && exit 0 ) 2>/dev/null || echo "ICMP is not accessible" & local_pid=$!
sleep $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_ICMP && kill -9 $local_pid 2>/dev/null && echo "ICMP is not accessible"
}

View File

@@ -8,30 +8,21 @@
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pid, $pids
# Generated Global Variables: $local_pid, $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
check_tcp_443(){
local TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443=$1
if ! [ -f "/bin/bash" ]; then
echo " /bin/bash not found"
return
fi
/bin/bash -c '
for ip in 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8; do
(echo >/dev/tcp/$ip/443 && echo "Port 443 is accessible" && exit 0) &
pids+=($!)
done
for pid in ${pids[@]}; do
wait $pid && exit 0
done
echo "Port 80 is not accessible"
' 2>/dev/null | grep "accessible" || echo "Port 80 is not accessible"
# example.com
(bash -c '(echo >/dev/tcp/104.18.74.230/443 2>/dev/null && echo "Port 443 is accessible" && exit 0) 2>/dev/null || echo "Port 443 is not accessible"') & local_pid=$!
sleep $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443 && kill -9 $local_pid 2>/dev/null && echo "Port 443 is not accessible"
}

View File

@@ -8,16 +8,41 @@
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables:
# Generated Global Variables: $url_lambda, $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443_BIN
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
check_tcp_443_bin () {
local TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443_BIN=$1
local url_lambda="https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/api/host-checker"
check_tcp_443_bin(){
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -s "https://2e6ppt7izvuv66qmx2r3et2ufi0mxwqs.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/" -H "User-Agent: linpeas" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "Port 443 is accessible with curl" || echo "Port 443 is not accessible with curl"
if curl -s --connect-timeout $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443_BIN "$url_lambda" \
-H "User-Agent: linpeas" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
echo "Port 443 is accessible with curl"
return 0 # ✅ success
else
echo "Port 443 is not accessible with curl"
return 1
fi
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
wget -q -O - "https://2e6ppt7izvuv66qmx2r3et2ufi0mxwqs.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/" --header "User-Agent: linpeas" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "Port 443 is accessible with wget" || echo "Port 443 is not accessible with wget"
if wget -q --timeout=$TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_443_BIN -O - "$url_lambda" \
--header "User-Agent: linpeas" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--post-data "{\"hostname\":\"$(hostname)\"}" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
echo "Port 443 is accessible with wget"
return 0
else
echo "Port 443 is not accessible with wget"
return 1
fi
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget available"
return 1
fi
}
}

View File

@@ -8,25 +8,21 @@
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $pid, $pids
# Generated Global Variables: $local_pid, $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_80
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
check_tcp_80(){
local TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_80=$1
if ! [ -f "/bin/bash" ]; then
echo " /bin/bash not found"
return
fi
/bin/bash -c '
for ip in 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8; do
(echo >/dev/tcp/$ip/80 && echo "Port 80 is accessible" && exit 0) &
pids+=($!)
done
for pid in ${pids[@]}; do
wait $pid && exit 0
done
echo "Port 80 is not accessible"
' 2>/dev/null | grep "accessible"
# example.com
(bash -c '(echo >/dev/tcp/104.18.74.230/80 2>/dev/null && echo "Port 80 is accessible" && exit 0) 2>/dev/null || echo "Port 80 is not accessible"') & local_pid=$!
sleep $TIMEOUT_INTERNET_SECONDS_80 && kill -9 $local_pid 2>/dev/null && echo "Port 80 is not accessible"
}

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS, $GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE, $IAMROOT
# Global Variables: $GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS, $GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $SEARCHED_DOCKER_SOCKETS, $dock_sock, $docker_enumerated, $dockerVersion, $int_sock, $sockInfoResponse
# Generated Global Variables: $SEARCHED_DOCKER_SOCKETS, $docker_enumerated, $dockerVersion, $int_sock, $sockInfoResponse
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -17,34 +17,55 @@ enumerateDockerSockets() {
dockerVersion="$(echo_not_found)"
if ! [ "$SEARCHED_DOCKER_SOCKETS" ]; then
SEARCHED_DOCKER_SOCKETS="1"
for int_sock in $(find / ! -path "/sys/*" -type s -name "docker.sock" -o -name "docker.socket" -o -name "dockershim.sock" -o -name "containerd.sock" -o -name "crio.sock" -o -name "frakti.sock" -o -name "rktlet.sock" 2>/dev/null); do
if ! [ "$IAMROOT" ] && [ -w "$int_sock" ]; then
# NOTE: This is intentionally "lightweight" (checks common runtime socket names) and avoids
# pseudo filesystems (/sys, /proc) to reduce noise and latency.
for int_sock in $(find / \
-path "/sys" -prune -o \
-path "/proc" -prune -o \
-type s \( \
-name "docker.sock" -o \
-name "docker.socket" -o \
-name "dockershim.sock" -o \
-name "containerd.sock" -o \
-name "crio.sock" -o \
-name "frakti.sock" -o \
-name "rktlet.sock" \
\) -print 2>/dev/null); do
# Basic permissions hint (you generally need write perms to connect to a unix socket).
if [ -w "$int_sock" ]; then
if echo "$int_sock" | grep -Eq "docker"; then
dock_sock="$int_sock"
echo "You have write permissions over Docker socket $dock_sock" | sed -${E} "s,$dock_sock,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
echo "Docker enummeration:"
docker_enumerated=""
if [ "$(command -v curl || echo -n '')" ]; then
sockInfoResponse="$(curl -s --unix-socket $dock_sock http://localhost/info)"
dockerVersion=$(echo "$sockInfoResponse" | tr ',' '\n' | grep 'ServerVersion' | cut -d'"' -f 4)
echo $sockInfoResponse | tr ',' '\n' | grep -E "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS" | grep -v "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE" | tr -d '"'
if [ "$sockInfoResponse" ]; then docker_enumerated="1"; fi
fi
if [ "$(command -v docker || echo -n '')" ] && ! [ "$docker_enumerated" ]; then
sockInfoResponse="$(docker info)"
dockerVersion=$(echo "$sockInfoResponse" | tr ',' '\n' | grep 'Server Version' | cut -d' ' -f 4)
printf "$sockInfoResponse" | tr ',' '\n' | grep -E "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS" | grep -v "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE" | tr -d '"'
fi
echo "You have write permissions over Docker socket $int_sock" | sed -${E} "s,$int_sock,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
else
echo "You have write permissions over interesting socket $int_sock" | sed -${E} "s,$int_sock,${SED_RED},g"
fi
else
echo "You don't have write permissions over interesting socket $int_sock" | sed -${E} "s,$int_sock,${SED_GREEN},g"
fi
# Validate whether this looks like a Docker Engine API socket (amicontained-style) when curl exists.
docker_enumerated=""
if [ "$(command -v curl 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ]; then
sockInfoResponse="$(curl -s --max-time 2 --unix-socket "$int_sock" http://localhost/info 2>/dev/null)"
if echo "$sockInfoResponse" | grep -q "ServerVersion"; then
echo "Valid Docker API socket: $int_sock" | sed -${E} "s,$int_sock,${SED_RED_YELLOW},g"
dockerVersion=$(echo "$sockInfoResponse" | tr ',' '\n' | grep 'ServerVersion' | cut -d'"' -f 4)
echo "$sockInfoResponse" | tr ',' '\n' | grep -E "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS" | grep -v "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE" | tr -d '"'
docker_enumerated="1"
fi
fi
# Fallback to docker CLI if curl is missing or the /info request didn't work.
# Use DOCKER_HOST so we can target non-default socket paths when possible.
if [ "$(command -v docker 2>/dev/null || echo -n '')" ] && ! [ "$docker_enumerated" ]; then
if [ -w "$int_sock" ] && echo "$int_sock" | grep -Eq "docker"; then
sockInfoResponse="$(DOCKER_HOST="unix://$int_sock" docker info 2>/dev/null)"
if [ "$sockInfoResponse" ]; then
dockerVersion=$(echo "$sockInfoResponse" | grep -i "^ Server Version:" | awk '{print $4}' | head -n 1)
printf "%s\n" "$sockInfoResponse" | grep -E "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS" | grep -v "$GREP_DOCKER_SOCK_INFOS_IGNORE" | tr -d '"'
fi
fi
fi
done
fi
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Title: LinPeasBase - su_try_pwd
# ID: su_try_pwd
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Last Update: 15-12-2025
# Description: Try to login as user using a password
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ su_try_pwd(){
BFUSER=$1
PASSWORDTRY=$2
trysu=$(echo "$PASSWORDTRY" | timeout 1 su $BFUSER -c whoami 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$trysu" ]; then
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo " You can login as $BFUSER using password: $PASSWORDTRY" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
fi
}
}

