Compare commits

...

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Carlos Polop
c5a77725db Fix Systemd module generated vars metadata 2026-02-03 23:51:27 +01:00
Carlos Polop
04c0b8aab3 f 2026-02-03 18:11:07 +01:00
SirBroccoli
a6c0491438 Auto-merge PR #578 (Codex)
Co-authored-by: HackTricks PEASS Autoimprover <peass-autoimprover@hacktricks.xyz>
2026-01-31 12:54:24 +00:00
SirBroccoli
fce28d2b81 Auto-merge PR #579 (Codex)
* autoimprover: simplify linpeas checks

* Fix CI failures for PR #579

---------

Co-authored-by: HackTricks PEASS Autoimprover <peass-autoimprover@hacktricks.xyz>
Co-authored-by: codex-action <codex-action@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-31 12:54:18 +00:00
Carlos Polop
fcc78b919a Fix Codex workflow gh usage 2026-01-31 13:19:50 +01:00
Martin Frandel
29d350fa79 Fixed binding error (#577)
Co-authored-by: Martin <git@frandel.eu>
2026-01-29 00:55:42 +01:00
8 changed files with 54 additions and 73 deletions

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Resolve PR context
id: gate
env:
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
pr_number="${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number }}"

View File

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
gh api -X POST -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
/repos/${{ github.repository }}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/labels \
-f labels='["codex-fix-attempted"]'
-f labels[]=codex-fix-attempted
- name: Checkout PR head
uses: actions/checkout@v5

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,33 @@
# Functions Used: echo_not_found, print_2title, print_list, warn_exec
# Global Variables:
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $ASLR, $hypervisorflag, $detectedvirt, $unpriv_userns_clone, $perf_event_paranoid, $mmap_min_addr, $ptrace_scope, $dmesg_restrict, $kptr_restrict, $unpriv_bpf_disabled, $protected_symlinks, $protected_hardlinks
# Generated Global Variables: $ASLR, $hypervisorflag, $detectedvirt, $unpriv_userns_clone, $perf_event_paranoid, $mmap_min_addr, $ptrace_scope, $dmesg_restrict, $kptr_restrict, $unpriv_bpf_disabled, $protected_symlinks, $protected_hardlinks, $label, $sysctl_path, $sysctl_var, $zero_color, $nonzero_color, $sysctl_value
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 0
print_sysctl_eq_zero() {
local label="$1"
local sysctl_path="$2"
local sysctl_var="$3"
local zero_color="$4"
local nonzero_color="$5"
local sysctl_value
print_list "$label" "$NC"
sysctl_value=$(cat "$sysctl_path" 2>/dev/null)
eval "$sysctl_var=\$sysctl_value"
if [ -z "$sysctl_value" ]; then
echo_not_found "$sysctl_path"
else
if [ "$sysctl_value" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${zero_color},"
else
echo "$sysctl_value" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${nonzero_color},g"
fi
fi
}
#-- SY) AppArmor
print_2title "Protections"
print_list "AppArmor enabled? .............. "$NC
@@ -81,67 +103,25 @@ print_list "User namespace? ................ "$NC
if [ "$(cat /proc/self/uid_map 2>/dev/null)" ]; then echo "enabled" | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"; else echo "disabled" | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED},"; fi
#-- SY) Unprivileged user namespaces
print_list "unpriv_userns_clone? ........... "$NC
unpriv_userns_clone=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$unpriv_userns_clone" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone"
else
if [ "$unpriv_userns_clone" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_GREEN},"; else echo "$unpriv_userns_clone" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "unpriv_userns_clone? ........... " "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone" "unpriv_userns_clone" "$SED_GREEN" "$SED_RED"
#-- SY) Unprivileged eBPF
print_list "unpriv_bpf_disabled? ........... "$NC
unpriv_bpf_disabled=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$unpriv_bpf_disabled" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled"
else
if [ "$unpriv_bpf_disabled" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$unpriv_bpf_disabled" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "unpriv_bpf_disabled? ........... " "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled" "unpriv_bpf_disabled" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
#-- SY) cgroup2
print_list "Cgroup2 enabled? ............... "$NC
([ "$(grep cgroup2 /proc/filesystems 2>/dev/null)" ] && echo "enabled" || echo "disabled") | sed "s,disabled,${SED_RED}," | sed "s,enabled,${SED_GREEN},"
#-- SY) Kernel hardening sysctls
print_list "kptr_restrict? ................. "$NC
kptr_restrict=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$kptr_restrict" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict"
else
if [ "$kptr_restrict" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$kptr_restrict" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "kptr_restrict? ................. " "/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict" "kptr_restrict" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "dmesg_restrict? ................ "$NC
dmesg_restrict=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$dmesg_restrict" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict"
else
if [ "$dmesg_restrict" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$dmesg_restrict" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "dmesg_restrict? ................ " "/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict" "dmesg_restrict" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "ptrace_scope? .................. "$NC
ptrace_scope=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$ptrace_scope" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope"
else
if [ "$ptrace_scope" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$ptrace_scope" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "ptrace_scope? .................. " "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope" "ptrace_scope" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "protected_symlinks? ............ "$NC
protected_symlinks=$(cat /proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$protected_symlinks" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks"
else
if [ "$protected_symlinks" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$protected_symlinks" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "protected_symlinks? ............ " "/proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks" "protected_symlinks" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "protected_hardlinks? ........... "$NC
protected_hardlinks=$(cat /proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$protected_hardlinks" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks"
else
if [ "$protected_hardlinks" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$protected_hardlinks" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "protected_hardlinks? ........... " "/proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks" "protected_hardlinks" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "perf_event_paranoid? ........... "$NC
perf_event_paranoid=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 2>/dev/null)
@@ -151,13 +131,7 @@ else
if [ "$perf_event_paranoid" -le 1 ]; then echo "$perf_event_paranoid" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"; else echo "$perf_event_paranoid" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_list "mmap_min_addr? ................. "$NC
mmap_min_addr=$(cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$mmap_min_addr" ]; then
echo_not_found "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr"
else
if [ "$mmap_min_addr" -eq 0 ]; then echo "0" | sed -${E} "s,0,${SED_RED},"; else echo "$mmap_min_addr" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_GREEN},g"; fi
fi
print_sysctl_eq_zero "mmap_min_addr? ................. " "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr" "mmap_min_addr" "$SED_RED" "$SED_GREEN"
print_list "lockdown mode? ................. "$NC
if [ -f "/sys/kernel/security/lockdown" ]; then