View File

@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ print_title(){
max_title_len=80
rest_len=$((($max_title_len - $title_len) / 2))
printf ${BLUE}
printf "%s" "${BLUE}"
for i in $(seq 1 $rest_len); do printf " "; done
printf "╔"
for i in $(seq 1 $title_len); do printf "═"; done; printf "═";
@@ -231,13 +231,13 @@ print_title(){
echo ""
printf ${BLUE}
printf "%s" "${BLUE}"
for i in $(seq 1 $rest_len); do printf " "; done
printf "╚"
for i in $(seq 1 $title_len); do printf "═"; done; printf "═";
printf "╝"
printf $NC
printf "%s" "${NC}"
echo ""
}
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ echo ""
printf ${BLUE}"Linux Privesc Checklist: ${YELLOW}https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/linux-privilege-escalation-checklist.html\n"$NC
echo " LEGEND:" | sed "s,LEGEND,${C}[1;4m&${C}[0m,"
echo " RED/YELLOW: 95% a PE vector" | sed "s,RED/YELLOW,${SED_RED_YELLOW},"
echo " RED: You should take a look to it" | sed "s,RED,${SED_RED},"
echo " RED: You should take a look into it" | sed "s,RED,${SED_RED},"
echo " LightCyan: Users with console" | sed "s,LightCyan,${SED_LIGHT_CYAN},"
echo " Blue: Users without console & mounted devs" | sed "s,Blue,${SED_BLUE},"
echo " Green: Common things (users, groups, SUID/SGID, mounts, .sh scripts, cronjobs) " | sed "s,Green,${SED_GREEN},"
@@ -514,4 +514,4 @@ else
HOMESEARCH="$HOME $HOMESEARCH"
fi
fi
GREPHOMESEARCH=$(echo "$HOMESEARCH" | sed 's/ *$//g' | tr " " "|") #Remove ending spaces before putting "|"
GREPHOMESEARCH=$(echo "$HOMESEARCH" | sed 's/ *$//g' | tr " " "|") #Remove ending spaces before putting "|"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# Title: Variables - EnvVarsRed
# ID: EnvVarsRed
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 26-05-2025
# Description: Useless env vars
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $EnvVarsRed
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
EnvVarsRed="[pP][aA][sS][sS][wW]|[aA][pP][iI][kK][eE][yY]|[aA][pP][iI][_][kK][eE][yY]|KRB5CCNAME|[aA][pP][iI][_][kK][eE][yY]|[aA][wW][sS]|[aA][zZ][uU][rR][eE]|[gG][cC][pP]|[aA][pP][iI]|[sS][eE][cC][rR][eE][tT]|[sS][qQ][lL]|[dD][aA][tT][aA][bB][aA][sS][eE]|[tT][oO][kK][eE][nN]"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# Title: Variables - NoEnvVars
# ID: NoEnvVars
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 26-05-2025
# Description: Useless env vars
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used:
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $NoEnvVars
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
NoEnvVars="LESS_TERMCAP|JOURNAL_STREAM|XDG_SESSION|DBUS_SESSION|systemd\/sessions|systemd_exec|MEMORY_PRESSURE_WATCH|RELEVANT*|FIND*|^VERSION=|dbuslistG|mygroups|ldsoconfdG|pwd_inside_history|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Precise|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Trusty|kernelDCW_Ubuntu_Xenial|kernelDCW_Rhel|^sudovB=|^rootcommon=|^mounted=|^mountG=|^notmounted=|^mountpermsB=|^mountpermsG=|^kernelB=|^C=|^RED=|^GREEN=|^Y=|^B=|^NC=|TIMEOUT=|groupsB=|groupsVB=|knw_grps=|sidG|sidB=|sidVB=|sidVB2=|sudoB=|sudoG=|sudoVB=|timersG=|capsB=|notExtensions=|Wfolders=|writeB=|writeVB=|_usrs=|compiler=|LS_COLORS=|pathshG=|notBackup=|processesDump|processesB|commonrootdirs|USEFUL_SOFTWARE|PSTORAGE_|^PATH=|^INVOCATION_ID=|^WATCHDOG_PID=|^LISTEN_PID="

View File

@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@
# Small linpeas: 1
capsB="=ep|cap_chown|cap_former|cap_setfcap|cap_dac_override|cap_dac_read_search|cap_setuid|cap_setgid|cap_kill|cap_net_bind_service|cap_net_raw|cap_net_admin|cap_sys_admin|cap_sys_ptrace|cap_sys_module"
capsB="=ep|cap_chown|cap_fowner|cap_fsetid|cap_setpcap|cap_setfcap|cap_dac_override|cap_dac_read_search|cap_setuid|cap_setgid|cap_kill|cap_net_bind_service|cap_net_raw|cap_net_admin|cap_sys_admin|cap_sys_ptrace|cap_sys_module|cap_sys_rawio|cap_bpf|cap_perfmon"

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ cap_sys_ptrace:python \
cap_sys_module:kmod|python \
cap_dac_override:python|vim \
cap_chown:chown|python \
cap_former:chown|python \
cap_fowner:chown|python \
cap_setfcap:python|perl|ruby|php|node|lua|bash \
cap_setpcap:python|perl|ruby|php|node|lua|bash \
cap_setuid:peass{CAP_SETUID_HERE} \
cap_setgid:peass{CAP_SETGID_HERE} \
cap_net_raw:python|tcpdump"
cap_net_raw:python|tcpdump|dumpcap|tcpflow"

View File

@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ pwd_in_variables7="MAILGUN_APIKEY|MAILGUN_API_KEY|MAILGUN_DOMAIN|MAILGUN_PRIV_KE
pwd_in_variables8="OKTA_OAUTH2_ISSUER|OMISE_KEY|OMISE_PKEY|OMISE_PUBKEY|OMISE_SKEY|ONESIGNAL_API_KEY|ONESIGNAL_USER_AUTH_KEY|OPENWHISK_KEY|OPEN_WHISK_KEY|OSSRH_PASS|OSSRH_SECRET|OSSRH_USER|OS_AUTH_URL|OS_PROJECT_NAME|OS_TENANT_ID|OS_TENANT_NAME|PAGERDUTY_APIKEY|PAGERDUTY_ESCALATION_POLICY_ID|PAGERDUTY_FROM_USER|PAGERDUTY_PRIORITY_ID|PAGERDUTY_SERVICE_ID|PANTHEON_SITE|PARSE_APP_ID|PARSE_JS_KEY|PAYPAL_CLIENT_ID|PAYPAL_CLIENT_SECRET|PERCY_TOKEN|PERSONAL_KEY|PERSONAL_SECRET|PG_DATABASE|PG_HOST|PLACES_APIKEY|PLACES_API_KEY|PLACES_APPID|PLACES_APPLICATION_ID|PLOTLY_APIKEY|POSTGRESQL_DB|POSTGRESQL_PASS|POSTGRES_ENV_POSTGRES_DB|POSTGRES_ENV_POSTGRES_USER|POSTGRES_PORT|PREBUILD_AUTH|PROD.ACCESS.KEY.ID|PROD.SECRET.KEY|PROD_BASE_URL_RUNSCOPE|PROJECT_CONFIG|PUBLISH_KEY|PUBLISH_SECRET|PUSHOVER_TOKEN|PUSHOVER_USER|PYPI_PASSOWRD|QUIP_TOKEN|RABBITMQ_SERVER_ADDR|REDISCLOUD_URL|REDIS_STUNNEL_URLS|REFRESH_TOKEN|RELEASE_GH_TOKEN|RELEASE_TOKEN|remoteUserToShareTravis|REPORTING_WEBDAV_URL|REPORTING_WEBDAV_USER|repoToken|REST_API_KEY|RINKEBY_PRIVATE_KEY|ROPSTEN_PRIVATE_KEY|route53_access_key_id|RTD_KEY_PASS|RTD_STORE_PASS|RUBYGEMS_AUTH_TOKEN|s3_access_key|S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID|S3_BUCKET_NAME_APP_LOGS|S3_BUCKET_NAME_ASSETS|S3_KEY"
pwd_in_variables9="S3_KEY_APP_LOGS|S3_KEY_ASSETS|S3_PHOTO_BUCKET|S3_SECRET_APP_LOGS|S3_SECRET_ASSETS|S3_SECRET_KEY|S3_USER_ID|S3_USER_SECRET|SACLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN|SACLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET|SACLOUD_API|SALESFORCE_BULK_TEST_SECURITY_TOKEN|SANDBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN|SANDBOX_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID|SANDBOX_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|SANDBOX_LOCATION_ID|SAUCE_ACCESS_KEY|SECRETACCESSKEY|SECRETKEY|SECRET_0|SECRET_10|SECRET_11|SECRET_1|SECRET_2|SECRET_3|SECRET_4|SECRET_5|SECRET_6|SECRET_7|SECRET_8|SECRET_9|SECRET_KEY_BASE|SEGMENT_API_KEY|SELION_SELENIUM_SAUCELAB_GRID_CONFIG_FILE|SELION_SELENIUM_USE_SAUCELAB_GRID|SENDGRID|SENDGRID_API_KEY|SENDGRID_FROM_ADDRESS|SENDGRID_KEY|SENDGRID_USER|SENDWITHUS_KEY|SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN|SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SECRET|SES_ACCESS_KEY|SES_SECRET_KEY|setDstAccessKey|setDstSecretKey|setSecretKey|SIGNING_KEY|SIGNING_KEY_SECRET|SIGNING_KEY_SID|SNOOWRAP_CLIENT_SECRET|SNOOWRAP_REDIRECT_URI|SNOOWRAP_REFRESH_TOKEN|SNOOWRAP_USER_AGENT|SNYK_API_TOKEN|SNYK_ORG_ID|SNYK_TOKEN|SOCRATA_APP_TOKEN|SOCRATA_USER|SONAR_ORGANIZATION_KEY|SONAR_PROJECT_KEY|SONAR_TOKEN|SONATYPE_GPG_KEY_NAME|SONATYPE_GPG_PASSPHRASE|SONATYPE_PASSSONATYPE_TOKEN_USER|SONATYPE_USER|SOUNDCLOUD_CLIENT_ID|SOUNDCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET|SPACES_ACCESS_KEY_ID|SPACES_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
pwd_in_variables10="SPA_CLIENT_ID|SPOTIFY_API_ACCESS_TOKEN|SPOTIFY_API_CLIENT_ID|SPOTIFY_API_CLIENT_SECRET|sqsAccessKey|sqsSecretKey|SRCCLR_API_TOKEN|SSHPASS|SSMTP_CONFIG|STARSHIP_ACCOUNT_SID|STARSHIP_AUTH_TOKEN|STAR_TEST_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID|STAR_TEST_BUCKET|STAR_TEST_LOCATION|STAR_TEST_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|STORMPATH_API_KEY_ID|STORMPATH_API_KEY_SECRET|STRIPE_PRIVATE|STRIPE_PUBLIC|STRIP_PUBLISHABLE_KEY|STRIP_SECRET_KEY|SURGE_LOGIN|SURGE_TOKEN|SVN_PASS|SVN_USER|TESCO_API_KEY|THERA_OSS_ACCESS_ID|THERA_OSS_ACCESS_KEY|TRAVIS_ACCESS_TOKEN|TRAVIS_API_TOKEN|TRAVIS_COM_TOKEN|TRAVIS_E2E_TOKEN|TRAVIS_GH_TOKEN|TRAVIS_PULL_REQUEST|TRAVIS_SECURE_ENV_VARS|TRAVIS_TOKEN|TREX_CLIENT_ORGURL|TREX_CLIENT_TOKEN|TREX_OKTA_CLIENT_ORGURL|TREX_OKTA_CLIENT_TOKEN|TWILIO_ACCOUNT_ID|TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID|TWILIO_API_KEY|TWILIO_API_SECRET|TWILIO_CHAT_ACCOUNT_API_SERVICE|TWILIO_CONFIGURATION_SID|TWILIO_SID|TWILIO_TOKEN|TWITTEROAUTHACCESSSECRET|TWITTEROAUTHACCESSTOKEN|TWITTER_CONSUMER_KEY|TWITTER_CONSUMER_SECRET|UNITY_SERIAL|URBAN_KEY|URBAN_MASTER_SECRET|URBAN_SECRET|userTravis|USER_ASSETS_ACCESS_KEY_ID|USER_ASSETS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID|VAULT_PATH|VIP_GITHUB_BUILD_REPO_DEPLOY_KEY|VIP_GITHUB_DEPLOY_KEY|VIP_GITHUB_DEPLOY_KEY_PASS"
pwd_in_variables11="VIRUSTOTAL_APIKEY|VISUAL_RECOGNITION_API_KEY|V_SFDC_CLIENT_ID|V_SFDC_CLIENT_SECRET|WAKATIME_API_KEY|WAKATIME_PROJECT|WATSON_CLIENT|WATSON_CONVERSATION_WORKSPACE|WATSON_DEVICE|WATSON_DEVICE_TOPIC|WATSON_TEAM_ID|WATSON_TOPIC|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_2|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_3|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_4|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_5|WIDGET_FB_USER|WIDGET_FB_USER_2|WIDGET_FB_USER_3|WIDGET_TEST_SERVERWORDPRESS_DB_USER|WORKSPACE_ID|WPJM_PHPUNIT_GOOGLE_GEOCODE_API_KEY|WPT_DB_HOST|WPT_DB_NAME|WPT_DB_USER|WPT_PREPARE_DIR|WPT_REPORT_API_KEY|WPT_SSH_CONNECT|WPT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_BASE64|YANGSHUN_GH_TOKEN|YT_ACCOUNT_CHANNEL_ID|YT_ACCOUNT_CLIENT_ID|YT_ACCOUNT_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_ACCOUNT_REFRESH_TOKEN|YT_API_KEY|YT_CLIENT_ID|YT_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_PARTNER_CHANNEL_ID|YT_PARTNER_CLIENT_ID|YT_PARTNER_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_PARTNER_ID|YT_PARTNER_REFRESH_TOKEN|YT_SERVER_API_KEY|ZHULIANG_GH_TOKEN|ZOPIM_ACCOUNT_KEY"
pwd_in_variables11="VIRUSTOTAL_APIKEY|VISUAL_RECOGNITION_API_KEY|V_SFDC_CLIENT_ID|V_SFDC_CLIENT_SECRET|WAKATIME_API_KEY|WAKATIME_PROJECT|WATSON_CLIENT|WATSON_CONVERSATION_WORKSPACE|WATSON_DEVICE|WATSON_DEVICE_TOPIC|WATSON_TEAM_ID|WATSON_TOPIC|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_2|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_3|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_4|WIDGET_BASIC_USER_5|WIDGET_FB_USER|WIDGET_FB_USER_2|WIDGET_FB_USER_3|WIDGET_TEST_SERVERWORDPRESS_DB_USER|WORKSPACE_ID|WPJM_PHPUNIT_GOOGLE_GEOCODE_API_KEY|WPT_DB_HOST|WPT_DB_NAME|WPT_DB_USER|WPT_PREPARE_DIR|WPT_REPORT_API_KEY|WPT_SSH_CONNECT|WPT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_BASE64|YANGSHUN_GH_TOKEN|YT_ACCOUNT_CHANNEL_ID|YT_ACCOUNT_CLIENT_ID|YT_ACCOUNT_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_ACCOUNT_REFRESH_TOKEN|YT_API_KEY|YT_CLIENT_ID|YT_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_PARTNER_CHANNEL_ID|YT_PARTNER_CLIENT_ID|YT_PARTNER_CLIENT_SECRET|YT_PARTNER_ID|YT_PARTNER_REFRESH_TOKEN|YT_SERVER_API_KEY|ZHULIANG_GH_TOKEN|ZOPIM_ACCOUNT_KEY|USERNAME|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIALS?"