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
# Functions Used: print_2title, print_list, echo_not_found
# Global Variables: $SEARCH_IN_FOLDER, $Wfolders, $SED_RED, $SED_RED_YELLOW, $NC
# Initial Functions:
# Generated Global Variables: $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH, $line, $service, $file, $version, $user, $caps, $path, $path_line, $service_file, $exec_line, $cmd
# Generated Global Variables: $WRITABLESYSTEMDPATH, $line, $service, $file, $version, $user, $caps, $path, $path_line, $service_file, $exec_line, $exec_value, $cmd, $cmd_path
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -116,18 +116,20 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
# Check ExecStart paths
grep -E "ExecStart|ExecStartPre|ExecStartPost" "$service_file" 2>/dev/null |
while read -r exec_line; do
# Extract the first word after ExecStart* as the command
cmd=$(echo "$exec_line" | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '"')
# Extract the rest as arguments
args=$(echo "$exec_line" | awk '{$1=$2=""; print $0}' | tr -d '"')
# Extract command from the right side of Exec*=, not from argv
exec_value="${exec_line#*=}"
exec_value=$(echo "$exec_value" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//')
cmd=$(echo "$exec_value" | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '"')
# Strip systemd command prefixes (-, @, :, +, !) before path checks
cmd_path=$(echo "$cmd" | sed -E 's/^[-@:+!]+//')
# Only check the command path, not arguments
if [ -n "$cmd" ] && [ -w "$cmd" ]; then
echo "$service: $cmd (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
if [ -n "$cmd_path" ] && [ -w "$cmd_path" ]; then
echo "$service: $cmd_path (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
# Check for relative paths only in the command, not arguments
if [ -n "$cmd" ] && [ "${cmd#/}" = "$cmd" ] && ! echo "$cmd" | grep -qE '^-|^--'; then
echo "$service: Uses relative path '$cmd' (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
if [ -n "$cmd_path" ] && [ "${cmd_path#/}" = "$cmd_path" ] && [ "${cmd_path#\$}" = "$cmd_path" ]; then
echo "$service: Uses relative path '$cmd_path' (from $exec_line)" | sed -${E} "s,.*,${SED_RED},g"
fi
done
fi
@@ -153,4 +155,4 @@ if ! [ "$SEARCH_IN_FOLDER" ]; then
fi
echo ""
fi
fi

View File

@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("Looking for documents --limit 100--");
List<string> docFiles = InterestingFiles.InterestingFiles.ListUsersDocs();
Beaprint.ListPrint(docFiles.GetRange(0, docFiles.Count <= 100 ? docFiles.Count : 100));
Beaprint.ListPrint(MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(docFiles, 100));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
if (recFiles.Count != 0)
{
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> recF in recFiles.GetRange(0, recFiles.Count <= 70 ? recFiles.Count : 70))
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> recF in MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(recFiles, 70))
{
Beaprint.AnsiPrint(" " + recF["Target"] + "(" + recF["Accessed"] + ")", colorF);
}

View File

@@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
Beaprint.MainPrint("DNS cached --limit 70--");
Beaprint.GrayPrint(string.Format(" {0,-38}{1,-38}{2}", "Entry", "Name", "Data"));
List<Dictionary<string, string>> DNScache = NetworkInfoHelper.GetDNSCache();
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> entry in DNScache.GetRange(0,
DNScache.Count <= 70 ? DNScache.Count : 70))
foreach (Dictionary<string, string> entry in MyUtils.GetLimitedRange(DNScache, 70))
{
Console.WriteLine($" {entry["Entry"],-38}{entry["Name"],-38}{entry["Data"]}");
}

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ namespace winPEAS.Helpers
""); //To get the default object you need to use an empty string
}
public static List<T> GetLimitedRange<T>(List<T> items, int limit)
{
return items.GetRange(0, Math.Min(items.Count, limit));
}
////////////////////////////////////
/////// MISC - Files & Paths ///////
////////////////////////////////////

View File

@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ if ($TimeStamp) { TimeElapsed }
Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| WHOAMI INFO"
Write-Host ""
if ($TimeStamp) { TimeElapsed }
Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| Check Token access here: https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.html#abusing-tokens" -ForegroundColor yellow
Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| Check Token access here: https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.html#abusing-tokens"
Write-Host -ForegroundColor Blue "=========|| Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege"
Write-Host "https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users--groups" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Start-Process whoami.exe -ArgumentList "/all" -Wait -NoNewWindow