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@@ -15,6 +15,5 @@
sidG1="/abuild-sudo$|/accton$|/allocate$|/ARDAgent$|/arping$|/atq$|/atrm$|/authpf$|/authpf-noip$|/authopen$|/batch$|/bbsuid$|/bsd-write$|/btsockstat$|/bwrap$|/cacaocsc$|/camel-lock-helper-1.2$|/ccreds_validate$|/cdrw$|/chage$|/check-foreground-console$|/chrome-sandbox$|/chsh$|/cons.saver$|/crontab$|/ct$|/cu$|/dbus-daemon-launch-helper$|/deallocate$|/desktop-create-kmenu$|/dma$|/dma-mbox-create$|/dmcrypt-get-device$|/doas$|/dotlockfile$|/dotlock.mailutils$|/dtaction$|/dtfile$|/eject$|/execabrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache$|/execdbus-daemon-launch-helper$|/execdma-mbox-create$|/execlockspool$|/execlogin_chpass$|/execlogin_lchpass$|/execlogin_passwd$|/execssh-keysign$|/execulog-helper$|/exim4|/expiry$|/fdformat$|/fstat$|/fusermount$|/fusermount3$"
sidG2="/gnome-pty-helper$|/glines$|/gnibbles$|/gnobots2$|/gnome-suspend$|/gnometris$|/gnomine$|/gnotski$|/gnotravex$|/gpasswd$|/gpg$|/gpio$|/gtali|/.hal-mtab-lock$|/helper$|/imapd$|/inndstart$|/kismet_cap_nrf_51822$|/kismet_cap_nxp_kw41z$|/kismet_cap_ti_cc_2531$|/kismet_cap_ti_cc_2540$|/kismet_cap_ubertooth_one$|/kismet_capture$|/kismet_cap_linux_bluetooth$|/kismet_cap_linux_wifi$|/kismet_cap_nrf_mousejack$|/ksu$|/list_devices$|/load_osxfuse$|/locate$|/lock$|/lockdev$|/lockfile$|/login_activ$|/login_crypto$|/login_radius$|/login_skey$|/login_snk$|/login_token$|/login_yubikey$|/lpc$|/lpd$|/lpd-port$|/lppasswd$|/lpq$|/lpr$|/lprm$|/lpset$|/lxc-user-nic$|/mahjongg$|/mail-lock$|/mailq$|/mail-touchlock$|/mail-unlock$|/mksnap_ffs$|/mlocate$|/mlock$|/mount$|/mount.cifs$|/mount.ecryptfs_private$|/mount.nfs$|/mount.nfs4$|/mount_osxfuse$|/mtr$|/mutt_dotlock$"
sidG3="/ncsa_auth$|/netpr$|/netkit-rcp$|/netkit-rlogin$|/netkit-rsh$|/netreport$|/netstat$|/newgidmap$|/newtask$|/newuidmap$|/nvmmctl$|/opieinfo$|/opiepasswd$|/pam_auth$|/pam_extrausers_chkpwd$|/pam_timestamp_check$|/pamverifier$|/pfexec$|/ping$|/ping6$|/pmconfig$|/pmap$|/polkit-agent-helper-1$|/polkit-explicit-grant-helper$|/polkit-grant-helper$|/polkit-grant-helper-pam$|/polkit-read-auth-helper$|/polkit-resolve-exe-helper$|/polkit-revoke-helper$|/polkit-set-default-helper$|/postdrop$|/postqueue$|/poweroff$|/ppp$|/procmail$|/pstat$|/pt_chmod$|/pwdb_chkpwd$|/quota$|/rcmd|/remote.unknown$|/rlogin$|/rmformat$|/rnews$|/run-mailcap$|/sacadm$|/same-gnome$|screen.real$|/security_authtrampoline$|/sendmail.sendmail$|/shutdown$|/skeyaudit$|/skeyinfo$|/skeyinit$|/sliplogin|/slocate$|/smbmnt$|/smbumount$|/smpatch$|/smtpctl$|/sperl5.8.8$|/ssh-agent$|/ssh-keysign$|/staprun$|/startinnfeed$|/stclient$|/su$|/suexec$|/sys-suspend$|/sysstat$|/systat$"
sidG3="/ncsa_auth$|/netpr$|/netkit-rcp$|/netkit-rlogin$|/netkit-rsh$|/netreport$|/netstat$|/newgidmap$|/newtask$|/newuidmap$|/nvmmctl$|/opieinfo$|/opiepasswd$|/pam_auth$|/pam_extrausers_chkpwd$|/pam_timestamp_check$|/pamverifier$|/pfexec$|/hping3$|/ping$|/ping6$|/pmconfig$|/pmap$|/polkit-agent-helper-1$|/polkit-explicit-grant-helper$|/polkit-grant-helper$|/polkit-grant-helper-pam$|/polkit-read-auth-helper$|/polkit-resolve-exe-helper$|/polkit-revoke-helper$|/polkit-set-default-helper$|/postdrop$|/postqueue$|/poweroff$|/ppp$|/procmail$|/pstat$|/pt_chmod$|/pwdb_chkpwd$|/quota$|/rcmd|/remote.unknown$|/rlogin$|/rmformat$|/rnews$|/run-mailcap$|/sacadm$|/same-gnome$|screen.real$|/security_authtrampoline$|/sendmail.sendmail$|/shutdown$|/skeyaudit$|/skeyinfo$|/skeyinit$|/sliplogin|/slocate$|/smbmnt$|/smbumount$|/smpatch$|/smtpctl$|/sperl5.8.8$|/ssh-agent$|/ssh-keysign$|/staprun$|/startinnfeed$|/stclient$|/su$|/suexec$|/sys-suspend$|/sysstat$|/systat$"
sidG4="/telnetlogin$|/timedc$|/tip$|/top$|/traceroute6$|/traceroute6.iputils$|/trpt$|/tsoldtlabel$|/tsoljdslabel$|/tsolxagent$|/ufsdump$|/ufsrestore$|/ulog-helper$|/umount.cifs$|/umount.nfs$|/umount.nfs4$|/unix_chkpwd$|/uptime$|/userhelper$|/userisdnctl$|/usernetctl$|/utempter$|/utmp_update$|/uucico$|/uuglist$|/uuidd$|/uuname$|/uusched$|/uustat$|/uux$|/uuxqt$|/VBoxHeadless$|/VBoxNetAdpCtl$|/VBoxNetDHCP$|/VBoxNetNAT$|/VBoxSDL$|/VBoxVolInfo$|/VirtualBoxVM$|/vmstat$|/vmware-authd$|/vmware-user-suid-wrapper$|/vmware-vmx$|/vmware-vmx-debug$|/vmware-vmx-stats$|/vncserver-x11$|/volrmmount$|/w$|/wall$|/whodo$|/write$|/X$|/Xorg.wrap$|/Xsun$|/Xvnc$|/yppasswd$"

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@@ -12,5 +12,4 @@
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
sudoB="$(whoami)|ALL:ALL|ALL : ALL|ALL|env_keep|NOPASSWD|SETENV|/apache2|/cryptsetup|/mount"
sudoB="$(whoami)|ALL:ALL|ALL : ALL|ALL|env_keep|NOPASSWD|SETENV|/apache2|/cryptsetup|/mount|/restic|/usermod|/sbin/ldconfig|/usr/sbin/ldconfig|ldconfig -f|--password-command|--password-file|-o ProxyCommand|-o PreferredAuthentications"

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@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@
# Small linpeas: 1
sudoVB1=" \*|env_keep\W*\+=.*LD_PRELOAD|env_keep\W*\+=.*LD_LIBRARY_PATH|peass{SUDOVB1_HERE}"
sudoVB2="peass{SUDOVB2_HERE}"
sudoVB1=" \*|env_keep\W*\+=.*LD_PRELOAD|env_keep\W*\+=.*LD_LIBRARY_PATH|env_keep\W*\+=.*BASH_ENV|env_keep\W*\+=.* ENV|env_keep\W*\+=.*PATH|!env_reset|!requiretty|peass{SUDOVB1_HERE}"
sudoVB2="peass{SUDOVB2_HERE}"

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Title: Variables - sudovB
# ID: sudovB
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Last Update: 04-10-2025
# Description: Sudo version bad regex
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@
# Small linpeas: 1
sudovB="[01].[012345678].[0-9]+|1.9.[01234][^0-9]|1.9.[01234]$|1.9.5p1"
sudovB="[01].[012345678].[0-9]+|1.9.[01234][^0-9]|1.9.[01234]$|1.9.5p1|1\.9\.[6-9]|1\.9\.1[0-7]"

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@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@
# Small linpeas: 1
writeVB="/etc/anacrontab|/etc/apt/apt.conf.d|/etc/bash.bashrc|/etc/bash_completion|/etc/bash_completion.d/|/etc/cron|/etc/environment|/etc/environment.d/|/etc/group|/etc/incron.d/|/etc/init|/etc/ld.so.conf.d/|/etc/master.passwd|/etc/passwd|/etc/profile.d/|/etc/profile|/etc/rc.d|/etc/shadow|/etc/skey/|/etc/sudoers|/etc/sudoers.d/|/etc/supervisor/conf.d/|/etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf|/etc/systemd|/etc/sys|/lib/systemd|/etc/update-motd.d/|/root/.ssh/|/run/systemd|/usr/lib/cron/tabs/|/usr/lib/systemd|/systemd/system|/var/db/yubikey/|/var/spool/anacron|/var/spool/cron/crontabs|"$(echo $PATH 2>/dev/null | sed 's/:\.:/:/g' | sed 's/:\.$//g' | sed 's/^\.://g' | sed 's/:/$|^/g') #Add Path but remove simple dot in PATH
writeVB="/etc/anacrontab|/etc/apt/apt.conf.d|/etc/bash.bashrc|/etc/bash_completion|/etc/bash_completion.d/|/etc/cron|/etc/environment|/etc/environment.d/|/etc/group|/etc/incron.d/|/etc/init|/etc/ld.so.conf.d/|/etc/ld.so.preload|/etc/master.passwd|/etc/passwd|/etc/profile.d/|/etc/profile|/etc/rc.d|/etc/shadow|/etc/skey/|/etc/sudoers|/etc/sudoers.d/|/etc/supervisor/conf.d/|/etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf|/etc/systemd|/etc/sys|/lib/systemd|/etc/update-motd.d/|/root/.ssh/|/run/systemd|/usr/lib/cron/tabs/|/usr/lib/systemd|/systemd/system|/var/db/yubikey/|/var/spool/anacron|/var/spool/cron/crontabs|"$(echo $PATH 2>/dev/null | sed 's/:\.:/:/g' | sed 's/:\.$//g' | sed 's/^\.://g' | sed 's/:/$|^/g') #Add Path but remove simple dot in PATH

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@@ -292,9 +292,12 @@ class LinpeasBaseBuilder:
all_module_paths += self.enumerate_directory(LINPEAS_PARTS["variables"])
for module in LINPEAS_PARTS["modules"]:
exclude = False
for ex_module in exclude_modules:
if ex_module in module["folder_path"] or ex_module in [module["name"], module["name_check"]]:
continue
exclude = True
break
if exclude: continue
all_module_paths += self.enumerate_directory(module["folder_path"])
for module in all_module_paths:

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@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
for orig_url in urls:
tar_gz_bin_name = ""
if ",,," in orig_url:
tar_gz_bin_name = url.split(",,,")[1]
tar_gz_bin_name = orig_url.split(",,,")[1]
url = orig_url.split(",,,")[0]
else:
url = orig_url
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
suidVB, sudoVB, capsVB = self.__get_gtfobins_lists()
assert len(suidVB) > 185, f"Len suidVB is {len(suidVB)}"
assert len(sudoVB) > 250, f"Len sudo is {len(sudoVB)}"
assert len(capsVB) > 10, f"Len suidVB is {len(capsVB)}"
assert len(capsVB) > 2, f"Len capsVB is {len(capsVB)}"
self.__replace_mark(SUIDVB1_MARKUP, suidVB[:int(len(suidVB)/2)], "|")
self.__replace_mark(SUIDVB2_MARKUP, suidVB[int(len(suidVB)/2):], "|")
@@ -348,8 +348,25 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
return bin_b64
def __get_gtfobins_lists(self) -> tuple:
r = requests.get("https://github.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/tree/master/_gtfobins")
bins = re.findall(r'_gtfobins/([a-zA-Z0-9_ \-]+).md', r.text)
bins = []
api_url = "https://api.github.com/repos/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/contents/_gtfobins?per_page=100"
while api_url:
r = requests.get(api_url, timeout=10)
if not r.ok:
break
data = r.json()
for entry in data:
if entry.get("type") == "file" and entry.get("name"):
bins.append(entry["name"])
api_url = None
link = r.headers.get("Link", "")
for part in link.split(","):
if 'rel="next"' in part:
api_url = part.split(";")[0].strip().strip("<>")
break
if not bins:
r = requests.get("https://github.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/tree/master/_gtfobins", timeout=10)
bins = re.findall(r'_gtfobins/([a-zA-Z0-9_ \-]+)(?:\\.md)?', r.text)
sudoVB = []
suidVB = []
@@ -357,12 +374,12 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
for b in bins:
try:
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}.md", timeout=5)
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}", timeout=5)
except:
try:
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}.md", timeout=5)
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}", timeout=5)
except:
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}.md", timeout=5)
rb = requests.get(f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/master/_gtfobins/{b}", timeout=5)
if "sudo:" in rb.text:
if len(b) <= 3:
sudoVB.append("[^a-zA-Z0-9]"+b+"$") # Less false possitives applied to small names
@@ -388,7 +405,7 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
name = entry["name"]
caseinsensitive = entry.get("caseinsensitive", False)
regex = entry["regex"]
regex = regex.replace('"', '\\"').strip()
regex = regex.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"').strip()
falsePositives = entry.get("falsePositives", False)
if falsePositives:
@@ -402,9 +419,9 @@ class LinpeasBuilder:
def __replace_mark(self, mark: str, find_calls: list, join_char: str):
"""Substitude the markup with the actual code"""
self.linpeas_sh = self.linpeas_sh.replace(mark, join_char.join(find_calls)) #New line char is't needed
"""Substitute the markup with the actual code"""
self.linpeas_sh = self.linpeas_sh.replace(mark, join_char.join(find_calls)) #New line char isn't needed
def write_linpeas(self, path):
"""Write on disk the final linpeas"""

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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from .yamlGlobals import (
class LinpeasModule:
def __init__(self, path):
self.path = path
real_path = os.path.realpath(path)
with open(path, 'r') as file:
self.module_text = file.read()
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ class LinpeasModule:
self.section_info = {}
if not (self.is_base or self.is_function or self.is_variable):
for module in LINPEAS_PARTS["modules"]:
if module["folder_path"] in path:
if os.path.realpath(module["folder_path"]) in real_path:
self.section_info = module
self.is_check = True
break

9558
linPEAS/linpeas_fat.sh Normal file

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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
class LinpeasBuilderTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
self.linpeas_dir = self.repo_root / "linPEAS"
def _run_builder(self, args, output_path):
cmd = ["python3", "-m", "builder.linpeas_builder"] + args + ["--output", str(output_path)]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(self.linpeas_dir), capture_output=True, text=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise AssertionError(
f"linpeas_builder failed:\nstdout:\n{result.stdout}\nstderr:\n{result.stderr}"
)
def test_small_build_creates_executable(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
output_path = Path(tmpdir) / "linpeas_small.sh"
self._run_builder(["--small"], output_path)
self.assertTrue(output_path.exists(), "linpeas_small.sh was not created.")
mode = output_path.stat().st_mode
self.assertTrue(mode & stat.S_IXUSR, "linpeas_small.sh is not executable.")
def test_include_exclude_modules(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
output_path = Path(tmpdir) / "linpeas_include.sh"
self._run_builder(["--include", "system_information,container", "--exclude", "container"], output_path)
content = output_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
self.assertIn("Operative system", content)
self.assertNotIn("Am I Containered?", content)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
import re
import sys
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
class LinpeasModulesMetadataTests(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
cls.linpeas_dir = cls.repo_root / "linPEAS"
cls.parts_dir = cls.linpeas_dir / "builder" / "linpeas_parts"
# Ensure `import builder.*` works when tests are run from repo root.
sys.path.insert(0, str(cls.linpeas_dir))
from builder.src.linpeasModule import LinpeasModule # pylint: disable=import-error
cls.LinpeasModule = LinpeasModule
def _iter_module_files(self):
return sorted(self.parts_dir.rglob("*.sh"))
def test_all_modules_parse(self):
module_files = self._iter_module_files()
self.assertGreater(len(module_files), 0, "No linPEAS module files were found.")
# Parsing a module validates its metadata and dependencies.
for path in module_files:
_ = self.LinpeasModule(str(path))
def test_check_module_id_matches_filename(self):
for path in self._iter_module_files():
module = self.LinpeasModule(str(path))
if not getattr(module, "is_check", False):
continue
# For checks, the filename (without numeric prefix) must match the module ID
# (either full ID or stripping section prefix like `SI_`).
file_base = re.sub(r"^[0-9]+_", "", path.stem)
module_id = getattr(module, "id", "")
module_id_tail = module_id[3:] if len(module_id) >= 3 else ""
self.assertIn(
file_base,
{module_id, module_id_tail},
f"Module ID mismatch in {path}: id={module_id} expected suffix={file_base}",
)
def test_module_ids_are_unique(self):
ids = []
for path in self._iter_module_files():
module = self.LinpeasModule(str(path))
ids.append(getattr(module, "id", ""))
duplicates = {x for x in ids if x and ids.count(x) > 1}
self.assertEqual(set(), duplicates, f"Duplicate module IDs found: {sorted(duplicates)}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

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@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ class MetasploitModule < Msf::Post
if datastore['CUSTOM_URL'] != ""
url_peass = datastore['CUSTOM_URL']
else
url_peass = datastore['WINPEASS'] ? "https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEASany_ofs.exe" : "https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh"
url_peass = datastore['WINPEASS'].to_s.strip.downcase == 'true' ? "https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEASany_ofs.exe" : "https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh"
end
# If URL is set, check if it is a valid URL or local file
if url_peass.include?("http://") || url_peass.include?("https://")

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@@ -106,8 +106,6 @@ def parse_line(line: str):
global FINAL_JSON, C_SECTION, C_MAIN_SECTION, C_2_SECTION, C_3_SECTION
if "Cron jobs" in line:
a=1
if is_section(line, TITLE1_PATTERN):
title = parse_title(line)
@@ -129,7 +127,9 @@ def parse_line(line: str):
elif is_section(line, INFO_PATTERN):
title = parse_title(line)
C_SECTION["infos"].append(title)
if C_SECTION == {}:
return
C_SECTION.setdefault("infos", []).append(title)
#If here, then it's text
else:
@@ -145,17 +145,26 @@ def parse_line(line: str):
def parse_peass(outputpath: str, jsonpath: str = ""):
global OUTPUT_PATH, JSON_PATH
global OUTPUT_PATH, JSON_PATH, FINAL_JSON, C_SECTION, C_MAIN_SECTION, C_2_SECTION, C_3_SECTION
OUTPUT_PATH = outputpath
JSON_PATH = jsonpath
for line in open(OUTPUT_PATH, 'r', encoding="utf8").readlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line or not clean_colors(line): #Remove empty lines or lines just with colors hex
continue
# Reset globals to avoid data leaking between executions
FINAL_JSON = {}
C_SECTION = FINAL_JSON
C_MAIN_SECTION = FINAL_JSON
C_2_SECTION = FINAL_JSON
C_3_SECTION = FINAL_JSON
parse_line(line)
with open(OUTPUT_PATH, 'r', encoding="utf8") as f:
for line in f.readlines():
line = line.strip()
# Remove empty lines or lines containing only color codes
if not line or not clean_colors(line):
continue
parse_line(line)
if JSON_PATH:
with open(JSON_PATH, "w") as f:

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@@ -69,57 +69,62 @@ ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 2
:ListHotFixes
wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | more
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn
) else (
powershell -command "Get-HotFix | Format-Table -AutoSize"
)
set expl=no
for /f "tokens=3-9" %%a in ('systeminfo') do (ECHO."%%a %%b %%c %%d %%e %%f %%g" | findstr /i "2000 XP 2003 2008 vista" && set expl=yes) & (ECHO."%%a %%b %%c %%d %%e %%f %%g" | findstr /i /C:"windows 7" && set expl=yes)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" ECHO. [i] Possible exploits (https://github.com/codingo/OSCP-2/blob/master/Windows/WinPrivCheck.bat)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2592799" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2592799" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS11-080 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: XP/SP3,2K3/SP3-afd.sys)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB3143141" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB3143141" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS16-032 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-secondary logon)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2393802" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2393802" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS11-011 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-WmiTraceMessageVa)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB982799" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB982799" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS10-59 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K8,Vista,7/SP0-Chimichurri)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB979683" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB979683" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS10-21 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP4,XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP0/1/2,7/SP0-Win Kernel)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2305420" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2305420" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS10-092 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K8/SP0/1/2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Task Sched)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB981957" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB981957" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS10-073 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2/2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Keyboard Layout)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB4013081" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB4013081" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS17-017 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-Registry Hive Loading)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB977165" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB977165" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS10-015 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K,XP,2K3,2K8,Vista,7-User Mode to Ring)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB941693" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB941693" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS08-025 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP4,XP/SP2,2K3/SP1/2,2K8/SP0,Vista/SP0/1-win32k.sys)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB920958" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB920958" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS06-049 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP4-ZwQuerySysInfo)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB914389" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB914389" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS06-030 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K,XP/SP2-Mrxsmb.sys)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB908523" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB908523" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS05-055 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP4-APC Data-Free)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB890859" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB890859" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS05-018 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP3/4,XP/SP1/2-CSRSS)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB842526" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB842526" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS04-019 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP2/3/4-Utility Manager)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB835732" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB835732" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS04-011 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP2/3/4,XP/SP0/1-LSASS service BoF)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB841872" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB841872" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS04-020 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K/SP4-POSIX)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2975684" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2975684" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS14-040 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-afd.sys Dangling Pointer)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB3136041" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB3136041" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS16-016 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-WebDAV to Address)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB3057191" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB3057191" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS15-051 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-win32k.sys)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2989935" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2989935" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS14-070 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 2K3/SP2-TCP/IP)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2778930" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2778930" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS13-005 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: Vista,7,8,2008,2008R2,2012,RT-hwnd_broadcast)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2850851" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2850851" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS13-053 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 7SP0/SP1_x86-schlamperei)
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB2870008" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn 2>nul | findstr /C:"KB2870008" 1>NUL
IF "%expl%" == "yes" IF errorlevel 1 ECHO.MS13-081 patch is NOT installed! (Vulns: 7SP0/SP1_x86-track_popup_menu)
ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 2
@@ -197,7 +202,12 @@ CALL :T_Progress 1
:AVSettings
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m Registered Anti-Virus(AV)"
WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List | more
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List
) else (
powershell -command "Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/SecurityCenter2 -ClassName AntiVirusProduct | Select-Object -ExpandProperty displayName"
)
ECHO.Checking for defender whitelisted PATHS
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths" 2>nul
CALL :T_Progress 1
@@ -226,7 +236,12 @@ CALL :T_Progress 3
:MountedDisks
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m MOUNTED DISKS"
ECHO. [i] Maybe you find something interesting
(wmic logicaldisk get caption 2>nul | more) || (fsutil fsinfo drives 2>nul)
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
wmic logicaldisk get caption
) else (
fsutil fsinfo drives
)
ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 1
@@ -273,15 +288,29 @@ tasklist /SVC
ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 2
ECHO. [i] Checking file permissions of running processes (File backdooring - maybe the same files start automatically when Administrator logs in)
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('ECHO.%%x') do (
icacls "%%z" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full ^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('ECHO.%%x') do (
icacls "%%z" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
)
)
) else (
for /f "tokens=*" %%x in ('powershell -command "Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Path -and $_.Path -notlike '*system32*'} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Path -Unique"') do (
icacls "%%x" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
)
)
ECHO.
ECHO. [i] Checking directory permissions of running processes (DLL injection)
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('ECHO.%%x') do (
icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full ^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('ECHO.%%x') do (
icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
)
) else (
for /f "tokens=*" %%x in ('powershell -command "Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Path -and $_.Path -notlike '*system32*'} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Path -Unique"') do (
for /f "delims=" %%d in ("%%~dpx") do icacls "%%d" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && ECHO.
)
)
ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 3
@@ -376,7 +405,7 @@ CALL :T_Progress 1
:BasicUserInfo
CALL :ColorLine "%E%32m[*]%E%97m BASIC USER INFO
ECHO. [i] Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebbugPrivilege
ECHO. [i] Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege
ECHO. [?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users--groups
ECHO.
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m CURRENT USER"
@@ -452,8 +481,19 @@ ECHO.
:ServiceBinaryPermissions
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m SERVICE BINARY PERMISSIONS WITH WMIC and ICACLS"
ECHO. [?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%a in ('cmd.exe /c wmic service list full ^| findstr /i "pathname" ^|findstr /i /v "system32"') do (
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%b in ("%%a") do icacls "%%b" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos usuarios %username%" && ECHO.
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%a in ('cmd.exe /c wmic service list full ^| findstr /i "pathname" ^|findstr /i /v "system32"') do (
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%b in ("%%a") do icacls "%%b" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos usuarios %username%" && ECHO.
)
) else (
for /f "tokens=*" %%a in ('powershell -command "Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Service | Where-Object {$_.PathName -and $_.PathName -notlike '*system32*'} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty PathName"') do (
for /f "tokens=1 delims= " %%b in ("%%a") do (
set "svcpath=%%b"
set "svcpath=!svcpath:~1,-1!"
if exist "!svcpath!" icacls "!svcpath!" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos usuarios %username%" && ECHO.
)
)
)
ECHO.
CALL :T_Progress 1
@@ -628,16 +668,29 @@ if "%long%" == "true" (
ECHO.
ECHO. [i] Iterating through the drives
ECHO.
for /f %%x in ('wmic logicaldisk get name^| more') do (
set tdrive=%%x
if "!tdrive:~1,2!" == ":" (
%%x
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES THAT CONTAINS THE WORD PASSWORD WITH EXTENSION: .xml .ini .txt *.cfg *.config"
findstr /s/n/m/i password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.cfg *.config 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\AppData\\Local \\WinSxS ApnDatabase.xml \\UEV\\InboxTemplates \\Microsoft.Windows.Cloud \\Notepad\+\+\\ vmware cortana alphabet \\7-zip\\" 2>nul
ECHO.
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES WHOSE NAME CONTAINS THE WORD PASS CRED or .config not inside \Windows\"
dir /s/b *pass* == *cred* == *.config* == *.cfg 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\windows\\"
ECHO.
where wmic >nul 2>&1
if !errorlevel! equ 0 (
for /f %%x in ('wmic logicaldisk get name') do (
set tdrive=%%x
if "!tdrive:~1,2!" == ":" (
%%x
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES THAT CONTAINS THE WORD PASSWORD WITH EXTENSION: .xml .ini .txt *.cfg *.config"
findstr /s/n/m/i password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.cfg *.config 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\AppData\\Local \\WinSxS ApnDatabase.xml \\UEV\\InboxTemplates \\Microsoft.Windows.Cloud \\Notepad\+\+\\ vmware cortana alphabet \\7-zip\\" 2>nul
ECHO.
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES WHOSE NAME CONTAINS THE WORD PASS CRED or .config not inside \Windows\"
dir /s/b *pass* == *cred* == *.config* == *.cfg 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\windows\\"
ECHO.
)
)
) else (
for /f %%x in ('powershell -command "Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | Where-Object {$_.Root -match ':'} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Name"') do (
%%x:
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES THAT CONTAINS THE WORD PASSWORD WITH EXTENSION: .xml .ini .txt *.cfg *.config"
findstr /s/n/m/i password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.cfg *.config 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\AppData\\Local \\WinSxS ApnDatabase.xml \\UEV\\InboxTemplates \\Microsoft.Windows.Cloud \\Notepad\+\+\\ vmware cortana alphabet \\7-zip\\" 2>nul
ECHO.
CALL :ColorLine " %E%33m[+]%E%97m FILES WHOSE NAME CONTAINS THE WORD PASS CRED or .config not inside \Windows\"
dir /s/b *pass* == *cred* == *.config* == *.cfg 2>nul | findstr /v /i "\\windows\\"
ECHO.
)
)
CALL :T_Progress 2
@@ -654,7 +707,8 @@ EXIT /B
:SetOnce
REM :: ANSI escape character is set once below - for ColorLine Subroutine
SET "E=0x1B["
for /F %%a in ('echo prompt $E ^| cmd') do set "ESC=%%a"
SET "E=%ESC%["
SET "PercentageTrack=0"
EXIT /B
@@ -666,5 +720,5 @@ EXIT /B
:ColorLine
SET "CurrentLine=%~1"
FOR /F "delims=" %%A IN ('FORFILES.EXE /P %~dp0 /M %~nx0 /C "CMD /C ECHO.!CurrentLine!"') DO ECHO.%%A
ECHO.!CurrentLine!
EXIT /B

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.16)
project(winPEAS_dotnet NONE)
set(PROJECT_FILE "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/winPEAS.csproj")
find_program(DOTNET_EXECUTABLE dotnet)
find_program(MSBUILD_EXECUTABLE msbuild)
find_program(XBUILD_EXECUTABLE xbuild)
if(DOTNET_EXECUTABLE)
set(BUILD_TOOL "${DOTNET_EXECUTABLE}")
set(BUILD_ARGS build "${PROJECT_FILE}" -c Release)
elseif(MSBUILD_EXECUTABLE)
set(BUILD_TOOL "${MSBUILD_EXECUTABLE}")
set(BUILD_ARGS "${PROJECT_FILE}" /p:Configuration=Release)
elseif(XBUILD_EXECUTABLE)
set(BUILD_TOOL "${XBUILD_EXECUTABLE}")
set(BUILD_ARGS "${PROJECT_FILE}" /p:Configuration=Release)
else()
message(FATAL_ERROR "dotnet, msbuild, or xbuild is required to build winPEAS")
endif()
add_custom_target(winpeas ALL
COMMAND ${BUILD_TOOL} ${BUILD_ARGS}
WORKING_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}"
)

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ $url = "https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEASany
# One liner to download and execute winPEASany from memory in a PS shell
$wp=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]](Invoke-WebRequest "$url" -UseBasicParsing | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Content)); [winPEAS.Program]::Main("")
# The cprevios cmd in 2 lines
# The previous cmd in 2 lines
$wp=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]](Invoke-WebRequest "$url" -UseBasicParsing | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Content));
[winPEAS.Program]::Main("") #Put inside the quotes the winpeas parameters you want to use
@@ -74,10 +74,16 @@ winpeas.exe -lolbas #Execute also additional LOLBAS search check
The goal of this project is to search for possible **Privilege Escalation Paths** in Windows environments.
New in this version:
- Detect potential GPO abuse by flagging writable SYSVOL paths for GPOs applied to the current host and by highlighting membership in the "Group Policy Creator Owners" group.
- Flag installed OEM utilities such as ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and Razer Synapse 4, highlighting writable updater folders and world-accessible pipes tied to recent CVEs.
It should take only a **few seconds** to execute almost all the checks and **some seconds/minutes during the lasts checks searching for known filenames** that could contain passwords (the time depened on the number of files in your home folder). By default only **some** filenames that could contain credentials are searched, you can use the **searchall** parameter to search all the list (this could will add some minutes).
The tool is based on **[SeatBelt](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt)**.
## Where are my COLORS?!?!?!
The **ouput will be colored** using **ansi** colors. If you are executing `winpeas.exe` **from a Windows console**, you need to set a registry value to see the colors (and open a new CMD):
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ Once you have installed and activated it you need to:
- **System Information**
- [x] Basic System info information
- [x] Use Watson to search for vulnerabilities
- [x] Use WES-NG to search for vulnerabilities
- [x] Enumerate Microsoft updates
- [x] PS, Audit, WEF and LAPS Settings
- [x] LSA protection
@@ -140,6 +146,7 @@ Once you have installed and activated it you need to:
- [x] Applocker Configuration & bypass suggestions
- [x] Printers
- [x] Named Pipes
- [x] Named Pipe ACL abuse candidates
- [x] AMSI Providers
- [x] SysMon
- [x] .NET Versions
@@ -204,7 +211,7 @@ Once you have installed and activated it you need to:
- [x] SCCM
- [x] Security Package Credentials
- [x] AlwaysInstallElevated
- [x] WSUS
- [x] WSUS (HTTP downgrade + CVE-2025-59287 exposure)
- **Browser Information**
- [x] Firefox DBs
@@ -255,7 +262,7 @@ Once you have installed and activated it you need to:
## TODO
- Add more checks
- Mantain updated Watson (last JAN 2021)
- Maintain updated WES-NG
If you want to help with any of this, you can do it using **[github issues](https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/issues)** or you can submit a pull request.

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Text.RegularExpressions" publicKeyToken="b03f5f7f11d50a3a" culture="neutral" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-4.1.1.0" newVersion="4.1.1.0" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-4.1.0.0" newVersion="4.1.0.0" />
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Linq" publicKeyToken="b03f5f7f11d50a3a" culture="neutral" />

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
using System;
using System.Reflection;
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
namespace winPEAS.Tests
{
[TestClass]
public class ArgumentParsingTests
{
private static bool InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid(string arg)
{
var method = typeof(winPEAS.Checks.Checks).GetMethod("IsNetworkTypeValid", BindingFlags.NonPublic | BindingFlags.Static);
Assert.IsNotNull(method, "IsNetworkTypeValid method not found.");
return (bool)method.Invoke(null, new object[] { arg });
}
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldAcceptValidNetworkTypes()
{
Assert.IsTrue(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=auto"));
Assert.IsTrue(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=10.10.10.10"));
Assert.IsTrue(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=10.10.10.10/24"));
Assert.IsTrue(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=10.10.10.10,10.10.10.20"));
}
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldRejectInvalidNetworkTypes()
{
Assert.IsFalse(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network="));
Assert.IsFalse(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=10.10.10.999"));
Assert.IsFalse(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=10.10.10.10/64"));
Assert.IsFalse(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=999.999.999.999/24"));
Assert.IsFalse(InvokeIsNetworkTypeValid("-network=not-an-ip"));
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
using System;
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
namespace winPEAS.Tests
{
[TestClass]
public class ChecksArgumentEdgeCasesTests
{
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldNotThrowOnEmptyLogFileArg()
{
// Should return early with a user-friendly error, not crash.
Program.Main(new[] { "log=" });
}
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldNotThrowOnPortsWithoutNetwork()
{
// Should warn and return early because -network was not provided.
Program.Main(new[] { "-ports=80,443" });
}
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldNotThrowOnInvalidNetworkArgument()
{
// Should warn and return early because the IP is invalid.
Program.Main(new[] { "-network=10.10.10.999" });
}
[TestMethod]
public void ShouldNotThrowOnEmptyNetworkArgument()
{
// Should warn and return early because the value is empty.
Program.Main(new[] { "-network=" });
}
}
}

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
<package id="System.Runtime.Numerics" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />
<package id="System.Text.Encoding" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />
<package id="System.Text.Encoding.Extensions" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />
<package id="System.Text.RegularExpressions" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" requireReinstallation="true" />
<package id="System.Text.RegularExpressions" version="4.3.1" targetFramework="net48" />
<package id="System.Threading" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />
<package id="System.Threading.Tasks" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />
<package id="System.Threading.Timer" version="4.3.0" targetFramework="net452" />

View File

@@ -61,9 +61,11 @@
</Reference>
<Reference Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestPlatform.TestFramework, Version=14.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, processorArchitecture=MSIL">
<HintPath>..\packages\MSTest.TestFramework.2.2.5\lib\net45\Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestPlatform.TestFramework.dll</HintPath>
<Private>True</Private>
</Reference>
<Reference Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestPlatform.TestFramework.Extensions, Version=14.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, processorArchitecture=MSIL">
<HintPath>..\packages\MSTest.TestFramework.2.2.5\lib\net45\Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestPlatform.TestFramework.Extensions.dll</HintPath>
<Private>True</Private>
</Reference>
<Reference Include="System" />
<Reference Include="System.ComponentModel.Composition" />
@@ -83,6 +85,10 @@
<Reference Include="System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation, Version=4.0.1.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, processorArchitecture=MSIL">
<HintPath>..\packages\System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation.4.3.0\lib\net45\System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation.dll</HintPath>
</Reference>
<Reference Include="System.Text.RegularExpressions, Version=4.1.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a">
<HintPath>..\packages\System.Text.RegularExpressions.4.3.1\lib\net463\System.Text.RegularExpressions.dll</HintPath>
<Private>True</Private>
</Reference>
<Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" />
<Reference Include="System.Data.DataSetExtensions" />
<Reference Include="Microsoft.CSharp" />
@@ -91,6 +97,7 @@
<Reference Include="System.Xml" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<Compile Include="ArgumentParsingTests.cs" />
<Compile Include="Properties\AssemblyInfo.cs" />
<Compile Include="SmokeTests.cs" />
</ItemGroup>
@@ -104,6 +111,40 @@
<Name>winPEAS</Name>
</ProjectReference>
</ItemGroup>
<Target Name="CopyVSTestFrameworkToMSTestAdapter" AfterTargets="Build">
<PropertyGroup>
<_PackagesDir>$(MSBuildThisFileDirectory)..\packages\</_PackagesDir>
<_MSTestFrameworkDir>$(_PackagesDir)MSTest.TestFramework.2.2.5\lib\net45\</_MSTestFrameworkDir>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup Condition="Exists('$(_MSTestFrameworkDir)')">
<_VSTestFrameworkDlls Include="$(_MSTestFrameworkDir)Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestPlatform.TestFramework*.dll" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<_VSTestCopyDirs Include="$(TargetDir)" Condition="'$(TargetDir)' != '' AND Exists('$(TargetDir)')" />
<_MSTestAdapterDirs Include="$(_PackagesDir)MSTest.TestAdapter.2.2.5\build\net45\" Condition="Exists('$(_PackagesDir)MSTest.TestAdapter.2.2.5\build\net45\')" />
<_MSTestAdapterDirs Include="$(_PackagesDir)MSTest.TestAdapter.2.2.5\build\_common\" Condition="Exists('$(_PackagesDir)MSTest.TestAdapter.2.2.5\build\_common\')" />
</ItemGroup>
<Message
Condition="@(_VSTestFrameworkDlls) != ''"
Importance="high"
Text="CopyVSTestFrameworkToMSTestAdapter: copying @( _VSTestFrameworkDlls )" />
<Copy
Condition="@(_VSTestFrameworkDlls) != '' AND @(_VSTestCopyDirs) != ''"
SourceFiles="@(_VSTestFrameworkDlls)"
DestinationFolder="%(_VSTestCopyDirs.Identity)"
SkipUnchangedFiles="true" />
<Copy
Condition="@(_VSTestFrameworkDlls) != '' AND @(_MSTestAdapterDirs) != ''"
SourceFiles="@(_VSTestFrameworkDlls)"
DestinationFolder="%(_MSTestAdapterDirs.Identity)"
SkipUnchangedFiles="true" />
</Target>
<Import Project="$(MSBuildToolsPath)\Microsoft.CSharp.targets" />
<Target Name="EnsureNuGetPackageBuildImports" BeforeTargets="PrepareForBuild">
<PropertyGroup>
@@ -129,4 +170,4 @@
<Import Project="..\packages\Stub.System.Data.SQLite.Core.NetFramework.1.0.119.0\build\net451\Stub.System.Data.SQLite.Core.NetFramework.targets" Condition="Exists('..\packages\Stub.System.Data.SQLite.Core.NetFramework.1.0.119.0\build\net451\Stub.System.Data.SQLite.Core.NetFramework.targets')" />
<Import Project="..\packages\Fody.6.5.5\build\Fody.targets" Condition="Exists('..\packages\Fody.6.5.5\build\Fody.targets')" />
<Import Project="..\packages\Costura.Fody.5.7.0\build\Costura.Fody.targets" Condition="Exists('..\packages\Costura.Fody.5.7.0\build\Costura.Fody.targets')" />
</Project>
</Project>

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="Microsoft.Bcl.AsyncInterfaces" publicKeyToken="cc7b13ffcd2ddd51" culture="neutral" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-8.0.0.0" newVersion="8.0.0.0" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-9.0.0.1" newVersion="9.0.0.1" />
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="Microsoft.Win32.Primitives" publicKeyToken="b03f5f7f11d50a3a" culture="neutral" />
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Text.Encodings.Web" publicKeyToken="cc7b13ffcd2ddd51" culture="neutral" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-8.0.0.0" newVersion="8.0.0.0" />
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="0.0.0.0-9.0.0.1" newVersion="9.0.0.1" />
</dependentAssembly>
<dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Text.RegularExpressions" publicKeyToken="b03f5f7f11d50a3a" culture="neutral" />

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -88,10 +88,13 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
new SystemCheck("userinfo", new UserInfo()),
new SystemCheck("processinfo", new ProcessInfo()),
new SystemCheck("servicesinfo", new ServicesInfo()),
new SystemCheck("soapclientinfo", new SoapClientInfo()),
new SystemCheck("applicationsinfo", new ApplicationsInfo()),
new SystemCheck("networkinfo", new NetworkInfo()),
new SystemCheck("activedirectoryinfo", new ActiveDirectoryInfo()),
new SystemCheck("cloudinfo", new CloudInfo()),
new SystemCheck("windowscreds", new WindowsCreds()),
new SystemCheck("registryinfo", new RegistryInfo()),
new SystemCheck("browserinfo", new BrowserInfo()),
new SystemCheck("filesinfo", new FilesInfo()),
new SystemCheck("fileanalysis", new FileAnalysis()),
@@ -353,7 +356,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
var rangeParts = networkType.Split('/');
if (rangeParts.Length == 2 && int.TryParse(rangeParts[1], out int res) && res <= 32 && res >= 0)
if (rangeParts.Length == 2 && IPAddress.TryParse(rangeParts[0], out _) && int.TryParse(rangeParts[1], out int res) && res <= 32 && res >= 0)
{
return true;
}

View File

@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
foreach (string regHkcu in passRegHkcu)
{
Beaprint.DictPrint(RegistryHelper.GetRegValues("HKLM", regHkcu), false);
Beaprint.DictPrint(RegistryHelper.GetRegValues("HKCU", regHkcu), false);
}
foreach (string regHklm in passRegHklm)
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("Looking for documents --limit 100--");
List<string> docFiles = InterestingFiles.InterestingFiles.ListUsersDocs();
Beaprint.ListPrint(docFiles.GetRange(0, docFiles.Count <= 100 ? docFiles.Count : 100));
Beaprint.ListPrint(MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(docFiles, 100));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
if (recFiles.Count != 0)
{
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> recF in recFiles.GetRange(0, recFiles.Count <= 70 ? recFiles.Count : 70))
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> recF in MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(recFiles, 70))
{
Beaprint.AnsiPrint(" " + recF["Target"] + "(" + recF["Accessed"] + ")", colorF);
}

View File

@@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
Beaprint.MainPrint("DNS cached --limit 70--");
Beaprint.GrayPrint(string.Format(" {0,-38}{1,-38}{2}", "Entry", "Name", "Data"));
List<Dictionary<string, string>> DNScache = NetworkInfoHelper.GetDNSCache();
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> entry in DNScache.GetRange(0,
DNScache.Count <= 70 ? DNScache.Count : 70))
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> entry in MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(DNScache, 70))
{
Console.WriteLine($" {entry["Entry"],-38}{entry["Name"],-38}{entry["Data"]}");
}
@@ -512,7 +511,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
}
else if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(resolutionInfo.Error))
{
Beaprint.BadPrint($" {resolutionInfo.Error}");
Beaprint.PrintException($" {resolutionInfo.Error}");
}
}
catch (Exception ex)

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